Showing posts with label Persia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Persia. Show all posts

Sunday, March 15, 2026

Zoroastrians

 Zoroastrians

By Mary Boyce

This is a book about what is said to be the forefather of our great religions, founded by the prophet Zoroaster in very early civilized man. It would be commonly associated with fire worshipers as you would find sacred fires as places of worship. In simple form the fire was to the early man where you gathered for warmth, cooking and where humanity came together. While today the fire may be a symbol of the faith, in its beginning it was much more a practice to bring people together. Zoroaster believed there was a separation of good and evil at creation. How subsequent tenants of this concept transitioned from lessons around a fire to a doctrine still practiced 4000 years later begins with song. Have you ever had a song stuck in your head and you couldn’t get it out? Well it was the Prophet Zoroaster who brought what is believed to be the world’s first religion to humanity through song. In a land where writing had yet to be invented, Zoroaster would have his priests commit to memory the Gatha in song, later to be written down.

This book is an academic account of the tenants of Zoroastrianism from is roots through all its evolutionary changes. With a sense of an archeological dig, the reader becomes aware of not only how the world affected Zoroastrianism but also how this ancient faith in turn influenced the Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim religions. This religion is still alive in corners of the world with strong holds in Tehran, Iran and Bombay, India. In a chronological format the author begins with an overview of the tenets of Zoroaster in the beginning and then pulls them through history capturing the ebb and flow of humanity, giving the reader a sense of before, after and most important the present day pictures of life as a Zoroastrian. I found myself focused on the travesty brought on to this religion by Islam and therefore spend a bit of time dwelling on its relevant bearing on us today.

In the early sections of the book the reader will be introduced to many new terms which may slow down the reading process with words that have no resemblance of English. That is because they are not even close to English sounding words. However spending time to get the cadence and meaning fluent in your mind will make the rest of the book more enjoyable and meaningful. Of the many, I’ve included at the end of this review terms that are critical in terms of understanding and enjoying the book.

If one were to distill all the coda into a practical statement on the merits of Zoroastrianism you could say that Wisdom to see things as they actually are, where Justice is the result of making choices in alignment with reality, and Lying being the fraudulent representation of reality. However history and humanity collude to blur this message. The 21st Century view of Zoroaster’s original tenant must be viewed through a kollidescope and thus provides reasons for debate. You could begin with the lack of the written word, using only the treasures of archeology as only clues to the testament of what was preached left in the symbols found in art. You must also contend with the evolving languages brought on by conquest, dominion and merging of one ruler over another. The effects are found in conquest and merging of cultures where a King could impose an interpretation of preceding doctrine thus imposing a schism in Zoroastrianism similar to what is found between Protestants, Catholics, and Lutherans in our western world.

Since Zoroaster came before the split of the Indo-Iranian culture many of the tenants developed in the beginning had a significant influence over the beliefs, doctrine, and practices, of both the Hindu and the Buddhist people. Against the backdrop of geography and time, we all know that within one language the story takes on at least different colors and many times evokes completely new paths of thought. The next few paragraphs are dedicated to the train to modern day Zoroastrianism. Avestan was the language Zoroaster used in the beginning. This is found in his original Gathas as they were written down long after his death. Pahlavi was the language in the time of the Persian Kings. Sanskrit, albeit equally as old as or older than Pahlavi is the language of India, found it was in prominent doctrine through immigration. The Indo-Iranian split occurred well before Islam, however when Islam forced Zoroastrianism to take refuge tin Bombay, translation from both Avestan and Pahlavi to Sanskrit took on a prominent influence in how we see the Zoroastrian Doctrine today.

With regard to critical deviations from its origins one could look at the Zurvanite split as the most prominent. This occurred under the Achaemenians times of Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes. The Avestan word ‘zurvan’ means ‘time’ and in a few of the younger Avesta it was used as the name of a minor divinity, hypostatizing time. The usage appears to be a very limited concession to Zurvanites who had come to believe that Time, Zurvan, did not merely provide the framework for events but was actually in control of them, hence a sentient being. While this would be considered heresy to Zoroastrians it ended up under the rule of the King of kings as being a sect of Zoroastrianism. Simply stated by Zurvanite’s through the authority of the King of kings, Ahura Mazda created both good and evil, which is contrary to Zoroaster who said he created all things good, and what wasn’t created by Ahura Mazda was evil. One could easily draw the one –v- many parallel story in the division of Eastern Orthodox and Western Christianity.

The Manichaeism deviation took root under the Sasanian kings with the introduction of a man named Mani who was reared under the Semitic influence brought a pessimistic view on life. Since he gained favor of the King of kings he was given license to twist existing Zoroastrian text to give authority to his views. Again the original Zoroaster priest found heresy in his preaching.

The Mazdakite deviation was brought on an ascetic pessimism where the Sasanian kings found common property to include the women of pheasants as slaves for the royalty. This fractured the families practicing the original tenets of Zoroaster as well strained the loyalty the people held towards their king and his religion. As timing would have it, it was against this back drop that Islam raged through Persia.

