The Grand Alliance

The Grand Alliance
Winston Churchill


This is the third in Churchill’s series of which I purchased the original publication of the whole set for fourteen dollars at a used book store in New York City. In this book the reader becomes intimately acquainted with the British experience of WWII during the period between the collapse of France and the alliance with the United States. As Churchill would say, this is the time when we would go it alone. What first catches the readers eye as impressive is how Churchill communicated and held consensus with his people, cabinet, the ministers, the War Council, the Prime Ministers of the British Empire, the Viceroys of India, Israel, Singapore, and Egypt., The Generals of the Home Army, the field Generals of The Mediterranean, North Africa,, India, the Heads of State in the conquered countries, The Heads of State of the free World, and saved time for private dialogue with Franklin Roosevelt, his King majesty, and then saved more time for his wife. I have read books that take a critical attack or a lesser passing swipe at Churchill and can only conclude that they were selfish authors for an audience and mad ( to sound British)at the same time.

I think the real plot of this tale of 1941 – 42 was found with the falling dominoes of Europe. Churchill, though try as he may, could not muster enough to stop Hitler’s advance. It give birth to the Domino Theory of the 1950’s. The book details the strategy of Churchill, and glosses over Hitler’s. You are left with the impression that the German Warmacht (war machine) was the prime strategy. It was indeed a Clawsitezian strategy that worked until the machine of his foe out produced him. So one is puzzled as to why Hitler turned to Russia without first consolidating his gains.

Churchill endeavors to make a case, modest though it may be, that it was his strategy of continuous annoyance in the Mediterranean and in North Africa that simply mesmerized Hitler with British valor and chivalry in the face of certain defeat. Meanwhile was it Hitler’s thinking leave him at bay while he looked East to defeat a people he had nothing but hatred toward? Hitler hated Stalin and was impressed with Churchill. He literally felt that by defeating Russia, Churchill would come to his senses and sue for armistice.

The question becomes was it strategy or failed strategy that prevailed? In the end we now see that it was Churchill that prevailed, but not because of Churchill’s strategy of maneuver but his strategy to hold on long enough for the United States to join in the fight. The strategy that failed was Hitler’s sense of an invincible warmacht that in reality failed him. And likely it was the strategy of the Gods as in winter that really prevailed. The reader eventually becomes aware that Hitler’s failure to formulate a sound alliance with Japan was as much a tribute to failed strategy as was the strategy to keep pressing his warmacht against Russia’s winter. So failure in Stalingrad and Moscow combined with Pearl Harbor brought a formidable opponent for Hitler to deal with. Hitler did not conceive the notion that even though the United States were attacked by Japan the Grand Alliance would hatch the strategy of Germany first. This strategy was first in the mind of Churchill and then through a deep private exchange of letters that found fertile soil in the mind of Roosevelt.

When looking at where a Head of State should have best spent his time, the reader learns that it first belongs to his own people and then international politics. Here is where Churchill excelled. He first built a Home Army and at every step incorporated Captains of industry to run the supply chain to a war machine. Production and supply chain management was that of civilian energy leaving war strategy to the benefiting Generals. In the international front, Churchill first looked to the appropriate Heads of State in each of his dominions. Second, during this time frame he looked to Roosevelt, and finally he spent time with the rest of the world. There became a time where the world was accusing Britain of roping them in to their fight. Then contrast this to Hitler who dictated to first his army through official orders, then his people through the lecture and press, and then the world through his warmacht. It was a battle for the world where Hitler lost it all and Churchill’s world empire saw the dawn of a new world order.

Britain is now an island country as opposed to a country who’s “fertile crescent” ran up the east coast of Africa, spanned the Middle East and then ran back down the Asian contenant to include India, ending up in Australasia. Against the world order pre WWII, contrast the belligerents and bring Japan and Italy in to the fold. Imagine Germany spanning from the English Channel, through the Middle East to Korea. Imagine Japan spanning the South Asia. Would India have been spared? Imagine Italy owning all of Africa. Should the United States have joined that axis, the western hemisphere would be her natural land grab. This was Rudolph Hess’s dream described in its own chapter.

