Ho Chi Minh

By William J Duiker

As a Vietnam War baby this book jumped out of the store window at Kent State University, of all places.  The 68 and 72 elections turned on the decisions made in Vietnam.  Slogans crying unjust war rang through the streets.  This book’s makes no attempt to weigh that question.  It is s granular biography of Ho Chi Minh, the first Leader of what is now Socialist Republic of Vietnam.  As a reader I had to keep my views and bias in check in order to appreciate the message of Ho Chi Minh, conveyed through the author William Duiker.  Duiker took a recursive lawyers brief style in painting a portrait of a man whose place in history is in my mind understated.  The author uses chronology as his ally in evolving the biography of a man into a snapshot biography at high level of the Vietnam War.  In the end the author’s position remains unbiased however there reader cannot come away without a verdict.

In a spider web of intrigue and against a back drop of Ho Chi Minh’s unwavering stated goal for independence from France, it is clear that the eventual alliance with China and the USSR was primarily strategic and not necessarily out of Communist Principal.  Read on.

Ho Chi Minh was born into an agrarian setting to a scholar family that was steeped in Confucian ways and means at a time when French colonization that began in 1858 was in full force.  It was the intellectual scholars of Vietnam that led the way to revolution with the French.  Along the way The Vietnamese embraced the need to evolve from Confucianism to western ways.  It was thought and taught, that in order to rise above them you have to learn them, the French.  There were two venues for the evolution away from traditional Confucianism; a parallel course with the Japanese who     were 50 years ahead of Vietnam.  And then there were opportunities to learn directly from the French.  Those Vietnamese returning from Paris, reported that the French liberties were much more civilized then that exhibited in colonial Vietnam.  The doctrine of French liberty was to be lauded and modeled.  The doctrine of French colonization was to be opposed.  Nguyen Tat Tan operating under the name Nguyen Ai Quoc traveled abroad, aboard as a cook aboard a steamship, to learn the ways of the West.  It is said by the Vietnamese that it was his intent to bring back a revolutionary solution.

Ngyuen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) in 1919, was famously rejected by the leaders of the World Powers, pointedly Woodrow Wilson.  This alone did not send Monsieur Ngyuen to Lenin in Russia in 1920.  However it was a more natural fit for these reasons:  Confucianism conforms more closely to Marx’s socialism than capitalism.  This in conjunction with the brand of capitalism that Asians saw was colonial capitalism otherwise stated as imperialism, where in his case the French were very oppressive to the Vietnamese people. In a sense of timing, Lenin had just published the Third International, doctrine of the socialist movement which advocated violent revolution.   Ho Chi Minh was steeped in the Bolshevik revolution.  To  Asians capitalism was solidly linked to world imperialism.  Ironically when Ho Chi Minh traveling under the pseudo named Ngyuen Ai Quoc  went to Paris he discovered that French socialism was France oriented only.  It paid little credence to the struggles of colonial oppression.  In the USSR, Lenin had different aspirations.  In 1924 as a result of Ngyuen Ai Cuoc’s participation in many socialist meetings in Paris, he was invited to Moscow by Dmitri Manuilsky a senior official of the Comintern of the USSR.    After the meeting Ho, a man bent on liberation not only from France but from out dated Confucianism writes the following:

There were political terms difficult to understand in this thesis.  But by

dint of reading it again and again, finally I could grasp the main part of

it.  What emotion, enthusiasm, clear sightedness, and confidence it

instilled in me!  I was overjoyed to tears.  Though sitting alone in my

room, I shouted aloud as if addressing large crowds” Dear martyrs,

compatriots!  This is the path to our liberation.

Bibliography note:  Need to retrieve the Eight Articles of Petition:

In the beginning, USSR’s communist world agenda took on a different flavor than the ‘spread of communism’ agenda that was held up to the American people in the 1960s.  In the 1920’s Lenin’s view was to replace the oppressive colonial capitalist with communistic ideals.  I will put forth that in the intervening forty years, the rhetoric of the leaders and situation changed.  I suspect this biography now becomes not only a history of one man, but a portal to a monumental event on a world stage in the 20^th century.