In 636 (AD) the Muslim Arabs, driven by poverty and religious fervor, had begun to attack the rich lands bordering their deserts. They overran the Byzantine province of Syria, and soon afterwards crossed onto Mesopotamia and met the Iranian imperial Army at Qadisiya. This conquest utterly different from that of Alexander, was carried out in the spirit of Surah 9.29 of the Quran:”Fight those who believe not in God and the Last Day and do not forbid what Allah and his Messengers have forbidden – such men as practice not the religion of truth, being people of the book – until they pay tribute (dhimmi) out of hand and have been humbled” The dhimmi (Zoroastrian who will not convert) has to stand while paying and the officer who receives it sits. The dhimmi has to be made to feel that he is inferior when he pays a strenuous tax.

Against this force of terror the doctrines of Islam in the beginning were attractively simple; and some of the most important – such as belief of heaven and hell, the end of the world, and the Day of Judgment – derived ultimately from Zoroastrianism and were disarmingly familiar. It made the choice of conversion over death or life in oppressed destitute an easy one. At a deeper level conversion meant change from a dualistic faith of justice/injustice and truth, with an accessible to reason, to one which demanded submission to an inscrutable, all-powerful God, whose decrees and purposes were regarded as beyond man’s understanding, rendering one’s access to God dependent on the Umma and a Caliph. Faced with the choice of death or paying tribute or adopting Islam found many adopters yet they had to find a way to make it work for them as Persians which gave birth to Shi ite.

The Shi ite movement grew steadily strong through the eighth century, fostered by propagandists for the house of Abbas, rivals of the Umayyads; and in the end there was open rebellion which led to Abbasid victory in 750. Ex-Zoroastrian converts an generatio once removed denied access to their original faith and language molded Islam to their liking while still being held to the ultimate mandate to convert which helped convert many more people who could now cross over and regain their sense of power. While strains of Zoroaster can be found in Shi ite Islam there exists a fundamental difference in their character, where a Zoroastrian may be found as a person with a positive and constructive outlook on life the opposite may be found in a She ite.

The triumph of Islam over Zoroastrian Persia led to a variation in the Zoroastrian practice where the inhabitants of Pars, thus adopting the name Parsis in Iran sought refuge in what we now know as Bombay. These religious refugees of India thrived in their own right yet still saw minor changes in their doctrine as the result of interpreting Pahlavi to Sanskrit and the comingling of Hidu and Zoroaster people. Over time as the Christians’ encroached on Parsis people prompting more change where as the Irani people stuck under the yoke of Islam in Iran held more closely to the original Avesta in Iran. There are exponentially more Parsis today than there are Iranis.

Today you can find Zoroastrian fires that have been tended for over two thousand years. Many scholars continue to piece the puzzle together causing a continual threat to the original message of Zoroaster. His original simple message was based in reality, “behold the way things are as sacred”. It is founded in truth and justice. It was simple yet humanity, specifically forces beyond themselves, made many attempts to make it dogmatically complicated. By contrast one can observe in Judaism and Christianity went to great length to impose a complicated message of right and wrong. I am no expert on Hindu or Buddhism, however I can say as found in this book more evidence that Islam is a religion of anything but the truth. As a by-standing participant in today’s terroristic acts on free men, I found a very ominous parallel between the times of 636 Persia and today’s western world. Most people are not even aware of Zoroastrianism. Many people think it is now as has always been , a small dark cult lost somewhere in this world. But contrarily it was the religion of the King of kings for over a thousand years for a multitude majority of people, annihilated in the short span of 70 years. Islam’s greed, borne in a sense of superiority equal to that of Hitler’s Aryan Race syndrome, and is now knocking at our door. Former president Bush recognized this. Our  President Obama appears about to let them in.

Terms:
• Ahura Mazda – Ormzad, lord of wisdom who Zoroaster saw as God
• Gathas are the hymns composed by Zoroaster which contain the basic doctrine that was committed to memory by his followers
• Zend Avesta the sacred book of Zoroastrianism
• Vendidad is a book read at night of the Avesta containing the code against demons.
• Dakhma – is the funeral practice of placing the dead body on a high platform for the vultures to eat the flesh. When there were only bones they would be collected and placed in an ossuary. This was out of respect for the earth as they believed the body would contaminate the pure earth.
• Spenta - is an adjective which characterizes the good creation, possessing power to aid.
• The Doctrine of Three Times – Creation, Mixture, Separation – makes history in a sense cyclical, with the world restored in the third time to the perfection it possessed in the first one. Meanwhile all the sorrows and strivings of the present time of Mixture as part of the battle against Angra Mainyu (evil). Thus Zoroaster not only saw a noble purpose for humanity, but also offered men a reasoned explanation for what they have to endure in this life.
• Yasna – is the act of worship. It is the main Zoroastrian service
• 7 Amahragpands – the seven creations are the first being Ahura Mazda and the six lesser beings forming the heptad with Ahura Mazda himself the six are:
o Vohu Manah – Good Purpose
o Asha Vahishta – Best Righteousness
o Spenta Armaitiurvatat - Holy Devotion
o Khshathra Vairya – Desirable Dominion
o Haurvatat – Health
o Ameretat – Long Life
• Saoshyant – is the one who will bring benefit; and it is he who will lead humanity in the last battle against evil. (saviour)