Churchill brings in a chapter of the Rudolph Hess intrigue that leaves the reader with food for thought. How would Hitler’s Germany have handled today’s Muslim problem? Imagine the post two WWII juggernauts of industry owning three quarters of the worlds resources. How would they have dictated world culture? Certainly English would not be the world’s international business language. Certainly capitalistic democracies would not exist. There would be no USSR, China, France, or Britain. (all major votes in the United Nations) Would strict conformity to two basic leaders have brought on a world peace that is today still a dream? Would the United States have been rendered in Splendid Isolation in her western hemisphere? Free from the obligation of the world’s policeman. Free to continue is pursuit of capitalistic democracy, un-encumbered with the pressures of European socialism. Would an isolated Western Hemisphere leaped ahead of a war torn world that would not receive the recovery assistance they received? I only pose these scenarios as a prelude to the question especially to those who make sport of criticizing Churchill: Is Churchill the man or the goat of humanity’s twentieth century? I welcome your answer.

Churchill catch phrases:
• Nemesis personifies “the Goddess of Retribution"' who brings down all immoderate good fortune, checks the presumption that attends it... And is the punisher of extraordinary crimes.
• In somber wars of modern democracy chivalry finds no place. Dull butcheries on a gigantic scale and mass effects overwhelm all detached sentiment.

Below is a bibliography. Notes that influenced my reaction to the book. Integrated with the notes are specific reactions of mine that may be worth reading.

Page 5... We felt free to send over seas all troops... To wage
offensive war in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Here was the
hinge on which our ultimate victory turned.

Page 17.... General Smuts to Prime Minister; The question is whether
Germany can afford to set the Balkans ablaze with Russia in
incalculable factor and Turkey hostile. The Italian defeat in Africa
and Greece, together with the failure of the Gamma Air Force against
Britain, have profoundly changed the position, and German
concentrations may only be intended to pacify the Italians, and to
lure British forces away from Britain, where the main attack has to be
made.

Page 19 Prime Minister to General Wavel. Nothing must hamper
capture of Tobruk, bit there after all operations in Libya are
subordinated to aiding Greece up to he limits prescribed.

Page 21 Prime Minister to General Smuts. Weather, maintains, Danube
crossing, fortified Greek-Bulgarian frontier, all helpful factors.
Turkey, Yugoslavia, Russia, all perhaps favorably influenced by
Evidences of British support of Greece.

Whatever happens in the Balkans, Italian army in Abyssinia probably
destroyable. If this should come off, everything useful from Kenya
should go forward to Mediterranean.

Page 30...if Hitler had been able, with hardly a fight, to bring
Greece to her knees and the whole of the Balkans into his system and
the force Turkey to allow the passage of his armies to the south and
east, might he not have made terms with the Soviets upon the conquest
and partition if these vast regions and postpone his ultimate
inevitable quarrel with them to a late part of his program? Or as
is more likely, would he not have been able to attack Russia in great
strength at am earlier date? The main question which the ensuing
chapters will probe and expose is whether His Majesty's Government by
their action influenced in a decisive or even in an appreciable manner,
Hitler’s movements in Southeast Europe and moreover whether that action
did not produce consequences first upon the behavior of Russia and
next upon her fortunes.

Page 32... The Reich Government believed that this action (troop
movement in the Balkans) was serving Soviet interest as well, which
would be opposed to England's gaining a foothold in these regions.

Page 42. His [Hitler's] optimistic time-table assumed that the Soviets
like the French, would be overthrown in a six-week campaign and that
all German forces would then be free for the final overthrow of
Britain in the autumn of 1941. Meanwhile the obstinate nation was to
be worn down first by the combination of the U-boat blockade sustained
by long range air, and secondly, by air attacks upon her cities and
especially the ports. For the German army "Sea Lion" was replaced by
"Barbarossa". The German Navy was instructed to concentrate on our
Atlantic traffic and the German Air Force on our harbors and their
approaches. This was far a more deadly plan than indiscriminate
bombing of London and the civil population, and it was fortunate
forbid that it was not pursued with all available forces and greater
persistence.

