Diplomacy

Diplomacy
by Henry Kissinger

This is a wonderful book discussing the world of diplomacy from an American and historical perspective. Kissinger’s role in making history drawing from a high degree of expertise that, in conjunction with his eloquent command of the English written word, gives the reader reason to pause and reflect on the turn of every page. His book suggests that there are two basic positions for which Diplomats have historically placed themselves. That of Richelieu, of 14Th century France and that of Bismarck in united Germany, of the 19th century. He then examines the political fabric of the United States from the perspective of Theodore Roosevelt’s sense of National Security and Wilson’s sense of liberty for all of mankind.

The book is as much a history lesson as it is a lesson on diplomacy. It looks behind the scenes to explore the thought processes of those leaders in their deliberation to commit their people to war. Especially in reading the diplomatic prelude prior to both World Wars. There was reckless madness of both the military leaders and their politicians, who are not always on the same page of music, as they order young men to their death. This review presents a theme followed by my notes and quotes, reflecting Kissinger’s conclusion. Liberty is a conscious that enabled every president of the 20th century to commit its people to war. But the underlying reason in every case was national security. The rest of the world does not necessarily think as we do. And so we must be prepared.

Liberty is something we demand within our boarders and promote internationally. But NATIONAL SECURITY is an issue where we need to change the way we think. I am reassured to hear Colin Powell, a man I hold in very high regard, say that we will form an international coalition, yet we will not be constrained by this coalition. Our new world order calls for a combination of Richlieu and Bismark as presented by Kissinger. Build SDS, secure our airports, avenge our perpetrators with a furry and at the same time promote international trade, assist our international community, and participate in world harmony. Do this from a foundation of security and strength. Can Americans submit to self-interest as opposed to principle? If not, then how to balance international power among regions of disparate moral values? Hence lay the conflicts of Richelieu (1700) and Wilson (1900).

Today, after reading this book, I am perplexed to be in agreement with Richelieu; yet hold a measure of disdain towards the French role in diplomacy. While Kissinger has a bias toward national security, he concedes to America’s penchant for human rights and civil liberty. But he did let the cat out of the bag by illustrating the contrasts, of all 20th century presidents involved in war except Nixon, between the strategy to defend our nation and gain public support for such defense. I believe after reading this book, and in the wake of terrorist activity in New York City and Washington D.C. I encourage all Americans to realize that we are a disparate human race and we must always maintain a high regard to National Security. Theodore Roosevelt began the 20th century on that note, I urge president Bush to do the same now.

NOTES & QUOTES:
I found it interesting to read that our Monroe Doctrine was primarily drafted to establish the Americans position between The Holy Alliance and Spain. Secondarily, it was what allowed for the American expansion across the West with European protection. We lived in “splendid isolation for 100 years.

It is popular thinking that American entrance into WWI was because of the sinking of the Lisutnia. When in fact Roosevelt’s and then Wilson’s doctrine on America's global responsibilities that primarily backed the proclamation of war. Wilson 's primary objective was a new and just international order based on Human Rights as opposed to the European arrangement of 'balance of power' between governments.

Balance of power was basically the brainchild of France; Raison detate. While Raison detate was perceive as a tool to allow nation states to balance power in the best interest of each nation; in fact this was a measure commensurate to the Monroe Doctrine. Raison detate benefited France the alliance security of smaller nations as she expanded her boarder eastward into the Habsburg Dynasty, The Holy Roman Empire of that time. I am intrigued to appreciate that the Catholic-Protestant schism was actually a political issue after all. France, Germany, Sweden clearly allied against the Habsburg Dynasty for national survival, more so than for religious reason. Britain was only an agent to light the fuse

You learn in the Austrian position of the 19th century that building alliances to balance the agendas of its neighbors were an exercise in balancing substance and form. Keeping the Tsar in check through consensus of conservative interests. And simultaneously maintaining an alliance with
Britain on the basis of last resort for resisting challenges to the balance of powers. As time allowed the aggression of France t fade, Austria found it much more difficult to broker peace. During this period Austria, at the Vienna Congress of 1815 came very close to forming an EU. Being in a position of relative weaker member yet still with the legacy vestiges of the Habsberg Dynasty, Lets hope Brussels gets the job done this time around.

Napoleon III's foreign policy clearly represents the consequence of not demonstrating the capability of standing behind it. He over the course of 20 years surrendered France’s European leadership to a newly united
Germany. One element that Prussia's Bismark used to seal the fate of France and a new European order by leaking Napoleons foreign correspondence to the press. Thus pressing Napoleon into a senseless war with Prussia.

“What is a revolutionary? If the answer to that question were without ambiguity, few revolutionaries would ever succeed. For revolutionaries almost always start from a position of inferior strength. They prevail because the established order is unable to grasp its own vulnerability.
This is especially true when the revolutionary challenge emerges not from a march on the Bastille but in conservative garb. Few institutions have defenses against those who evoke the expectation that they will preserve
Them." Bismark was a revolutionary for sure. So much so that his only flaw was to find someone with the right skills to succeed him. The wrong leadership to a good German role as a world leader and made it a bad one.”