Wednesday, November 2, 2011

Song of Wrath

Song of Wrath
By J.E. Lendon

For those interested in historical trivia, I can save you from reading this book with the following chronicle. From the time of the ‘Age of Heroes’ to 450BC Athens ranked number one. The 30 Year Peace agreement of 450 BC leaves Sparta as number one. The battle of Sphacteria between Athens and Sparta in 425BC signaled a quest for Athens to reclaim hegemony of Greece. Her over reaching and loss, not to Sparta but to Boetea, leaves Athens’s quest an illusive butterfly of illusion. She found supremacy for a brief span of a few years time where inevitably war returned and she eventually lost her grip. Ironically the triumph of Athens over Sparta or vice-versa it never came with terms that held complete sway over all of Greece or the outside world. The lesson learned was it was all in the minds of ego, an ego that was portrayed in this book primarily through the oration of Thucydides.

Comparing Athens-v-Sparta with its 30 Year Peace and USA-v-USSR with its 40 year cold war, finds parallel characteristics. Many proxy wars were waged. With the close of the Athens Sparta drama, Argos gained time and space to reenter the fray for supremacy found in ‘‘TIME’’. With the close of the USA-Soviet drama, the sick old man of Ottoman Empire, seems to have awoke with a bankroll of oil money. In the wake of the fall of the USSR, mankind found room for the resumption of ‘TIME’ to be tested once again between Muslims and the world. Hence we have ominous parallels for any reader of the 21st century.

‘Time’ with an overscore on the 'e' was how the Greeks ranked themselves. It was a measure of their worth. ‘Time’ was thought to give a real, almost physical existence in the world: it could for example be taken by one man from another. It could be captured in war. It was not just a Greek trait. I once heard from my Iranian Muslim friend. “Iranian’s do not want anything more than a seat at the table with world powers”, in essence ‘Time’. He also helped me see that they lost that seat in 646 when Islamic Arabs invaded Persia. The path to war follows these steps: ‘time’, hybris, wrath, revenge. With this undercurrent in the psyche of the Thucydydeian man we find it odd the bloodless way we now write about relations between states and the whitewashed diplomatic language of our ‘time’ have weakened our grasp on the power of emotion and psyche in foreign affairs.

Playing this theme in Lendon's introduction on our current world affairs that pits in my mind Muslim's on a similar path against the West asking the question: does the trail fit the story? If so then would you conclude hybris is at the core of psyche the Muslims or the West? Hybris is defined in this book as the act of essentially thumbing your nose at he who holds ‘time’ over you. Contrarily, it is popular opinion today for Western liberal thought, at least among the Press to acquiesce the allegation of Western hubris, a derivative word. Using Greek thinking, considering the superior standard of living, observing obvious status of Western ‘Time’ or superiority, should not the Muslims be charged with hubris/hybris instead? Evidence of this can be found not in Terrorist agenda, but rather in the Madrassas formulation of the Muslim terrorist psyche. The terrorist's actions are only the result of madrassas rooted in their quest for ‘Time’ where wrath and revenge are their modality.

This book uses the Peloponnesian War, the first ten years, to study foreign policy and statesmanship in examining the causes of war. It is interesting to read that all the States of Greece practiced ‘Time’ in their relationship with each other and as well in their war with Persia. In 570BC Persia was a world leader and was so for 1100 years before surrendering to the Muslim moniker and fall from world leadership. At the time Persians, Zoroastrians by faith, were transformed by Arab Muslims. They assimilated to the Muslims, yet to come to terms with their loss of their Zoroastrian faith they made a diversion and founded the Shiite schism sect of Islam. That schism is as deep today as it was 1600 years ago. Its depths are as great as the schism between Islam and the West. Like the ominous parallel of the Peloponnesian era where Argos stood on the sidelines, Shia and Sunni have still to find their place in ‘Time’ with each other. As a western strategy; is now the time to be engaging them?

With history as an answer, after ten years of war where Athens had the upper hand over Sparta who was not without victory, the belligerents came to a truce. The truce was born not in what victories were inflicted on each other or any slim advantage one side might have, but for the mitigation of risk of losing control over those they once mastered. Athens feared revolt from within her colonies. Sparta feared a loss of her allies. The truce and following alliance made Athens the victor without surrender. Athens' goal was to prove equal to Sparta. Sparta's goal was to prove her superiority. Truce being equated to a draw left Athens a shallow but meaningful victory in Greek terms. That victory was short lived. For within a few years after, inter-state intrigue found Athens an ally of Argos and Sparta an ally of Persia where a sound and thorough defeat was Athens' fate.