The conquest of Italy in Africa exposed the strategic consequence of
Britain's effort. The reader of 2010 is made aware of the mapping of
world power in the final days of the colonial period that in my
opinion only ended with Vietnam. The chapter was described as a
perquisite though not main thrust at either Italy or Germany. The
prime strategic advantage was the control of the Eastern
Mediterranean. Learning of the collapse of Italy's aspirations of a
larger Roman Empire was added largely as Churchillean historic drama.

My comment: In the chapter on Greece the reader realizes the immediate benefit of the conquest of Italy in Africa and also realizes that this victory was a mere pittance of strategic advantage against a larger and more mature German war machine. The strategy of England and Germany is revealed from a Churchill view. While Churchill clearly knew what England could bring to the table was too little too late, he very much realized the diplomacy required to sway Turkey and Yugoslavia to stand with the allies. Reading this chapter on the heels of the Rudolph Hess chapter this reader at least romanticized the consequence of Hess's view. That being a main land Germany/Europe, an Italian/Rome in north Africa and the English Empire from South Africa up the east coast of that continents, across the Middle East, through India and ending in Austral-Asia with Canada as a kicker. One has to wonder first why Churchill wouldn't have given that serious consideration and more-so why Hitler pursued Soviet Russia as opposed to the Balkans. Clearly the Balkans and Hess's dreams were obtainable. Imagine Germany owning all the oil. It becomes clear that the personalities of both Hitler and Churchill weighed in on the fate of the whole world and millions of lives.

While the above is an impression left on the reader, Churchill makes it very clear the importance of international diplomacy to engage a vacillating Greece, Greece did nit want British help as it was too little too late. Yet Greece needed her help for fear of certainty against a German war machine building in Bulgaria. In the end the English engagement struck the right diplomatic chord but the reader is led to believe that Eastern Europe fate was forestalled only through Hitler's turn northeast to Russia where history tells the rest.

Page 121: again this reader finds evidence of a questionable German
character:

Meanwhile the Hipper [German] had fallen upon a homeward-bound Sierra
Leone convoy near the Azores which had not yet been joined by an
escort. In a savage attack lasting an hour she destroyed seven out of
nineteen ships, making no attempt to rescue survivors, and regained
Brest two days later.

My Comment: One could argue that Hipper left the rescue to the remaining convoy and here may lay German stay of conviction. In my view against the plethora of German atrocity this question is worth probing. One could begin with examining German orders, German SOP, and looking at German code of conduct with the rest of the tonnage they sent to the bottom of the sea.

Page 184: in a minutes document from Ribbentrop to Japan’s Matsuoka
on 27 March 1941 disposition the status of Germany's war, he
concludes:

If, then, we summed up the military situation in Europe we should come
to the conclusion that in the military sphere the Axis was completely
master of Continental Europe. A huge army, practically idle, was at
Germany's command, and could be employed at any time and at any place
the Fuhrer considered necessary.

My comment: Why Russia? Here is the probing with evidence presented by Churchill. There was only a modest resistance in Greece. The victory in Africa was minor and a turn for Germany would throw England back out. Spain could be had by Germany even over reluctance from Franco.

Why did Hitler not work with Japan to first consolidate his position and then second have a formidable alley in Japan to take on his despised Russians from the east while he would consolidated power from the west? This would have knocked out England for sure, without drawing in the United States. I have read elsewhere of Hitler’s deep regard for the English. Was it Hitler's regard that caused refrain
from the finishing blows to England? Or did Hitler despise Bolshevism and Russian Jews so much as to make such a critical strategic mistake? Did the personal views of one man bring the Third Reich to it's knees fir never to be a Forth Reich.

Page 188: [said Matsuoka]. The ideological struggle in Japan was
extremely bitter, but those who were fighting for the restoration of
old ideals were convinced they would finally win. The Anglo-Saxons
represented the greatest hindrance to the establishment of the New
Order. He had to Stalin that after the collapse of the British
Empire the differences between Japan and Russia would be eliminated.
The Anglo-Saxons were the common foe of Japan, Germany, and Soviet
Russia. After some reflection Stalin had stated that Soviet Russia
had never got along with Great Britain and never would.