Moral Convictions or National Security appear to have been a pivotal card to play in the game of foreign policy. In 1880 Gladstone won the office of British Prime Minister on Moral Convictions. Wilson mobilized Roosevelt’s public supported policy using a higher moral ground argument. Bismark was
constrained in his dispatch of Real Plotik in the Balance of Power by his acquiescence to public moral convictions. Since Gladstone, human rights have been the guiding light to international peace movements, weather through successful diplomacy or war. However as in Gladstones defense of Afghanistan against Russia’s quest for a southern port in 1880, it became easy to question weather Britain's leader was compelled by geopolitics or was he genuine in his higher international moral ground to the extent he would commit British lives.

Russia, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Austria all contributed in foiling the Balance of Power in Europe in the 25 years preceding The Great War. Primarily the catalyst was the shortsighted vision of German leaders post Bismark. Her balancing act through alliance treaties could not be sustained for two reasons. First the newly united Prussian German people were conflicted by the insecurity of having 200 years of war fought on their
Soil by foreign powers. Second, their new found strength found short sighted leaders with the tendency in negotiating alliances by forcing the German position. While Germany did not have aspiration to expand in any direction, her short sighted foreign policy found herself surround by adverse countries, each having their own network of dependant alliances.

I am absolutely amazed that if diplomacy worked we would have allied with Great Britain and Germany prior to the World Wars. Funny how it turned out. Why didn’t we? In the end diplomacy was not the perpetuating factor. Individual military planners, drawing up plans using new technology dependant on general war versus local war, in conjunction with no communication with their diplomatic counterparts created the fuse.

It was not the assassination of the Austrian Prince. It was not the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia. It was the military response of Russia and Germany. Russia had no military plan to war with Austria of which was their sole aim, that did not include an attack on Germany. Germany had no military plan to war with Russia without defeating France. Austria only lit the fuse in an effort to solidify its annexation of Bosnia; a very local issue causing Russia to take action and Germany to defend herself. If only the diplomats knew the constraints and General War –v- Local War designs of their perspective military.

The United States people were lured into the Great War based on the Wilsonian spin on Roosevelts national security. That spin was the promotion of democracy, a nations self-determination, and collective security. Evidence that the world then was not ready for such lofty ideals is the post War Paris peace conference did not include Russia and Germany. Russia having been defeated by Germany and Germany defeated by the Allies led to the over throw of their leaders. Hence giving 20 years to harvest the seed of a poorly constructed peace settlement.

The peace conference included 27 states, 1,646 meetings and kept Wilson over seas for 4 months. He was drawn into international diplomatic detail that his country's domestic agenda would not tolerate. Therefore the ideals for which he gained public support fell off the table in Paris.

The fundamental difference between European and Wilsonian interpretations of the causes of WWI is Europeans presumed that national interest tend to clash, and view diplomacy as a means to reconcile. Wilson considers international discord the result of clouded thinking. Europeans negotiate with incentives and penalties. Wilson negotiations require the agreement of general principles. With this said, it becomes difficult to separate Wilson's and Lenin's end goal of international relations. Wilson pursued a common mindset of state. Lenin pursued the abolishment of the state in lieu of collective thinking. Uhm.

Hitler was a demagogue. “Demagoguery resides in the ability to distill emotion and frustration into a single moment. " This in conjunction with a very suspicious treaty of Versailles, the continued failure of the League of Nations and the continued uncertainty of Western heads of State over Hitler's intention gave Germany all the room to rebuild its military machine. The guilt clause
of the treaty of Versailles left the German people in a mood to pressure any German leader for retribution.

“Hitler was your worst nightmare in this situation. Foreign policy builds on quicksand when it disregards actual
power relationships and relied on prophecies of anothers intention.” This is a lesson George Bush is trying to leverage in his argument towards a new nuclear defense.

Cold War players; Truman, Stalin, Churchill, Leahy, Davies, Hopkins. Primary interlocutors were Stalin and Hopkins. Primary issue was Eastern European countries. It is interesting how Truman convinced Congress and the American people how NATO, Americas first peace time alliance, was unlike the others used to maintain the 'balance of power'. As Dr. Kissinger notes 'any history student would not receive a passing grade for such an analysis. So like Wilson and Roosevelt before him
a great selling job on 'we the people' had to occur. The common theme was principle. Not national security

Trivia; who gets credit for the inauguration of the Cold War? That is right, he did so in his Fulton, Missouri speech known as the Iron Curtain speech. At the beginning of the Cold War, Henry Wallace was quoted often stating that hatred, prejudice, and fear were the root causes of
international conflict and the United States had no moral right to intervene abroad until it banished these scourges from its own society. I find it interesting that Kinssinger would put the quote in his book on diplomacy. It is also paradoxical that Wilson, Roosevelt, and Truman all got the American public in wars with high moral ground rhetoric. I sense that Kissinger, like the Bush family, and Theodore Roosevelt who view diplomacy as a means to national security.

In reading the diplomatic events that paralleled the U.S. entrance in Korea, specifically the misconceptions communist China held, you appreciate the need to keep military and diplomacy in concert. In post WW II and Korea
this eluded American leaders in the same way it eluded the European leaders in pre WWI. As a side note I found it interesting that Kissinger proclaims McArther the most talented General Officer in the 20th century after having
read the memoirs of Japanese Generals who out foxed McArther often.