In conclusion a reader of this book may be found thinking the following. Look around the world for ‘Time’. Look at India – Pakistan, North -South Korea, Japan- China of the 1930s, France –Germany, dormant at the moment, every North American Indian tribe pre European conquest of North America. This book alludes to that character in “Time” vested in society as a root to war. Its symptoms are civil unrest, either through oppression or through economic stress. Thucydides points out: "Civil strife- stasis is the Greek word - has a fearful dynamic of it's own. Whatever it spark, civil strife burns high and soon consumes within it all the forms of division between men, giving license to wickedness under the cover of party and enforcing by a principle of tit-for-tat escalation to ever more fearful methods. When a person looks to another as superior in any way they might respect that person, but underneath their ego gives way to fear driven hybris of which carries through to wrath and finally vengeance. Is there a deed or a characteristic that he who holds ‘time’ can bestow on the rest those who may be prone to hybris to end the cycle of war? My only answer is transcending ‘time’

Below is my bibliography with nested notes. The last note in particular is worth reading. While I look to find a lesson in all that I read, I would have preferred a different author. I view Lendon as a PhD professor who fully subscribes to the ‘publish or perish” doctrine. And forcing his students to purchase and read his books.

Cool metaphor; not yet the cry of trumpets, but the moans of low bassoons



Bibliography

Page 64 understanding the ethos of alliances first and the in particular the status of Argos and Athens is key to understanding the rest of the mid century war.

Note: Argos held ‘time’ over Athens even though Sparta held ‘time’ over Argos. Since Athens and Sparta were rivals, Athens bent her homage towards Argos if for anything else to have an ally.

Page 81: Lacking in the Spartan victory in 446BC was the crucial psychological component that made victory "stick"- that made the defeated take their defeat, and therefore their inferiority in rank, to heart and therefore behave with lowly deference to the victor.

...it is best not to puff yourself up because of the misfortunes opponents says a speaker much later than Thucydides, "but only be confident when you have conquered their spirits". Said Churchill in response to the German smashing of French will, only they be responded to in kind in 1945, thus drawing to a conclusion of two countries propensity for war for hegemony.

Note: this book notes that it's not so much the sued terms at the conclusion of a war but the actual battle that marks the defeat. Making this point 2500 years later we find examples of Germany's defiance of the world in the 1930's and likewise Iraq thumbing it's nose at the world, the United States in particular, in 2003.

Page 86: What broke out in 431BC is one if the most famous passages in his narrative and one of the most quoted passages from ancient Greek historians today, for it encapsulated the cold principles of the contemporary realist school of international relations. "The truest cause of the war" wrote Thucydides, " was the growing greatness of Athens and the fear that this inspired, which compelled the Lacedaemonians to go to war."... This "growing greatness" more exactly atmosphere increase of Athenian' power, dynamis, was a threat to Spartan and her allies. ... This cause is distinguished sharply from the immediate. Events that led up to the war, which Thucydides terms the "charges" or the "grounds for complaint" (aitiai) and "points if difference" (diaphorai), which are not the “truest cause" of the war.

Note: I made it a reading project to analyze the causes of war using the 20th century Germans. I did not land on Thucydides’ theory but won’t challenge it as I may look back and add the theory to the mix in my thought. Does power and it's cousin "fear of power" underwrite the practical causes of war?

Page 87: ... Thucydides and Hobbs, who translated him into English, are the progenitors if the theoretical realism that abides in today’s universities and think tanks, perhaps more important they have molded the vulgate of age. Power and fear are the tools for thinking about relations between states unreflectively employed in the media. Thus if looking out the window we approve of Thucydides’ landscape, we do so unaware that it was Thucydides who cited the window in the first place.

Note: the different primary causes were not prevalent in Greece, nor if there in the 20th century Europe. Is this a mistake mankind has failed to correct? Or is Thucydides’ theory correct? The Cold War never fired a shot because there was no real fear between the contestants. That is only if you exclude the proxy wars, being the complaint underwritten by the Keannan Theory of 1950.

Page 103: the Spartans in ‘time’ would feel that they were waring to refuse arbitration and that their neglect of this term of the 30 Years Peace Treaty had offended the Gods.

Note: I find this correlating to the Gods parallel at least to the message of Christ, the basis of Christian faith. (Though too often obliterated by religious sects over 2000 years) Thucydides, Hobbs, contemporary think tanks and Christianity are the entire same mind yet they quarrel with each other much like Athens did with Sparta. The quarrel appears to be more for supremacy or in context of the thesis of Thucydides, ‘TIME’. Is the spirit of competition found in the Greek Olympic Games, with it's unintended byproduct transcendent in our modern world? Are the unintended consequences really the cause and not the effect or are they symptoms? Is Marx right? The internal philosophy of a corporation is in deed communal where surrendering to corporate missions is required of it's individual business units. Yet corporations compete with each other. This only applies to economics which is a philosophy with money as the metric. How does this translate to nations in competition? Clearly you see this correlation in the 2011 budget debate where the competition in international currency is central to the American way of life. Very rich people understand this and therefore are willing to contribute to America. But at large the middlemen (politician, press) and their pawns are lost.