My comment: if the natural allies were as such, imagine the world
powers today if Hitler had not turned on Russia and Japan had not
attacked Pearl Harbor. Neither of those two strategic made military
sense let alone international sense of power.

Page 200: [Churchill of General Rommel]. In somber wars of modern
democracy chivalry finds no place. Dull butcheries on a gigantic scale
and mass effects overwhelm all detached sentiment. Still, I do not
regret or retract the tribute I paid to Rommel, un fashionable though
it was judged.

My comment: when the reader comes to appreciate the time frame of
decisions being the first six months of 1941, the questions of
Hitler's decision on Russia became influenced by his megalomaniac
illusions of world power. Hitler already had in mind enough power to
easily sweep in through Churchill's back door in North Africa, of
which he did anyway [Tobruk]. This made Greece and the Balkans look easy and afforded the march on Moscow. None the less this was a lot of fast moving
world strategic decisions for any one man. Churchill makes mention of
this and pays tribute to the machine that fed him the information.
Tribute aside the amount of information and decisions made are/were
daunting, while being bombed nightly.

Page 229: of the decision to fight on in Greece Churchill’s position;
I am most reluctant to quit, and if the troops were British only and
the matter decided on military grounds alone, I would urge Wilson to
fight if he thought possible. Anyhow before we commit ourselves to
evacuation the case must be put squarely to the Dinions after
tomorrow's Cabinet. Of course, I do not know the conditions in which
our retreating forces will reach the new key position

My comment: contrast page 229 with the leadership methods of Hitler.
One of deference to Generals in conjunction with consensus of the
Cabinet as opposed to a pure dictator.

Page 233: from April 21 until the end of the evacuation twenty-six
ships were lost by air attack. Twenty-one of these were Greek and
included five hospital ships.

My comment: did German dive bomber pilots know they were bombing
defenseless hospital ships? Of everything I have read to date, I
suspect they knew and indiscriminately bombed away.

Page 265: on a successful Iraq campaign; The Germans, of course, at
a their disposal an airborne force which could have given them at
thus time. Syria, Iraq, and Persia, with their precious oil fields.
Hitler's hand might have reached out very far towards India, and
beyond to Japan. He had chosen, however, as we shall soon see, to
employ and expand his prime air organism in another direction
[Russia]. We often hear military experts inculcate the doctrine of
giving priority to the decisive theater [Clawswitz]. There is a lot
to this. But in war this principal, like all others, is governed by
facts and circumstance, otherwise strategy would be too easy. It
would become a drill book and not an art; it would depend upon rules
and not on an instructed and fortunate judgment of an ever changing
scene. Hitler certainly cast away the opportunity of taking a great
prize for little cost in the Middle East. We in Britain, although
pressed to the extreme, managed with scanty forces to save ourselves
from far reaching or lasting injury.

My comment: this agrees with and at the same time challenges the
American policy of Clawswitz that prevailed in the decision for
Normandy as opposed the Lubjana Gap strategy in Yugoslavia. I
could argue that either location would have been the main thrust of
the war. But who I really see is the prime strategic player was
always Hitler of which all others countered.

Page 301: they [British refugee soldiers] and the Greek soldiers were
succored by the villagers and country folk, who were mercilessly
punished whenever detected. Barbarous reprisals were made upon
innocent or valiant peasants, who were shot by the twenties and
thirties. It was for this reason that I proposed to the Supreme War
Council three years later, in 1944, that local crimes should be
locally judged, and accused persons sent back for trial on the spot.
The principal was accepted, and some outstanding debts were paid.

My comment: Would Germany, winners or losers as they were, have initiated
the same justice? I have come across no evidence that would support
an affirmative answer.

Page 311: [Bismarck's fatal decision ]. She had the choice of
returning home victorious [after sinking the Hood, to repair her
severe oil leak as well], with all the options of further enterprises
open, or going to almost certain destruction. Only the extreme
exaltation of her Admiral or imperious orders by which he was bound
can explain the desperate action which he took.

