The Gathering Storm

The Gathering Storm
by Winston Churchill

The following poetic quote sums up the words on the pages of the age of ink press:
He who will not when he may
When he will, he shall have Nay
Churchill’s prose interpretation of the same:
“In this Twilight War…It was after France had been flattened out that Britain, thanks to her island advantage, developed out of the pangs of defeat and the menace of annihilation a national resolve equal to that of Germany.
I personally noted that it were those same pangs of defeat that gave Germany the resolve to rise up to the world in the way they did. In reading this remarkable account of history by a leader who was part of it makes you the reader in want to take decisive lesson from the time spent between the covers of this book. The following summarizes what I learned.

It has been claimed at dinner parties that Britain and France had been the policemen of Europe in the prelude of World War II. Churchill makes in plainly clear in this book that they were champions of appeasement and diplomatic folly. In his careful and colorful description of events, using excerpts of speeches, and correspondences, blended with dialogue; the reader becomes painfully aware that appeasement was simply a term used in the press to lull the citizens towards a false hope for peace. Rather, the reader becomes clearly appraised as to the miss-steps in diplomacy in the nature of French Richelieu’s balance of power. A diplomacy where France instead breaks her commitment of balance of power through failed obligation in defense of smaller nations in domino succession, leaving Poland as the last domino to fall coinciding with the outbreak. Britain simply followed suit, as there were no formal commitments to counter act the overwhelming call in the press for peace. In the end such folly rendered both policemen as accomplices to a world tragedy. Churchill writes that the tale was not about diplomacy aimed at national security guised as justice; it ended up being a fight for our lives.

While the copyright is 1948 Churchill claims many words published were actually written eighteen years earlier as a message to prevent what he calls the second conclusion of mankind. I took grave note that Britain and France' roles aside, Churchill makes clear that most of all the immense power and impartiality in the United States allowed conditions to be gradually led to the very climax that peace dreaded most. In 1948 he is certain to caution any notion that the United States should make the same mistake for a third convulsion from which none may live to tell the tale. In almost every strategic decision to prepare England and her allies for defense, Churchill found himself perplexed with the prevailing sentiment of defensive –v- offensive stratagem. Where you actually call the start of the war didn’t matter. For instance just before Hitler attacked Norway and France it was learned that Hitler planned to attack Norway to defend herself and as well, maintain the industrious raw material from Sweden. Churchill faced absolute refusal to land troops in Norway or supply bombers to an offensive plan of defense of the world. Churchill writes of a French communiqué from his interlocutor: “The president of the Republic himself had intervened and that no aggressive measure must be taken which might only draw reprisal upon France. “ He again writes his personal frustration of well laid offensive plans in the defense of his home land

“The idea of not irritating the enemy did not commend itself to me.”“

To help the reader comprehend such a grim summary view the beginning is a good place to start. Churchill spends a chapter describing how the German leadership began their rearmament as early as 1923 and could have been stopped with out the risk of a single life up to 1934. Even when he sounded the alarm in 1930, there were eight years to arrest the build up of which not only did the allies reject but they also proceeded to reduce their own militaries.

In describing Hitler, in immediate Post Great War, Churchill describes a man capable of rationalizing a hatred for Jews and Bolsheviks, not for any other reason than it was they who exploited the defeated German people. But Hitler found himself not alone as he discovered a party of people of the same mind. They held a defeated passionate hate for those who exploited them in a time of defeat. With the collapse of the German mark Hitler, the new leader of the National-Socialist Party, found hungry AND THUS EASY RECRUITS. A PARTY FOUNDED IN HATRED. While in prison in 1924, Hitler outlined Mien Kampf. A Hitler doctrine adopted by the German people that appeared to have its sole basis in nothing but hatred of anything not German. It was a doctrine that mandated men to fight for freedom, a word guised in supremacy. Ironically, freedom arrived at a cost of individuals surrendering ones mind to the Fuehrer. In Churchill’s chapter on Locusts the reader of twenty-o-four cannot help but draw an Ominous Parallel to current world situation, but also to a theory analyzed on Piekoff’s book Ominous Parallel.

It took more than a desperate people for Hitler to spring to power. It took the coalescence of military organizations bent on power. As they viewed each other as foes that could bring each other down against the political enemy, being communist Bolsheviks, they united in a fashion that brought down the Bruening Cabinet, thus creating a political vacuum. There existed a vacuum; not of ideas, but of a leader to execute on his ideas. It should be noted that while the elite palace leaders were in no way impressed with Hitler, 13,000,000 Germans were behind him. While Churchill does not address the philosophical foundation of the German mind he makes a case for opportunity for a leader to take advantage of a willing mind, for whatever reason. In essence it takes willing people, but a cacophony of political stratagem must also coincide for such a catastrophe of an elected Hitler leadership to occur. In a note on humility, Hitler’s predecessor Hindenberg once said that Hitler is suited for no more than Postmaster, "where he can lick stamps with my head on them".