In the years from 1920 through the late 1930’s, Ho Chi Minh seemed to have drifted from one city to the next in the countries of China, USSR, and France.  He was always on the run from French colonialists rendering himself off the French wanted list by 1930.   With most of his new cities he took on a new pseudo name.  He took on two apparent wives, but the authenticness of marriage is in doubt.  Reading this portion becomes difficult as though the reader must have the patience of a lawyer in order to glean anything of substance.  It seems that, still under the primary mane of Ngyuen Ai Quoc, he struggled to keep a consistent philosophy and policy of the party line.  The party names changed with shifting philosophy and policy.  What the section doe s do is make Ho Chi Minh human.

Ngyuen Ai Qouc’s philosophy primarily set off to follow Lenin’s two step philosphy: nationalism of the masses then internationalism of communistic principle.  Quoc’s gave ‘lip service’ to the communistic principle as an end but saw it as a means to independence from colonial France.  That means mean meant careful organization of party policy of revolution in building a critical mass as a prerequisite to any sort of violence.  Quoc experienced a lot of party conflict that made progress seem morbid in many phases.  To exacerbate Quac’s efforts, USSR policy was also experiencing conflict in the post Lenin period with Stalin forcing a need for violent nationalism first.  Quoc was blessed with nationalism but also cursed with any policy of violence.  The random and scattered violent uprisings in the 20’s and 30’s were swiftly dealt with by the French, leaving many setbacks to Ho Chi Minh’s vision of revolution that would bring about an independent Vietnam.  The Japanese invasion of China and WWII would set the stage for a break through.

If one were to look for a date of the start of the Vietnam War; December 22, 1944 would be a candidate for sure.  Allbeit in 1919 the seeds were officially sown in an international light in a request from Ho Chi Minh to President Wilson in the Paris Peace conference of 1919.  It was on that date in 44  that the newly formed VLA units won their first military victories over the French in the villages of Phai Kat and Na Ngan.  Coincidently on a note of trivia, the first downed American plane was on November 11, 1944.  The pilot, Randolph Shaw was taken in by the VLA, Ho Chi Minh, as a friend.  General Ho escorted Shaw to a USA military base in an effort to meet with the US General to form an alliance.  The Americans had to be careful to balance the commitment.  On the scales were the fact that the USA was an ally of the French in liberating them from Germany and military assistance against the French Empire in Indochina would chaff with the political agenda in Washington, with Roosevelt as the exception.  Roosevelt had no liking for European colonialism but it  was Truman who was seeking a means of restoring the colonies to Southeast Asia.  Ho Chi Minh read these words in reports made available to him in the OSS office in China.  If history does repeat itself, one can clearly see the seeds of the same melees of international politics in the Middle East today.  

By 1944 Ho Chi Minh’s effort to foment a revolution was already thirty-two years in the making.  He assumed many aliases in maintaining a cover of his activities over that span of time.  It was only in 1944 that this bibliography writes of the character as Ho Chi MInh, a General of the VLA.  We are twenty-six years since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, a fight of Suni-Shia. We are twenty-three years since the Desert Storm.  Two years since President Obama took down Desert Shield.  ISIS is now terrorizing every agency of governments across the Middle East and around the world.  Will there one day be an autobiography written on Ibrahim ibn Awwad ibn Ibrahim ibn Ali ibn Muhammad al-Badri al-Samarra, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi with alias name of Amir al-Mu'minin Caliph Ibrahim, who claims to be a descendant of Muhammad?  Will we learn that he was simply looking out for self determination? That may be a stretch.  But what is clear is the deals made in 1919 appear to be a peace to end all peace.  What is also clear, is America’s attempt to broker legitimate democracies cannot continue through a means of standing up and standing behind crony leaders.   