Page 319: It was the cruiser Dorestshier that delivered the final
blow [to the Bismark] with torpedoes, and at 10:40 the great ship
turned over and foundered. With her perished nearly two thousand
Germans and their Fleet Commander, Admiral Lutjens. One hundred and
ten survivors, exhausted but sullen, were rescued by us. The work of
Mercy was interrupted by the appearance of a U-boat and the British
ships were compelled to withdraw.

My comment: The British had enough ships to sink the U-boat and rescue
the survivors. But they deferred to the humanity of the survivors as a
priority. The difference between Germans and the English.

Page 352: Nemesis personifies “the Goddess of Retribution"' who
brings down all immoderate good fortune, checks the presumption that
attends it... And is the punisher of extraordinary crimes

My comment: of the finest yet obscure Churchillian phrases to mark down and make reference to in moments of vengeance and revenge.

Page 369: [in choosing the lesser of two evils on the eve of
Germany's invasion of the USSR] ... 'I have only one purpose, the
destruction of Hitler, and my life is much simplified thereby. If
Hitler invaded Hell I make at least favorable reference to the Devil
in the House of Commons.'

My comment: a classic Churchill quote though not so well known

My comment: as I read on into Book 3 of this Volume, I'll be looking for the first vestiges of the Domino Theory of Kennen circa 1950s. Was it apparent in Churchill's mind long before Keenen and US international policy.

Page 431 on Sunday morning August 10, Mr Roosevelt came aboard the HMS
Prince of Wales and, with his Staff officers and several hundred
representatives of all ranks of the United States Navy and Marines,
attended Divine Service on the quarterdeck. This service was felt by
us to be a deeply moving expression of the unity in faith if our two
peoples, and none who tool part in it will forget the spectacle
presented that sunlit morning on the crowded quarterdeck - the
symbolism of the Union Jack and the Stars and Stripes side by side.,,,

My comment: You often hear the cliché claim that religion starts wars. This passage exemplifies my rebottle to such comment. Here you find that religion did not start any war but rather it was a common unity found in religion that helped two peoples endure a war. If this were today’s Britain’ Brown and our Obama, would such a ceremony occur?

Page 440:[on positioning with Japan, in the first meeting of Churchill
and Roosevelt of the coast of Newfoundland]. At the end if the Note
which the President will hand to the Japanese Ambassador when he
returns from his cruise in about a week's time he will add the
following passage, which was taken from my draft: "Any further
encroachment by Japan in Southwest Pacific would produce a situation
in which the United States Government would be compelled to take
counter measures, even those might lead to war between the United
Statea and Japan."

My comment: Here you find Churchill manipulating Roosevelt? Was that
Note passed on? Was that Note an invitation to Pearl Harbor? Were we,
Imperialist of the Philippines, accomplices with Great Britain,
Imperialists of Singapore, [claimed in the previous chapter to be more
vital to England that Egypt] in a threat to impede Japan's Imperial
aspirations?

Imagine a world map where Imperial Germany extended across the Middle
East to include all of India and half way across Russia., to meet up
with Imperial Japan, who 40 years earlier was at war with Russia and
now the conquerors of China. Then Italy would own all of Africa. The
Western Hemisphere would today be working as partners with Japan,
Italy, and Germany. The Middle East would be their problem.
Communism and the Cold War with all is ancilary wars including Korea
and Vietnam would have never happened. Russia, China, and England
would NOT be in existance let alone sitting at the top five security
table. How different would our problems be today? Would the be the
same only with different names?

Page 459: [Prime Minister to Monsieur Stalin 4 Sept 41]
We are ready to make joint plans with you now. Whether British
armies will be strong enough to invade the mainland of Europe during
1942 must depend on un foreseeable events. It may be possible however
to assist you in the extreme North when there is more darkness. We
are willing to raise our armies in the Middle East to a strength of
three- quarters of a million before the end of the present year, and
there after to a million by the summer if 1942. Once the German-
Italian forces in Libya have been destroyed, all these forces will be
available to come into line on your southern flank....,

My comment: history shows Stalin requesting a second front to
distract and dilute the German effort on Russia. A year later the
Americans pushed a second for Clawzwitizian reasons. Why a flanking
maneuver from the south after the Allied win back Africa and defeated
Italy was not pursued is yet to be sorted out in this readers mind.
Churchill's vision of 1941 was over run by his Allied partners. We
merely armed The USSR to first survive and then to consolidate her
victory in the counter attack to rule Eastern Europe for 50 years.
Churchill who fought alone for two years found his vision and strategy
stymied by two powers that would build nuclear muddled that would fly
over Churchill’s empire that is reduced to an island country. This was
the humble reward for the man that saved the world firm Hitler.