Meanwhile in the course of European debate over weapons of war (WMD) Churchill gave his first warning to England of the eminent danger being sown in 1936. While Europe was disarming, Germany was ripe to rearm. Meanwhile British public opinion concluded that all doubts of a peaceful Germany should be cast aside. After the takeover of the Rhineland of which without a challenge Hitler assumed un- questionable authority over his Generals. All of Germany was succeeded in the easy gain of ground against its former adversaries, so divided and tame. There is no doubt that had His Majesty's Government chosen to act with firmness and resolve through thru League of Nations, they could have led a united Britain on a final quest to avert war. In 1939 Churchill writes
“in keeping with a 400 year history to avert a dominance by a dictator from any country We ought to set the life and endurance of the British Empire and the greatness of the this island very high in our duty, and not be led astray by illusions about an ideal world, which only means that other and worse controls will step into our place, and that future direction will belong to them.''

In a speech to the House of Commons Churchill said the credit of the Government has been compromised by what has occurred. The House has been consistently misled about the air-position. The Prime Minister himself has been misled. He was misled right up to the last moment, apparently. Look at the statement, which he made in March when he spoke about our armaments:
“The sight of this enormous, this almost terrifying power which Britain is building up has a sobering effect, a steadying effect, on the opinion of the world.”

When I compare the political debate surrounding National Defense of 1936-1938 and compare it to 2001-2004, I am again struck by the similarities. History will again decide if G.W. Bush made the correct strategic decisions in Iraq. The notion to bring Bush up for war crimes comes from minds not incapable of examining the multi layered landscape of issues with a focus on National Security. And thus with absence of personally formed bias our ill informed public opinion leaves our current world vulnerable to Churchill’s greatest fear. Back to the book review specifically Churchill’s views were opposite those of Baldwin and Chamberlain. Attack through diplomatic channels and then with arms were his messages. The measured results of Churchill’s time where an immediate World War with grave loss of life ensued, yet it’s conclusion drew an apparent beginning of lasting peace in Europe. That conclusion did not have to weigh so heavy a price on the world. Credit is given to leaders such as Churchill, Roosevelt & Truman, of WWII and then Reagan who pushed for the close of the Cold War. Can history be used to chart our future in twenty-o-four?

Some lessons are never learned; this one being harmony in leadership. In 1937 and in the midst Italian buildup Secretary of British Foreign Affairs Eden was knitting together a plan to ally France and England against Italy on submarine attacks. Of course there are a few dynamics to be noted that draw a parallel with slight departure in terms of role reversals to current events in 2004. At first it should be noted that Eden, Secretary of State was placed at odds with his Prime Minister, Chamberlain of who replaced Baldwin. He did his duty at odds with his cabinet in a Machiavellian setting and eventually was neutralized in Chamberlains circle. His course of action was to play a strong hand and tendered an offer to Mussolini that the powers of the Mediterranean will join together to sink all submarines as pirates and requested Italy’s participation. With firm resolve of a united front Mussolini agreed to enjoin in the anti pirate campaign, and suddenly his Italian subs refrained from sinking any more merchant ships. The outlook Churchill held as he encouraged Eden to continue in the face political headwinds he wrote

“Poor England! Leading her free, and careless life from day-to-day, amid careless good-tempered parliamentary babble, she followed, wondering, along the downward path which led to all she wanted to avoid, She was continuously reassured by the leading articles of the most influential newspapers, with some honorable exceptions, and behaved as if all the world were as easy, uncalculating and well-meaning as herself.”

He further writes:
“Mr. Roosevelt was indeed running great risks in his own domestic politics by deliberately involving the United States in the darkening European scene. All the forces of isolationism would have been aroused if any part of these exchanges had transpired. On the other hand, no event could have been more likely to stave off or even prevent war than the arrival of the United States in the circle of European hates and fears.”

Churchill’s following words damning Chamberlain’s decision to not accept Roosevelt’s offer must be left for the reader, who would by page 255 of the book be in a Churchill frame of mind to appreciate the gravity of Chamberlains mistake.

” I must remark here though there is at least on consistent parallel and that is the influence of the press to tilt an uniformed population with incomplete information, and the necessity of a press secretary to spin leadership policy against these winds. And we the people must vote a leader and allow him to lead with a willingness to view and seek out the complete story as opposed to submit to the whirlpool of partisan politics found in the press at the fate of National Security. “

Churchill’s story makes this ever clearer in my mind and puts me on the look out for Colin Powell’s book. I must personally say that I have making a case for clarity and thoroughness in reporting. As well I have been condemning those with a voice of hatred towards our leadership when I find them banking all their emotion on the whims of our American press. If only in the heat of debate could I remember such eloquent words?