McArther’s decision to advance up the Yalu River proved to be enough to draw China into the war. McArther ignored Chia's experience with Japan over the same real-estate. Truman exacerbated the Chinese view by changing the war goal often and by separately sending the 7th fleet to defend Tiawan. With regard to the Truman-McAther rift, Kissinger sides with McArher yet holds out for a different military strategy. Truman's handling of Korea set the tone for Viet-Nam and continued downward spiral until the US leaders recognized the importance of harmonizing diplomatic and military strategy.

Adenauer; Germany’s first Chancellor after World War II was primarily responsible for taking Germany west rather than east. Given the historical trend we in the west owe some gratitude to this man. In the mean time: How did Dulles get an airport named after him? According to Kissinger, Dulles single handedly alienated the leaders of both Great Britain and France in his diplomacy on the Suez Canal and Hungary incidents. Andenaur of Germany found similar distaste over Dulles's role in the Berlin crisis. All in all though Kissigers insight on the Cold War goes like this, “it was predictable but no one had predicted it.” In the meantime Khrushchev stirred on international crisis to, in the opinion of deGulle, mask over the Russian domestic shortfall.


You can surely point blame at Dulles' actions during the peak of the Cold War for deGulle’s move towards an EU. The end game, being EU, is perfectly fine. However the seed of bitter sentiment was planted then in France of which now comes back to haunt the enterprise of the US. The recent snubbing of a GE/Honeywell merger has more than business concern. The EU actually reversed the decision of the US courts. As globalization continues this decision will represent the French led sentiment of Europe in a movement to settle the score and return to the old fashion balance of power policy, to the determent of all. This is my opinion.

During the Cold War it is interesting to take note of the styles of diplomacy of the Western allies. While Great Britain acquiesced to the new US style; approaching alliances like corporate mergers exacting returns on
investment that are proportional to investment. Meanwhile, France continued it’s 300 year tradition of Richelieu's calculation of risks and rewards.

With regard to nuclear threat, Kissinger illustrates the effort to detour its allies let alone the threat of non-allies or actual adversaries. The US could become a target in cross fire in an attempt to neutralize us.

I, like most American witnesses of Viet-Nam and communist fears once found it easy to criticize our 'conservative anti communist leaders' for committing the US to a war that was not related to our interest. Well; after Kissinger's memoirs and this book Diplomacy, I have a broader perspective. I now understand the events of Communist aggression; the Czech coup, the Berlin blockade, testing of the Soviet A-bomb, and the Communist victory in China all gave US leaders cause to take fearful notice. Compound this with the Wilsononian rhetoric of 'global liberty with no foreign interest. These two converging sets of collective conscience allowed America to ignore the
standing principles of Richelieu and Bismark and commence a naive defense of a not yet established State of Viet-Nam. While we at home had to come to grips with our values as a country, all other observing nations were struggling to distinguish our acts as being non aggressive or imperialistic. I would suspect that we have yet to sort this out.

As much as I have been receptive of Reagan's SDI proposal; Kissinger's theory, shared by many intellectuals, that SDI gave the politician an out on mutual nuclear suicide makes sense. His insight brings home the fears of other countries. Viet-Nam gives evidence that the United States can portray a sense of imperialism. Albeit our country learned a valuable lesson, as did Germany, the world is not ready for a defense that allows for a unilateral nuclear capability; even with the United States. Yet
when Reagan and Gorbachev proposed in Reykjavik to destroy their complete nuclear arsenals, Great Britain, France, and China were not even remotely prepared to follow suit. UHM!!! Just when diplomacy seemed to be getting easy in a
bipolar superpower world, the landscape changes. And thus a deterrent is again viable issue to contemplate.

It is interesting to hear Kissinger describe the collapse of the USSR as the only time a country was overthrown without a war. Gorbachev, as a reformist of revolutionary proportion, miss calculated on principles of revolution.
First is revolutions consume their children because revolutionaries rarely understand that after a certain point of social disintegrating, there are no longer any fixed Archimedean points of which to leverage success. As such, Gorbachev's programs of perestroika and glastnost found themselves diametrically opposed and the center of the Soviet fall.

Can Americans submit to self-interest as opposed to principle? If not, then how to balance international power among regions of disparate moral values? Hence lay the conflicts of Richelieu (1700) and Wilson (1900). Today,
after reading this book, I am perplexed to be in agreement with Richelieu; yet hold a measure of disdain towards the French role in diplomacy. While Kissinger has a bias toward national security, he concedes to America’s penchant for human rights and civil liberty. But he did let the cat out of the bag by illustrating the contrasts, of all 20th century presidents involved in war except Nixon, between the strategy to defend our nation and gain public support for such defense. I believe after reading this book, and in the wake of terrorist activity in New York City and Washington D.C. I encourage all Americans to realize that we are a disparate human race and we must always maintain a high regard to National Security. Theodore Roosevelt began the 20th century on that note, I urge president Bush to do the same now.