August 19, 1945 could be considered, by accounts in this book, as the day Vietnam declared independence…their version of the USA Fourth of July.  Albeit they celebrate it in Sept 2.  As Ho Chi Minh’s VLA government was seizing power Ho Chi Minh set a  meeting with the US General now in Hanoi.  The General commented that in settling matters one must be careful that Vietnam would need the French to counteract the aspirations of China’s appetite for dominance of Indo China.  The reader of history must be mindful that indeed the VietMinh were being oppressed both by the imperialist French and the Chinese.  The French were blatant.  The Chinese were coy.  This comment by the General was in response with Ho Chi Minh’s statement that The VietMinh were merely looking for their own nationalism and only turned to the USSR because they were the only ones that would offer help.  At this point in the book it becomes obliquely apparent to the reader steeped in the rhetoric of USA War with Vietnam that the effort was to help them obtain Ho Chi Minh’s goals stated in 1919 to President Wilson.  Two countries were slaughtering each other in the pursuit of a mutual goal, National Independence from imperialists.

In a spider web of intrigue and against a back drop of Ho Chi Minh’s unwavering stated goal for independence from France, it is clear that the eventual alliance with China and the USSR was primarily strategic and not necessarily out of Communist Principal.  As events unfolded from the 1930’s through the second World War, Ho drifted away from both USSR and China;  the former because the USSR was preoccupied with WWII and the latter because of his fear that if China were to help they would “stay for a thousand years.”    Ho reached out indirectly through one envoy or another and directly to Truman in the post WWI years.  That effort failed for two reasons, first is Truman’s paradigm was one that allied with French out of convenience as not to disrupt a fragile agenda in Europe.  The second reason was Truman although contrary to Ho’s letters felt that Ho was a Red Communist.  US aid was not to come from Truman and the French succeeded in drawing the USA into their scheme under the fear of Red Communism.  Parallel to this China was involved in its own civil war between Nationalist Chiang Kai-shek and Mio Zedong.  When the communists prevailed the dominoes of the Infamous Dominoes Theory ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domino_theory ) began to fall that eventually led to the actual war between Vietnam and the USA.  In the beginning both China and the USSR committed to only supplying arms to the VietMinh.  Hence the poetic draw for this reader to read this autobiography on Ho Chi Minh.  I knew of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  It was a route of supplies through Laos and Cambodia, about twelve miles inside those prospective boarders with Vietnam, according to Henry Kissenger’s Memoires. Ironically, both China’s and Vietnam’s primary reason towards communism was NOT in league with the USSR’s but a principle they were contrary to the Imperialism of the French and the British.  While Americans were working vigorously to stabilize Europe through the Marshall Plan, they became preoccupied with shoring up “firewalls” against USSR’s brand of communism on either boarder with the new Peoples Republic of China.  Hence the USA experienced the Korean War and then the Vietnam War.   Keep in mind there has yet to been a war with China, but only with her vassal States.

In retrospect all the world leaders and not foreseen the failure of the communist model in USSR.  They had not foreseen the failure of Chairman Mao’s model.  Had anyone paid attention to Ho Chi Minh’s pleas the Vietnam War would have been avoided.  Both China and Vietnam would have been viewed as democracies that may have contained a blend of parties including communist parties.  This arrangement exists all over Europe.  It is actually a tenement of Lenin’s view of the three phases of communism, whereby national identity is achieved first and then social change within each nation.  This view is one of evolutionary revolution not revolution by arms.  Just imagine what would have happened if President Wilson in 1919 had NOT rejected Ho Chi Minh’s request for self determination.   Just imagine if President Wilson had actually invited Ho Chi Minh to the White House for a sincere dialogue.  That dialogue was granted by both Stalin and Chairman Mao.  Ho Chi Minh took the path of most support for one reason.  It was the only path offered to liberate is country from the oppression of French Imperialism.

By 1951 the spider web of international involvement became coated with irony.  The French were defending their colonial interests.  The Chinese who are by now Chairman Mao communist, are not only helping the VienMinh liberate themselves from France, they are forcing the ideology of Lennist  (not Stalin’s) communism on the VietMinh who are merely looking for military support to liberate themselves.  The Vietnamese people despise their allies;  Chinese for their imperialism and hate the French for their colonialism.  The Americans are being lured into the fray by the French who are looking for air support and supplies.  The first installation came in the form of aircraft loaded with naphalm.  In the meantime the VietMinh just want to be left to their own self-determination, a request made by Ho Chi Minh in 1919 in Paris after WWI to Woodrow Wilson.  I read elsewhere that in Wilson’s denial to Ho Chi Minh, he made this racial slur: “no slope heads are capable of managing their own self determination, so Vietnam will remain a French colony.”  Franklin Roosevelt told Ho Chi Minh he would honor that request after WWII was settled.  During WWII Vietnam was under Japanese rule.  And finally it was a promise that Harry Truman reneged on in 1950.  Eventually, as we know; the French left, the Chinese provided supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, in the dense un populated jungle of Laos and Cambodia; leaving the USA to help Vietmigh to avoid communism while they achieved self determination.  Read the last part carefully for its irony.