I also learned that the Domino Theory that prevailed in the 50s and formulated a tenant of our involvement in Viet Nam becomes none too original when reading the succession of events in the late 1930s where England and France, mishandled their “world policemen” obligations. France was bound by treaty to defend Czechoslovakia in the case of invasion by Germany. England had no such obligation. However without the commitment of one or the other, neither would defend Czechoslovakia over the Hitler proclaimed issues of the Sudentland area of German speaking Czechs. To this extend a French envoy to the Czechoslovakia government since 1925 resigned and became a Czech citizen when he heard of the folly of the French and Brits over Czechoslovakia. “Honor among men existed somewhere.” Were Churchill’s words. Underpinning the whole situation was a bent towards world peace through disarmament against a world axis menace of Germany, Japan, and to a lesser degree Italy. As a student I remember the film reels of Neville Chamberlain boarding tail-dragger planes of DC3 form, in his last ditch attempt of diplomacy with the Fuehrer. In the letters between all parties, held within the pages of this book, and Churchill’s description, the reader clearly becomes aware, how innocent and ill-informed leaders can play the wrong cards in the high stakes game of world dominance of that time. Chamberlains trip to Berchtesgaden proved to be a pinnacle mistake in diplomacy. Churchill in my opinion describing the events makes a clear case for a strong hand i.e.: T.Rex “speak softly and carry a big stick” or Ronald Reagan’s clear stand with Gorbechov in Reykjavik and then Berlin. Churchill in his book asks for history to be the judge of diplomacy’s hand. When I read of Carters handling of Iranian affairs in 1979 along with Chamberlain Berchtesgaden in contrast to Reagan and Bush(s), I must again stand behind a leader who plays a strong hand in matters of National Security, at high sacrifice to world opinion or ACLU protests of encroachment upon civil liberties. Both are a small price to pay for inalienable rights of freedom. I fully appreciate that there is a difference and a hierarchy between and within the two.

The most striking “news to me’ was to read of the high ranking German Generals plot to arrest Hitler and his leadership just prior to Chamberlains lack luster attempts at diplomacy. Churchill’s conclusive words are most appropriate at this point:

“If it should eventually be accepted as historical truth, it will be another example of the very small accidents upon which the fortunes of mankind turn.”

I am quickly reminded of Jimmy Carters week-handed diplomacy that was followed two days later of the capture of the American embassy in Iran. If only fate fell into the hands of stronger leaders?

In the aftermath of the Czechoslovakia invasions and the prelude of Poland and Albania by Germany and Italy respectively, Churchill continues to detail the errant decisions carried out in diplomatic relations; not only with his allies but also with his adversaries. The familiar phrase of appeasement becomes clearly understood, in terms of miscalculations, by the emotional words of Churchill standing in the wings waiting his turn to lead. His words towards Neville Chamberlain are typically British, as he allows history to redress Chamberlains leadership into disaster.

Coincidently mentioned but not delved into in this book was the quality of intelligence available to Chamberlain. Churchill claims a superior level of intelligence, and questions Chamberlains and the British Admiralty lack of preparedness against Mussolini’s invasion of Albanian. Ciano, a cabinet member of Mussolini, writes these British are not those of Drake, they are tired old rich men. As I listen to John Kerry not knowing hunger and the Democratic candidate of Presidency of 2004. He who claims he would have gotten up from a school room and done something on the morning of 911, without specifying what he would have done, gives me reason to draw a parallel to Chamberlain; rich men compelled to say I’m in charge and make decisions without trusting the service of his administration and his advisors. Churchill paints an emotional picture of failed diplomacy when placed in the hands of a leader with a self-centered leadership, bent on decision-making in a closet. Perhaps this could be a lesson in history.

As the book transitions from the sad tale of failed diplomacy to a declaration of war, Churchill describes his feelings upon inspecting the naval positions in Scotland as the reappointed Minister of the Admiralty, a position he once held in the onset of the Great War. He first writes a short poem reflecting his reaction to a new generation of crew placed upon the same ships of a previous war. It goes like this:

I feel like one
Who treads alone,
Some banquet hall deserted,
Whose lights are fled,
Whose garlands dead,
And all but he departed.

After reading of the failed preparations at cost of appeasement, Churchill while having a picnic lunch on a hill overlooking a Scottish harbor writes:
“Poland is in agony; France but a pale reflection of her warlike ardour; the Russians Colossus no longer and ally, not even neutral, possibly a foe, Italy no friend, Japan no ally. Would America ever come in again? The British Empire remained intact gloriously united but ill prepared.”