Page 168; in 1888 Julius Von Pflgk-Hartung had a passive policy of no clear cut victory. He said to active engagement "No Pericles' plans were well conceived 'strategy of exhaustion' had every prospect of winning the war by wearing out the resources of Athens’s opponents. In fact however Pericles' strategy was one of communication: by carefully judged reprisals for the Spartan ravaging of Attica, by humiliation of the Spartans through attacks on Sparta’s allies and by exaltation of Athens by helping Athen's allies, Pericles planned to impress the rank and renown of Athens upon the Spartans and upon the wider world of Greeks.

Page 206: Slaves were, after all, the natural enemies of all free men in a society that kept them in shackles. In a poor world , too, much of a city's wealth was tied up in it's slaves, because buying slaves and putting them to work was one of the few ways free capital could be invested for profit - capital that would be consumed in the holocaust of a single moment were the slaves to be set at liberty. For men locked in civil strife to bid for the support of slaves, then signaled that an unnatural frenzy had come upon Corcyra: there was nothing the men of the island would not do or waste, if helped them to overcome their foes.

Page 211: Thucydides points out: "Civil strife- stasis is the Greek word - has a fearful dynamic of it's own. Whatever it spark, civil strife burns high and soon consumes within it all the forms of division between men, giving license to wickedness under the cover of party and enforcing by a principle of tit-for-tat escalation ever more fearful methods. It is war itself and the resulting scarcity, says Thucydides that destroys human morals and ideas. “War proves a teacher of violence that brings most men's characters to level with their fortunes." War is why “ancient simplicity into which honor so largely entered was laughed down and disappeared."

Yet Thucydides' diagnosis of the cause of stasis - his argument that domestic strife is usually the child of foreign war - was not true as a rule even in Thucydides' own ‘time’, and was certainly not true in the case of Corcyra, which was untouched by the wider war and hardly, in 427BC, confronted with "imperious necessities"

Note: while the wider war was between Sparta and Athens, there was a civil war between the oligarchs and democracy of Corcyra, where civil strive of that island prevailed over the larger rules of honor held between Sparta and Athens.

Note: Clearly the world witnessed this in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

Page 224: in 426 Athens took a new tact on Sparta. Rather than simple revenge, Athens took a posture of Hybris. If Athens neglected Boeotia [an active ally of Sparta] it was not because they considered her a threat. But just as a southern gentleman jostled by another in the streets of Charleston, could coolly decide not to construe the contact as an insult and thus avoid a duel, so did an ancient Greek state in a war over rank, as we have seen, enjoy a certain latitude to fail to "notice" acts of their adversaries - by framing their acts too trivial to deserve revenge.

Page 232: this Greek checkerboard of loyalties in the northwest was no creation of the Athenians or Spartans but simply reflected the hostility of Greek states to their immediate neighbors: thus when one perhaps on the basis of ancient kinship, called the Athenians or Peloponnesians for assistance against a neighbor, that ally naturally allied itself to the other great power. Although Greek in language and habits, for the most part these continent dwellers lived as tribes and clans spread over the land, rather than owing their loyalty to individual cities, as was custom in Southern Greece. They were, then, and old fashioned folk, their men still carrying weapons on their daily rounds, leading to a more forthright, rambunctious, even Homeric notion of mine and thine than prevailed in
the city-states to the south.

Note: oh the ominous parallels of that neighboring track of land from the Middle East through central Asia, post 1919. The fall of the Ottoman Empire has yet to find the civility of the Southern Greek city- state of the forth century BC .

At this juncture of 2011 Barak Obama is making the same mistake as British Prime minister Lloyd-George did in 1919. It was for the same reason: his Empire was war weary and in economic despair. Iraq through the legacy of GW Bush mission and policy will prove to be an oasis of civilization in a sea of 'tribes in turmoil', if history does have a pattern, for the next 20 years. More ominous of historical patterns would be found in the dynamic of US-Sino relationships on a Greek canvas, and the allies of choice of those warring tribes.


Page 275: But the personal hurt of the Spartans and the trampling of the Greek warrior code by the Athenians were not the only forces at play in the Spartan decision to surrender. A singularly Spartan factor also contributed. For Spartans, far more than other Greeks, looked to be commanded in war, and the absence of command [the commanders were killed early in the battle] forced to form a tiny parliament of the wounded to debate their own fate, they proved different men from those, who under orders, were so dauntless. The Spartan authorities had expected their men to behave like Achilles,to choose noble death. But Spartans had not brought up their sons to act like Achilles; they had brought them up to obey orders. Never does the strange contradiction at the heart of Spartan society show so clearly here: Spartans were expected to live the Iliad, but an Iliad set in a totalitarian Sparta.

Page 276: The Spartans surrendered on the seventy-second day after the sea battle in Navarino Bay, in the middle of August, 1 the year 425BC. Thucydides pretends to read the minds of the greater Greek nation as they savored every appalling detail. Luke mere humans, the Spartans had surrendered because they were hungry. They had yielded their weapons to the Athenians: they had not been disarmed and helpless but surrendered with weapons in their hands. They had not fought until they were killed. The root of Spartan power, the martial mystique of the Lacedaemonians that the Athenians had so long both feared to confront on the field of battle and feared to encourage by compelling the Spartans to die fighting, was given a mighty yank halfway from the ground by this surrender. And as for rank of Sparta, the primacy that Athens and Sparta were fighting was over. The answer was obvious to any Greek. “the glory of the Lacedaemonians was cast down," wrote a later author, " because of thei loss of their men on the island."