With the first Geneva resolution after the French defeat Dein Bein Phu, the battle that forced the French out  in 1954 Ho Chi Minh’s group experienced a wholesale betrayal by all the world’s superpowers.  With the exit of the French from Vietnam the country was divided in the Geneva Peace acords.  A referendum vote in two years would decide if North Vietnam and South Vietnam should unite.  In subsequent years, Moscow and China shunned active support of the North Vietnam’s pursuit for an agreed upon election for unification in two years.  Under the flag of ‘world peace’ they looked to avoid a confrontation with the United States.  France left the North, but maintained a presence in the South of which they lured the United States in to protect.  Great Britain who co-sponsored the First Geneva Peace Accord, simply refused to promulgate the two year political solution of an election.  It was obvious that there was a Communist –v- Imperialist showdown.  Somehow the USA is hooked into defending capitalist democracy and is labeled by North Vietnam as Imperialist.  Somehow, the United States sees Ho Chi Minh as communist of the Stalin/Mao brand when they were first Nationalists.  More irony.

In his final testament, as in his life Ho Chi Minh had sought to balance the commitment to Vietnamese national independence with a similar dedication to the world revolution.  In the document, which he first drafted in 1965 and then amended by hand in 1968 and 1969, Ho reaffirmed the dual importance of nationalism and socialism, although he emphasized the  immediate priority was to heal the wounds of war and improve the living standards of the Vietnamese people.  He paid particular attention to the importance of realizing equality of the sexes.  He praised the Party for having played the leading role in the Vietnamese revolution, but called for a campaign of rectification and self-criticism to democratize the organization and raise the level of morality among Party cadres after the end of the war.  Finally, he included a fervent plea to restore unity of the world Communist movement on the basis of the principle of proletarian internationalism.

My comment:  Against this enemy 55,000 American soldiers gave their last full measure.  In the end America violated United Nations policy and intervened in a civil war that was raging in South Viet Nam.  We killed over 1,000,000 Vietnamese people in the process.  All because our leaders feared a Red Chinese brand of Communism of which was never stated by Ho Chi Minh, or Vietnamese leadership, as they too feared Chinese imperialism.  In the end, Ho Chi Minh and his country got exactly what they asked for of President Wilson in 1919.  They gained their self determination as a people against imperialist French, Communist China, and Capitalist United States.  Today the two governments are doing capitalist business together.

Known and UnKnown

Known and Unknown
By Donald Rumsfeld

It seemed often enough to draw a general summary of Rumsfeld to be a man who stated his mind in so sufficient detail that he lay groundwork for disagreement. Throughout his political career, among those that friction existed you would find names such as GHW Bush, Kissinger, and Rockefeller. Even within the GW Bush Cabinet, Rumsfeld takes numerous critiques of Colin Powell. Though never a direct challenge, Rumsfeld provides enough narrative framed with ample detail to draw lines of critique or at least question marks around Powell. He does the same with Condoleezza Rice. So why with so much controversy would you read this book? To discover the history of a well thought executive. You could preface this book with the phrase “May it please the ‘people’ ” Though his beginnings were in elective office most of has career as a public servant was in administration at executive level.

Rumsfeld was a Young Turk Congressman turned career beltway executive. What is remarkable about this book is Rumsfeld's detail in description knits together with a ‘frictious yarn’ the relationships of many prime movers from 1960 his political career inception, to 2006 its close. The most notable was his relationship with Dick Cheney a man he first hired in government who later ‘hired’ him back to government. As an additional bonus Rumsfeld's detail lays a landscape in beltway activity that intersects many issues and biographies making this book a required cross-reference for all historians and biographers. There is a continuous thread in his government work with only a couple of side tracks.