I was struck in reading these words written by a man who was placed in political exile for many a year, waved his flag of alarm to a deaf ear of England, and could place claim on a gloriously united spirit of his countrymen. I am struck by what it took to unite England, as it was not Churchill’s flag waiving. And then I am awe-struck at Churchill’s immediate gratification to be once again in a position to defend his fellow man. Churchill is immediately forgiving of his fellow mans penchant for peace at any cost. In a prefect world it is the higher road. In a real world of 1930 thru 1939, 1991 thru 2004 history proved that perfection was yet to be met.

As the story plunges deeper into the reality of war, the Cabinet officials were busy consuming themselves with the affairs of their own offices and vying for priority with the Prime Minister. Churchill spends a chapter describing his private letters to key officials, putting forward his concerns, recommendations and commitment for support. What Churchill had in his favor were actual experience in many posts of government, a continued study of the government while in 10 years exile, and as sense of raising above any grudge with an aim of National Defense in a headwind of war. The lessons in diplomacy on paper are well worth reading to glean the art of apprising your friend of unsolicited advice. This nature of diplomacy at an individual level is in my opinion a tenant of his countrymen’s call for his Prime leadership.

With Poland in ruins, the Baltic States parlayed to the Soviet Union, Churchill describes the strategy and diplomacy in building the defensive lines along it Belgian frontier. Herein, Churchill describes two tenants of diplomacy finding them tangled in military strategy. The first tenant is quite simple and basically prescribes that no military strategy involving the occupation of Belgian soil in the defense of France could be permitted without Belgian approval. As no approval came forth, plan B was quickly acquiesced to with no hard insistence by either party to Belgium for a plan of mutual benefit. One could easily draw a parallel to the Cambodian circumstance along the Ho Chi Min Trail question and find that world standards caused extreme compromise on a military battlefield. The questions placed upon our leaders are far more complicated than the average bear comprehends. And in too many cases our journalists as simply average bears. Second tenant was the military question of success of attack -v- defend, being argued largely by diplomats as opposed to military strategists. While history at that time proves that attacking leaves one in a more vulnerable position in terms of battlefield and supply lines, Hitler defied history as his Armies broke through the Allied lines on the Belgium frontier and proved that attack can be done while defending ones self. Churchill simply notes that Germany was first to put heavy plates of armor in vehicles. This lesson seems to have been over looked in 2004 by the greatest military planners in man kind.

The combination of the two issues draws into question preemptive attack, which is as a popular question today as it might well have been in 1961 with regard to the Cuban missile crisis. When war is eminent not in terms of days but years, building a case for preemptive action as a defense seems plausible, as Churchill makes clear. However on a world stage of hundreds of countries, this leaves the country of preeminence vulnerable to technical objection reverberated into a frenzy of biased views and exacerbated by journalist. The real questions may be when do the people entrust in our leaders, elected via due process and allow them unabated, but questioned execution of a plan. Churchill’s history makes it clear that the challenge for a unanimous world coalition in the winds of the minority objectors requires a strong leader to stay a course in National Defense, regardless of the popular view.

With regard to making strategic war decisions involving small countries soil, Churchill is mindful of international law but willing to abrogate to the laws of humanity, and allow history to be his judge. Here is a man willing to chart a new course if required; the mark a great leader on a world stage, in my opinion. This said, Churchill describes his efforts to not be confrontational with his “Commander in Chief” Neville Chamberlain; a requisite step in becoming a world class leader, teacher in history, professor in journalism, and spokesperson for personal integrity on a world stage. He was appointed Prime Minister of England by the King on the day Germany invaded Belgium and Holland; not because of the invasion but because of Chamberlains resignation over the poor performance in Norway. His words spoken and written are a hallmark of great leaders worth reading from. Had we only listened in 1936?

Post Script: To draw an ominous parallel to today’s popular venue in Michael Moore’s film, I read in this book of two days prior to the German invasion of Norway, German officials invited the civilians of Oslo, including Western Allies to view a film reel of the capture of Warsaw. With the falling of the bombs the caption at the bottom of the screen read: “This if not for the hand of France and England”. It seems Moore is a student of Hitler. It is too bad our general population is one of “30 second sound bites” students as opposed to one of conscientious study of grave matters. We can be so easily duped. Like the Communists of France who denounced the war as “an imperialistic and capitalist crime against humanity”, there are those factions here in the United States who continue in those ways of the French. As much as I can say I enjoy French culture and would endorse a world of it, I have yet to read of French politics where there was not a selfish French end in mind, blind to the realities of the world.


Catch phrases
1. Death stands at attention, waiting the command to pulverize civilization.
2. Long his victim - for once his master.
3. The world lifted its head, surveyed the ruin
4. The vessel of peace has sprung a leak at every beam.
5. Of all this let history be the judge. We now face events.
6. The veils of the future are lifted one by one, and mortals must act from day to day.
7. Facts are better than dreams.