Page 337: Bresadis [Spartan], pledging to revolt if he should come to them Amphipolis]. The kindly terms hebhag given at Amphilipolis urged along this movement, as did, the earnestness of his proclamations that he had come to free the Greeks from empire rather
than simply replace Athenians rule with Spartan. For he pledged to leave the constitutional arrangements of the rebels unchanged and to impose no garrisons or governors. After a seven year pregnancy, Sparta seamed finally to have brought to birth a son who was in earnest about freeing the Greeks from Athens, the slogan under which Sparta had gone to war in 431BC and that had brought Sparta such
goodwill at war's beginning.

Cool metaphor; not yet the cry of trumpets, but the moans of low bassoons.

Page 380: At the same ‘time’ as she became more successful at shaming Sparta, Athens also saw her estimation if value of shaming acts, as well as her definition of the make up of ‘time’, prevail in the minds of Greeks. Put positively, in terms of honor rather than shame, the Athenians managed over the course if Ten Years' War subtly to shift the definition of ‘time’, of the rank of states, from a preponderance emphasis on Andrei, the courage displayed particularly in hoplite battle, to place greater value on charis (helping friends and taking revenge upon enemies) and metis ( the cunning display of tactics and trickery). Since metis and charis played to Athenian strengths, while Sparta was supreme in Andreia, this change in the way Greeks estimated ‘time’ was decidedly to Athens' advantage. The war over the definition over ‘time’ chiefly depended not on convincing the Greeks directly but appearing to have convinced the enemy. And so it was that in the eyes of the Greeks, the Spartans slowly yielded the battle over the definition of ‘time’ to the Athenians. This was the legacy of Pericles.

Page 381: (Thucydides') realism is the theory of international relations that considers power, the dread of the power of others, and the quest for power that dread imposes impartially upon all as the primary drivers of acts of states.

Note: This book on page 382 makes a case that war is an idea of man, not of God. The US Constitution, 2000 years later fixed that mistake. 21st century liberal America appear poised to remake that same mistake. Power is not of strength Andreia but of previous combination of dominion over ideas and way of life. If one loses his way of life, liberty, his power is threatened of if not avenged then defeated.

And then in the end out of nowhere, within the pages of this book the author makes war about the complex nature of revenge, leaving the dynamics of ‘time’ and hybris as inconsequential. Lendon aside from the detailed spaghetti of events, is found a maddening author.

Monday, September 20, 2010

Persian Puzzle

Persian Puzzle
By Kenneth Pollack


I picked this book up chiefly because of recent news in Iran and secondarily because of an Iranian friend I had in New York. He often spoke of the rich Persian culture and spoke Farsi with his children. I have an Iranian tapestry in my hallway and eat Amir’s pistachios from Iran when I get them. True enough you read early on in the book about Darius, Xerxus, and Cyrus with an emphasis on Cyrus’ conquering of Babylon. In this conquest Cyrus frees the Jews and returns them to their homeland, Palestine. This point I find interesting as the primer landmark contradiction in the Persian/Iranian history; a history that only evolved to the name Iran at the insistence of Reza Shah Pahlavi in the 1920’s. This is a point in history that flies in the face of the current Iranian theocracy and supports one of the tenants of American sanctions on Iran for their sponsored terrorism, anti-peace in the Middle East and the “destruction” of Israel.

Pollack prepares a backdrop for which he lays room for the reader to contemplate many moral questions while reading the book. I found it interesting to read that Persia over history is a land fragmented by mountains and deserts with no significant navigable rivers. Holding a band of people together to be the world’s first superpower was no small feat. A feat that today’s Iranians are still so proud of that it permeates in their civil consciousness. I saw this in my friends Amir and Mondona, and better appreciate this now.

Oddly enough the Arabian conquest brought Islam to Persia a religion that over shadowed Zoroastrianism and threw Persia into a state of civil unrest and contradiction ever since. The one hundred year period prior to our current political situation (1979 to present) is a story of repressive dictatorships over a new sovereign state. The first Shah who regained his family’s through a coup and internal unrest saw himself much in the liking to Mussolini, and Franco. Pollack associates this mentality to Kadafi, Arafat, and a few of Egypt’s recent leaders. Notice he separates these inept leaders from the terrorist of Hitler, Stalin and Hussein. The important similarity to all was while encumbered with internal instability in conjunction with a fear of foreign domination; these recent rulers absconded power and ruled their people poorly.

The irony of Iranian leadership of the 19th and 20th centuries is similar to that of Poland. There were regions of people with a desire to lead themselves but displayed no proven capability to do so. Reza Shah Pahlavi was only an example of a line of leaders who lived in fear of Russia and Great Britain. The imposition of either of two foreign powers was self-inflicted to a certain degree. Persia’s fear of Russia gave reason to draw Great Britain into their sphere of influence, yet it was Great Britain with the dominant tools to lead. With the imbalance in skills as they were, Great Britain took advantage of all business activity. The discovery of oil exacerbated the imbalance. The weak leaders whether the Shah or Prime Minister Mosaddeq, could not manage the divergent demands on internal policy.