He was most passionate in international commitments, making note that being weak was provocative. From Vietnam; through Carters failed Salt II prompting Russian expansionism and Iran's Hostages, to Reagan's who while strong elsewhere was not strong Lebanon, to the EIGHT weak responses to terrorism by Clinton, Rumsfeld felt an about face in American response to being pushed around was in order. While Kennedy and Johnson were devious though largely ineffective, Carter had proven to be totally unqualified, Clinton was marginally strong in the Balkans but weak in executing and response elsewhere, it was Bush ‘41’ and ‘43’ that put the world on notice. This qualified Rumsfeld as a Cabinet member in GW Bush’s presidency and it was Dick Cheney who made the case to the president elect and then sought him out.

Rumsfeld rubbed folks in power with difficult questions, which created adversaries and respect at the same time Asking the difficult question or going against the grain can be found in examples like Rumsfeld asking LBJ, as the Senate's youngest Congressman, if his actions against North Vietnam had any affect. Johnson admitted a reluctant no. In another example, while being assigned the Space Committee in Congress he asked why are we going to the moon when developing technology and capability in orbiting earth would be a better way of staying even with the Soviet space race. In 1963 Rumsfeld moved against his constituents for LBJ's Civil Rights Bill. This happened to be a move JFK wouldn't take. He noted that while Kennedy achieved legendary status he achieved little as a President. Kennedy’s mission to the moon spent much but accomplished little. Kennedy’s record noted by Rumsfeld; on the foreign front Khrushchev came away from the Vienna talks feeling Kennedy was young and inexperienced. Khrushchev demonstrated this feeling by building a wall in Berlin and engaged Kennedy with a missile crisis. On the domestic side Kennedy would not stand up to Southern Democrats on Civil Rights, giving the issue only lip service. As a note of caution, we find an exact parallel in President Obama.

This tendency to let his convictions from well formed thought, some of known facts some in anticipation of what wasn’t yet known, found friction that comes out even in GW Bush’s administration. Rumsfeld goes on record of not being fond of Condoleezza Rice. He suggests that consensus was formed as opposed to decisions being made. You would think that consensus was more democratic and therefore more effective. As a result decisions were not clear nor were the resulting actions. While it may have created an impression of disharmony to the outsider it only existed between Rumsfeld and Rice and possibly Rice and Powell with a little of Rumsfeld and Powell. Rumsfeld writes 'Our NSC discussions were nothing like what was described by the book chroniclers and so-called experts, none of whom had ever attended an NSC meeting. While he critiques Rice's style as NSC Chief he in a backhanded way admits that Bush's cabinet was more harmonious than the other presidential administrations he served on. This is a mark of a good leader in GW Bush.

Circling back to the 1960’s in drawing on the knitted patters of lessons learned that led to decisions made in government, Rumsfeld's 'Young Turks' chapter of the 1960's is quite intriguing to see that while alienating most from the left and a select group from the out dated right, it found a formulation of relationships of GOP leaders that would shape our country in the last half of the 20th century. On the list were Reagan, George Romney, and GHW Bush. Their first prize accomplishment however was Rumsfeld’s who reshaped parliamentary procedure allowing more transparency in legislature. This accomplishment was lost under his tenure as Secretary of Defense as he was too often accused of underhanded closed door decisions. Let us be reminded that an executive of Department of Defense works under very different circumstance that a US Congressman. Also let us not forget that too often the accusations came from a Press with an adversarial agenda and no real proof.

In decision making at a personal level, in those defining days the known and unknown theme comes out as he describes his position for appropriation of $700M for the Vietnam War in May of 65. He writes: "basing my decision, as I wrote at the time, "on for fundamental fact that we cannot know what is in the mind of the President and certainly we cannot function if we operate on the assumption that his motives were bad." I concluded, "Frankly I did not have the vaguest idea whether I voted properly.” Fact is he voted on fundamentals not detail. The fundamental that Rumsfeld worked from was that LBJ was well intended and honest. Fact is LBJ may have been well intended, but asking a simple detail question like what is the $700M for, may have flushed out the truth in the massive troop increase that Johnson deployed in 65. His unknown was one question away, though never asked.