Page 480: it was clear from their message of August 6 1941 that the
Persians would not meet our wishes regarding the expulsion of German
agents and residents from their country, and that we would have to
resort to force. The next stage was to coordinate our plans,
diplomatic and military with those of the Russians

My comment: this represents why I say that our troubles with Iran
first start with the British. Iranians do not trust the British
because if their oil agenda openly discussed in this chapter of the
book. They equally don’t trust the Russian because of their conquest
aspirations. The prefer the United States yet our association with
Britain over the years has tainted their appreciation for our culture.

Page 583: in 1936 Japan had concluded with Germany the Anti-
Comintern Pact, which was originally negotiated by The Japanese War
Ministry, with Rippentrop representing the Nazi Party behind the backs
of both the then Foreign Ministers. This was not yet an alliance, buy
it provided the basis for one. In the spring of 1939 the Army
Ministers in the Cabinet, headed by Baron Hiranuma, tried to conclude
a full military alliance with Germany. He failed owing to the
opposition of the Navy Minister, Admiral Yonai. In August, 1939,
Japan not only engaged in the war with China which had begun in July,
1937, but was also involved in localized hostilities with Russia about
the boundary between the newly created State if Manchukuo and Outer
Magnolia. Alondra and behind this smoldering front large armies
lay. When, on the eve of European War, Germany made her Non-
Aggression Pact with Russia without consulting or informing Japan, her
Anti-Comintern partner, the Japanese felt with reason that they had
been ill-used. Their dispute with Russia fell into the background,
and Japanese resentment against Germany was strong. British support
and sympathy for China had estranged us from our former ally [Japan]
and during the first few months of the European war our relations with
Japan were already by no means friendly. There us however in Japan
little or no enthusiasm for Germany.

My comment: and there you have a explanation why Japan remained
fundamentally isolated from all World Powers in her quest to become
The World Power

Page 586: the drastic application of economic sanctions in July 1941,
brought to a head the internal crisis I. Japanese

Embargo imposed by Britain, United States, and Holland

Page 628: 5 Jan 42 [Eden to Churchill from Moscow]
...At my first conversation with M. Stalin and M. Molotov on December
16 M. Stalin set out in some detail what he considered should be post
war territorial frontiers in Europe and in particular his ideas of the
treatment of Germany. He proposed the restoration of Austria as an
independent state and the detachment of the Rhineland from Prussia as
an independent state or a protectorate, and possibly the constitution
of an independent State of Bravaria. He also proposed that East
Prussia should be transferred to Poland and the Sudetenland Land
returned to Czechoslovakia. He suggested that Yugoslavia should be
restored, and even receive certain additional territories from Italy;
and that Turkey should receive the Dodeanese, with possible
adjustments in favor of Greece as regards islands in the Aegean
important to Greece. Turkey might also receive certain districts in
Bulgaria, and possibly also in Northern Syria. In general the
occupied including Czechoslovakia and Greece, should be stored to
their pre-war frontiers, and M. Stalin was prepared to support any
special arrangements for securing bases for the United Kingdom in
Western European countries....As regards to the Soviet Union, M Stalin
desired the restoration of the position in 1941, prior to the German
attack in respect to the Baltic States, Finland, and Bessarabia. The
Curzon Line should firm the basis for furrier Soviet-Polish frontier.

My comment: Here you find clear argument in the political
perspective that A dominant powerful USSR would take any land she
could get. And while she was weak willing to make enormous
concessions. Thus our American insistence on a Normandy invasion over
Churchill's Lubjana Gap invasion in Yugoslavia allowed Russia to be
come powerful in Eastern Europe during WWII setting the stage for a
fifty-year Cold War