After World War II Iran began to invite the Unites States in to counter balance their triad of problematic and conflicting issues. Like all poor leaders their focus on military led themselves to financial ruin on every other front. It is important to have read that the United States were reluctant participants brought in at the invitation of Iran, no matter what was perceived through the fog of the coups for a leader. Unfortunately with our preoccupation with the spread of Communism at the time, no matter who was in the White House, we did not live up to the expectations of Iran’s leaders or their people. Later our pre-occupation with Viet Nam caused the Johnson administration to lose sight of the call for internal reform that was heard and revered by the Kennedy administration.

The CIA participation in the stacked 1953 election (now called a coup by Iran and somehow tolerated by the United States) between Pahlavi and Mosaddeq gave all the justifiable appearances of our meddling in another countries affairs. And it was justified, a mistake by the Eisenhower administration. What is important to know says Pollack is our agenda was not about oil. The agenda was to bring someone into power that would stand up to the Soviets, which paradoxically was indeed an agenda of the Iranian people. To accuse the USA of propping up a puppet regime is somewhat misguided according to Pollack. The Shah was dependent on the United States initially for economic reasons and we supplied ample aid. Unfortunately, this money was redirected to the military while his people were oppressed. Over time the Shah thumbed his nose up to American calls for human rights. The Shahs new found oil wealth, thanks to American intervention over the British in behalf of Iran, allowed him this option and left American influence neutered. By the time Carter became aware and made a call for human rights, it was too late.

I found it very interesting that even Pollack describes the events of 1953 as a CIA directed stacked election and then goes on later in his book to name that event as a coup. In Pollack’s defense, after reading the events surrounding every election of the 20th century, one would conclude that the words election and coup in Iran are synonymous.
It is important to appreciate why Iran, the theocratic government hates the United States, and why Iran conducts its foreign affairs as though it can thumb its nose at the United States to the extent that it can wage terrorist war against us. With a xenophobic persona caused by fear of both the USSR and Britain, Iran’s request to the United o mediate and or counteract the situation was not executed with clarity. With a revolving door in leadership every four years in the White House, a consistent policy and or named responsible person could not be defined. During pre and near post WWII the revolving door in Iran was even less clear. Elections in Iran through this same period were closely parallel to coups. Upon this canvas, one can easily visualize a people’s propensity to take aim at the tallest participant as it stands above the smoke.

Once we got on that slippery slope the only course was and is down. While it was common practice to offer a choice of two evils and prompting voter disenfranchisement to the extent that the candidates would get assassinated the CIA wrongly engaged in this in 1953. What the CIA did was bombard the Iranian people with election propaganda to get the Shah elected. THAT’S IT!!!. According to the author. After this election/coup, from Eisenhower through Ford, the United States largely turned a blind eye to the Shah’s shenanigans; largely due to our focus on anti communism threats elsewhere in the world. The Iranian people felt betrayed in two ways. First we did not give them the attention they asked for. Second, the Shah on his own accord and with no pressure from the United States oppressed his people. Not speaking out on human rights violations committed by the Shah was a slap in their face.

Iran has learned through the hostage taking in 1979 and through the 1980s that they could influence policy in America. Khomeni realized that his capital in the Embassy hostages was already spent. But he despised Carter for his double talk. Carter spoke strongly against human rights violations around the world and did nothing in Iran. When he allowed the Shah into the US for surgery it was an insult to Iran. Carter’s response incorporated a fundamental mistake in making it clear that the hostages were to come back alive, this is despite that every hostage taken swore an oath that the Unites States interests came first. (Implying first before their own lives). Khomeni leveraged this in negotiations and sucked everything he could out of the US and embarrassed us publicly with his booty. The only thing Reagan did to free the hostages was get sworn in to office. The very minute this took place the hostages were set free. Thus the author puts forth the theory that an Iran got even for what the CIA did in 1953. Khomeni learned another lesson, that the United States was weak and its people did not have the stomach for conflict. He took Reagan to task by taking hostages in Lebanon. While Reagan did not make the same mistake as Carter he made a different one. He negotiated with terrorist in the Iran Contra fiasco. It was not until 1991 that all the hostages were set free.

Reagan ’s continued reluctance to engage directly in the Iran Iraq war demonstrated to Iran American weakness or intolerance to war. It was clearly stated that Iran had intentions to march through Iraq and straight to Israel. Khomeni’s agenda was an Islamic World. Reagan’s agenda was a continued resistance through the support of other armies where American interests were involved. Our eventual involvement through our Naval escorts of Kuwaiti ships did nothing to show American strength and everything to show a continued American betrayal. Through the Clinton administration America’s continuance to tolerate terrorist activity emboldened Hezbollah and al Queida. Theocracy leadership with a whip to its people and a stick to its neighbors internationally became a theme.