Further on lessons learned leading to future decisions we find a long term memory, and with that appreciably a lesson never to forget. What is interesting is to speculate on is how Rumsfeld was real close to the political damage caused by body count reports in our newspapers during the Vietnam War. He knew it affected our strategy as well as that of Le Duc Tao's negotiating position with Kissinger during the Paris Peace Talks. Was it this experience that affected the troop count in the 2003 Iraq war? Or was it Tommy Frank's new technology strategy? Or both? Both strategists were deeply entangled in Vietnam with lessons learned. In the end, although it took a few more years for success in Iraq, it's my opinion that we gave the enemy less to send home in body bags. We took away that political opportunity that defeated us in Vietnam. We saved lives of American troops. I am satisfied with Rumsfeld’s unpopular decision. This was a decision from a known perspective.


Bringing details to a higher level the book brings out Rumsfeld’s pre-emptive posture in defending America. As early as 1984 as a prime mover himself, in this role of Middle East envoy for Reagan, Rumsfeld found his beginnings to the 2001 anti-terror policy of GW Bush. In an era where America where still at the affect of Vietnam, the bombing of the Marine barrack in Lebanon left an impression. He writes "It should be clear: the way to successfully deal with terrorists is to not only try to defend against them, but also take the battle to them. Beirut demonstrated to me the profound truth that weakness is provocative. Our withdrawal from Lebanon contributed again to an impression among our friends and enemies of a vulnerable and irresolute America." In a speech in 1984 Rumsfeld registers his position on terrorism saying: “Increasingly, terrorism is not random nor the work of isolated madmen. Rather, it is state-sponsored, by nations using it as a central element of their foreign policy...A single attack by a small weak nation, by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nations or force tribute for wealthy nations. Unchecked, state-sponsored terrorism is adversely changing the balance of power in our world.”

The GW Bush Administration and Rumsfeld’s role as Secretary of Defense during the Iraq war would be the prime reason one would read this book. Rumsfeld, like many other auto biographers, hopes that the preceding half of the book helps shapes the reader's mind with the same paradigm Rumsfeld held while serving at a post fraught with many controversial issues. The theme known and unknown by this time has not just an appreciation by the reader, but it also has a personality. What follows here is a summary of a may it “please the people” defense summary dissertation

Rumesfeld writes "While it may look like trivia, the Bush administration gained 90 coalition partners in the War on Terror." This flies in the face of the liberal pundits and their democrat protagonists that I have come to despise. What I find remarkable is that like Bush, Rumsfeld takes the heat and calls it a communication short fall on their part. They din not blame it on Clinton. What was not effectively communicated was the purpose of the alliance. The fact is Rumsfeld followed the advice of a close ally in Benjamin Netanyahu who cautioned against building a permanent alliance that would restrict flexibility in the future. Rumsfeld advised that the mission should define the alliance not the other way around. Calling it a war on terror implied a message that we were defending our country; not exacting revenge. Calling it a war enabled a coalition to form with multifaceted missions. The facets were not made know to the world. Both Bush and Rumsfeld take the heat, for which when looking at roles and responsibilities of a Cabinet, one would normally look to the Secretary of State who in this case is Colin Powell and in succession Condoleezza Rice.


There is much criticism of our handling of Afghanistan in terms of not finishing the job before starting a war with Iraq. This criticism comes from not clearly defining the job in a region where no one country trusted the other, beginning with the factions within Afghanistan. Here is an interesting fact: the Clinton administration through CIA officials advised Massoud, Afghanistan's Northern Alliance leader, not to kill bin-Laden if the opportunity arose. "You guys are crazy," Massoud responded. "You haven't changed a bit." So why would the leaders of Afghanistan trust Bush? Bush made one thing clear; the government that sponsored terrorism was to be properly disposed of. And that was accomplished. More importantly was how we did it. Nearly all Muslim countries concurred that the Taliban had to go. They also advised that a US backed war spearheaded by Afghans would do wonders inside Afghanistan and in the larger Muslim world, in terms of American-Islam relations.