With regard to Pollack’s assessments of all the administrations foreign policy, he found something to criticize in every administration with exception to Kennedy the G.H. Bush. I found it interesting that a consistent theme of criticism of both Carter and Reagan was not being firm enough with Iran over terrorism, Pollack only mentions the Bahran Towers, and gives plausible argument for the Clinton Administration not taking a firm hand against Iran. His argument being that after full disclosure from Saudi Arabia, that Iran organized the assault, a new Khatami government was in power. This contradicts the Madeline Albrights assessment that un-elected hands controlled Iran. Pollack later recommends that any act of terrorism would be responded to with force regardless of regime change, so he leaves the reader somewhat confused. Additionally the other incidents of terrorism against the United States during the Clinton administration were not addressed to the same degree as both Carter and Reagan. This in itself is a puzzle within a puzzle. Pollack paints a picture where Iran became use to American weakness in the face of terrorism, but asserts that Iran was not specifically involved, and then claims Iran spreads terrorism; a foggy area for this expert author.

The book title becomes relevant in describing Iran. It is a country conflicted by its leadership that does not appear to represent the voice of its people. In 1997, with 91% of the people voting, more that 70% of the vote was in favor of reform from the “hardline” mullahs, the Madeline Albright speech of 1999 to Iran in an effort for rapprochement contained two critical words, “un-elected hands”. Every other word in the speech was aimed at a rapprochement of the two countries. While the elected Khatami government did take notice of those two words, they were willing to overlook them. Kahamen’i, the new un-elected Supreme Leader assumed control in delivering a very negative reply to the Clinton administration. To quote Pollack “Indeed it is unfortunate that this was all that came from it, but by trying so hard to start a process of rapprochement with the Khatami government, the Clinton administration gave the George W Bush administration the perfect argument to demand a harder line on Iran from America’s allies.”

If Clinton’s stick were equal in size to his carrot, would he have handed George W. Bush a different set of cards? In fact Pollack was equally generous to G.W. Bush. He speaks of the strategies between Clinton and Bush as complementary being that Iran always took the carrot and left the United States with nothing but the stick, a stick that for many reasons detailed in the book can be used for nothing but waving in the air. Pollack suggest that Clinton handed Bush the stick. Pollack reiterates that over the course of our relationship with Iran, and particularly in the last 25 years, their negotiating style called for the United States to put all concessions on the table for which they take them and leave. However Pollack demonstrates many cases where Iran does respond to the stick.

In Pollack’s closing chapters he describes a three-part strategy to become good neighbors with Iran. He claims that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is the number one concern; because if successful Iran’s complete persona of xenophobia changes. (a root cause resolution dynamic not explored universally by the author) The first is through a “Grand Bargain” whereby each side lay down their concessions, detailed in the book. The second is through international diplomacy where all nations of the world lay out a new world protocol among nations, detailed in the book. And the third part being military might. Because this is three-part strategy is introduced only after Pollack makes a case for the failure of each strategy independently, you the reader must pay close attention to the intricate relations between all three and the “trip wires” that would transition from one policy to another. In the end you begin to see the edges of the Persian Puzzle. You may even have your colored pieces in their proper piles, but there is no way the puzzle get completed in this book. You also begin to appreciate a requirement for a tremendous staff in our State Department to piece this all together. In retrospect I found the details and criticism in the early going of the book to be much sharper. There is enough history provided to appreciate the general feeling of the common man that Iran holds anxieties towards America. There is also enough history provided to be sure that Iran has much to be responsible for in their anxiety about many things internally and externally, including The West. This gives true meaning to the saying only history will tell. I can only hope that Pollack will be around in 50 years so that at age 99 I will read his sequel.





Epilogue: I am always taken back by: those in America that unilaterally condemns “THIS ADMINISTRATION”; when I contrast it to the following quote in the book by Ayatollah Khomeni upon burying two prostitutes up to their chest and had them stoned to death by the public. Bear in mind there was not trial. He said, “ Criminals should not be tried. The trial of a criminal is against human rights. Human rights demand that we should have killed them in the first place.” It is similarly described in the book where the leftist student Revolutionaries physically, and physiologically abused many hostages and Ayatollah Khomeni gave his seal of approval to these acts. To the Ayatollah perceptions were more important than truth; a reality he can hold to without a free press and a fair judicial system.

This country does have a judicial process, free press and core values aimed at liberty. On the moral questions raised, it appears that making compromises to those opposing this freewill is counterproductive. It is time we all turn up the volume on the beacon on the hill and stand together for what we are for regardless of WHICH ADMINISTRATION. The situation in the Middle East is very complicated. Pollack is much more versed than myself and his views are highly regarded. But he does not have a clear answer a proven answer. So why would we blame him while serving under Clinton or any other American for not solving this puzzle? I believe this strategy is the key in Pollack’s book the he touches but fails to utilize this KEY to simplify is three-part strategy. Pollock glosses over it, but ever since the Czar of Russia recognized the will of the people were not behind Napoleon, he knew the French would retreat regardless of what happened on the battlefield. A beacon on the hill is for liberty and anti terrorism. Let it shine through our people and our press. But let us shine what unites us, rather than that which divides us.