With regard to 'finishing' and the Tora Bora question; Rumsfeld's General Tommy Franks reasoned against an Afghan winter in a mountain pass that holds much military history in favor of the local Pashtun people who had no affinity with any country, 'The insertion of a large number of our own forces would have taken time, providing a window for the terrorists to escape. The marshaling of American troops could also have led to fierce engagements with local Pashtuns, causing casualties on both sides. Further, an intrusion into the Pashtun heartland with thousands of American conventional ground forces, who were unfamiliar with the language, the cultures, and the territory, might have reversed the hard work that had convinced a large number of the Pashtuns to cooperate with us.

With as much criticism for timeline wars and immediate gratification of victory, as though the war was a sporting event led by presidential candidate Obama, the patience in both Iraq and Afghanistan allowed for achievement of the goals at the lowest possible cost of American lives. In retrospect gaining field victory, allowing the rebels, the Pashtuns, to claim victory. This is exactly what appears to be Obama's agenda in Libya. Sadly he either doesn't know this yet as of 90 days post Libyan invasion, or he won't claim that he is once again following GW Bush war policy against a country that has actually assisted America in
it's war on terror. In Bush we had a President. In Obama we have the same as we did in Clinton a candidate, making all moves by the polls in pursuit of a second term.

Trivia fact: in 1998 the Hill in Washington DC passed a bill (Congress 360 to 38, Senate unanimous) for regime change in Iraq and Clinton signed it. Clinton failed to act however. He sited UN sanctions that were actually funneling millions in un-designated aid the Saddam Hussein. Rumsfeld requested a NSC principals meeting on Iraq in July of 2001 to set predetermined options on the table. All declined. It was Rumsfeld who had a war agenda alone, contrary to popular belief under strong encouragement of Democrat pundits. One has to look at what was known and unknown as the harsh facts that 9/11 put the United States on a war footing that was not of its choosing. Bush did not come in to office with a war agenda. He campaigned on a education theme. 9/11 forced Bush to re-examine everything.

In the WMD quagmire Rumsfeld and others at senior level would engage intelligence officials in briefings. This process brought a deeper investigation on intelligence causing some within the intelligence community to complain the process was politicized. In response to this Rumsfeld removed himself from direct participation of which brought complaint that absence of senior participation caused undesirable results and diminished the clarity of the objective. Who in the general public knows and appreciates this inner dialogue of decision making? Yet we the people, not at the benefit of Rumsfeld’s closing statements of 'his-story' if not to read this book would miss it. Amazingly on page 433 the now unclassified list of WMD evidence is published. At summary level it provides a list that all governments agreed to.

The list is not long. The last two bullets are the most provocative:
1. Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an
organization such as al-Qaeda - with world wide reach and extensive
terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a life-or-death
struggle against the United States - could perpetrate the type if
terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.

2. In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step if
assisting the Islamist terrorist in conducting CBM [chemical or
biological weapon] attack against the United States would be his last
chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.

It is essential to note that there was no coercion by Bush on intelligence supporting WMD. There was no challenge by Powell on WMD or troop quantity. Rumsfeld defined a process and engagement of key principals that helps one visualize a rise to a decision by the most qualified of person in Colin Powell. He did not push back on troop count, though he was given ample opportunity to do so in the pre-launch phase of the war. He made no objections. The situations to do so make it clear Powell was on board with troop count. Powell the most seasoned Cabinet member on intelligence was allowed his own ascent to a determination. He made his own decision that there was conclusive evidence for WMD. The narrative that he was duped sprung from the live interview in Riyadh. It took off and Powell never retreated from it. This was Powell's fall from my graces. He could have stepped up and simply said what Rumsfeld and Bush said...'I was wrong


Rumsfeld takes the heat for a misstatement he made saying he knew where the WMD were as opposed to saying "suspected". Again we find one statement made out of context exploited with a negative spin for political reason alone. There were no winners and this country will continue to lose its footing when we the people respond to coined phrases without reading the books. The popular phrase chanted "Bush lied, people died" was the simple phrase that too many people latched on to foolishly. It was as viral as “hell no we won't go". I despise vehemently those who participated in that chant and associated actions, including some in my family. It suggests a tendency of mob rule by the ignorant. Rather to learn and consider the wider context they prefer to be ignorant in the vain of partisan politics at the cost of national security. I say this on June 19,
2011 when our current president has taken us to war with Libya, a brutal regime but in line with US security and helpful to us in the war on terrorist. Obama, like Johnson waged war not simply without declaring it, but actively denying it. He hides behind NATO and says we have no boots on the ground while boots are in the air. And yet there is no cry of foul from the partisan morons.

In the end I found reading Rumsfeld’s book, a autobiography of a controversial person, as rewarding as reading all of Kissinger’s work. Both authors are strong in detail and rationale. For that reason alone the read is a great mental work out that recharges a discipline lost among too many people. In reading their testimonies, while one may still struggle with concurrence, he does become enlightened on the notion that the decisions were always complex and there was no evil agenda. Books like these should be required reading before a person goes to the ballot box.

Interesting Notes

It was a Democratic Congress that actually passed a bill that gave Nixon the power to impose wage and price control as a way to show the public they were doing something about inflation. They never dreamed Nixon would enact it. Carter also made the same imposition on Corporate America with the same dismal results. It was in Rumsfeld's opinion the worst thing Nixon did. Oddly enough he was persuaded by John Connelly an ex-Democrat known for being shot along side Kennedy, turned Republican, as Secretary of Treasury, who received all the powers enacted by the new and broad economic controls. They were akin to obamacare. The saving grace was the controls were temporary. Rumsfeld was eventually assigned the job to manage it mostly because he was against it and therefore would ensure that it was temporary.


It is popular opinion that the president's position is influential in abortion decisions. It is also popular opinion the Republicans are pro life and Democrats are pro choice. It was Republican Nixon who chose the Supreme Court Justice that wrote the majority position in Roe-v-Wade that favored abortion-choice.

It is quite clear in the book that Rumsfeld and GHW Bush did not have an affinity for one another. There are no occurrences of disagreement but a few occurrences of competitive rivalry when the political landscape of Washington D.C. Shrugged. Rumsfeld writes that GHW Bush was in the running to be selected by Ford as his Vice President. He suggests that Bush was lobbying for the job. Having just read All the Best, Bush's memoirs, I don't recall any position that Bush was appointed where he lobbied fir the job. Here is the irony; in both memoirs every appointment was met with modesty. Rumsfeld seems to hold the record for turning down but later accepting appointments. He is convincing with his detail in his case each time.

Rumsfeld writes that as Chief of Staff for Ford he made a long list of candidates for Director of CIA. GHW Bush was on his list but below the 'short list' candidates. He says Bush was eager to get back from then remote China and into the main stream. Having just read Bush's Auto biography I note a differing story where Bush was thoroughly enjoying China. The request to be CIA Director came as a surprise to Bush. Rumsfeld taken by the controversy called Ford for a clarification. Ford sided with Rumsfeld. In 1988 after a brief attempt at A presidential run Rumsfeld found Dole preferable to GHW Bush. As a result the close relationship Rumsfeld held with Cheney
over the years saw a period of frost while Cheney was Secretary of Defense under GHW Bush.

I find it simply classic that Clinton's rhetoric brow beating on GHW Bush over the phrase 'read my lips' but raised taxes anyway got him elected. Yet Clinton too raised the same taxes he beat Bush up on. It is classic Democrat strategy to beat up the opponent rather than take a stand. This same tactic was used by Obama who has in two short years confirmed more GW Bush legacy policy than any of his own campaign promises.

A quip of wit to Putin in 2001: 'money is a coward'- that is when potential investors see instability and uncertainty, they tend to invest their money elsewhere... When businessmen see that Russia's closest associates are Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Libya and the like and see corruption and periodic opposition to American policies, they
conclude Russia is an uncertain place and that their investments could be at risk.

Interesting trivia: LBJ had approval from Cambodia and Laos to bomb. Nixon never crossed what was he was approved to do.