Does America Need a Foreign Policy

Does America Need a Foreign Policy
By Henry Kissinger

While he does not take history to his typical intimate detail, this book is a valuable history lesson with a specific connection to a recommendation of American foreign policy. While I was expecting his recommendation to be finite in nature, I was somewhat let down, yet history and our current world order as he describes precludes such a narrow mind.

Europe

It is a popular concept in the western world, that sovereignty is derived through a democratic process whereby the people elect leaders who proscribe common law to abide by. Kissinger points out that the Westphalia agreement in post 30 Years War, where regions of land actually were bound by a specific demarcation line, lay the beginning of this popular belief. We have evolved from Kingdoms and Fiefdoms to a world largely dominated by a democratic process. Whether this is merely a transitional phase or the ultimate end is examined in the book. He does fall short in this book in proper examination of China. That review is forth coming.

In taking a historical look at America’s relationship with the various regions of the world, one can conclude that many of today’s nations either a.) Do not fall into this definition, or b.) Fall into this definition as a result of a settlement of a war. Kissinger takes the time to examine the difference between a nation and state, and the application of Wilsonian imposition of human rights versus national interest. Where is the balance in the answers? Again, Kissinger resorts to history in drawing his conclusion. Yet he takes a stand early on is stating that “So long as post Cold Was generation of national leaders is embarrassed to elaborate an un-apologetic concept of enlightened national interest, it will achieve progressive paralysis, not moral elevation. Certainly, to be truly American, any concept of national interest must flow from the country’s democratic tradition…”

Asia

The geopolitical challenge of every Asian nation is not so much how to conquer neighbors as how to prevent those neighbors from combining against it. Kissinger includes China in this assessment; there is historical evidence to challenge him on this accord. Kissinger recommends America to play the role of an independent broker and or arbiter of issues, yet remain implacable when the balance of power causes a threat to American interest.

In China, Kissinger recognizes the vast cultural difference in foreign policy and relates his personal experience on this point. While he describes the American emissaries effort beginning in 1971 as transitory he only scratches the surface of the reason for China’s impression of the US. He does make a cultural observation that I am personally familiar with and that is that the Chinese think in terms of stages of process that has no precise culmination, while Americans think in terms of concrete solutions to specify problems. The Chinese are averse to appearing supplicant they prefer an appearance of patience and aloofness. They do not rely on personal relations as a lubricant to agreement. They view Americans who hold such reliance as erratic and somewhat frivolous.

Kissinger describes the future of Taiwan as a wild card. While he recognizes Taiwan’s Nationalist Party and its goal to seek “One China on it’s terms, he does not describe the recent democratization of Taiwan whereby the Nationalist Party has been over shadowed by a freely elected government who’s vision is ambivalent towards a One China with either mainland or island bias. He describes diplomatic correspondence an international intrigue, yet fails to examine the historical and current internal psyche of the Chinese leaders. China is imperialistic as witnessed in Tibetan, and Mongolia for starters. China has a loose interpretation of boarders. China views the world has that that is Chinese and that that is subservient to China, in measured terms. While Kissenger recommends restraint on the part of Taiwan not to enflame the relations between China and the United States, I have found evidence that kowtowing to China is a slippery slope toward Chinese Imperialism.

Middle East

The challenge de jour of course is Palestine. How and where to define it. Kissenger sites a conversation he had with a member of Arafat’s regime sited Jaffa as his home not the West Bank. Arabs see Israel as a threat, back by the United States. Unfortunately, the ultimate solution for the Arab world is the abolishment of Israel as it exists in “Palestine.” Ironically, many Israelis I have met with while in Israel, just as-soon be given land in Iowa. When you drive around Tel Aviv the common architecture are malls, strip malls and every franchise store found in America. You would think you were in east East LA.

Kissinger clearly indicts the Clinton diplomacy as a failure in peace negotiations. He sites the Oslo peace accord as technically Norwegian, yet underpinned by the United States policy and then under minded by Clinton’s in ability to keep Saddam in the box, which according to Madeline Albright was the declared aim of American policy. The PLO failed to live up to any of the terms of Oslo. Meanwhile the Arabs while unified in military order against Israel, were coming apart in political unity. Clinton/Christopher failure to recognize this had led to a crescendo in global affairs. Clinton’s ambition to be the broker of peace during his term was quickly leveraged by all sides. Thus rendering the United States exposed to diplomatic blackmail and a victim of the conflict. He called the Camp David meetings as meetings of the deaf. I am sure in judging Kissinger’s’ overall sentiment towards the Clinton behavior on a world stage that the vision of a two term presidency would represent a view that international diplomacy begins with internal policy and the voice of the people as a instrument of national security against the forces from within.

Kissinger writes a nine step plan towards the Middle East situation. Central to these steps is recognition that allegiances with any European country would draw special interests of such that may be in conflict with American policy. While Europe craves public sentiment, there lay underneath a hidden national agenda. Basing policy around individual Arab nations runs the same risk for various reasons; depending on the strategic, economic, political, and security position of each country. In each case we find the United States going alone as the world policeman.

With regard to diplomacy and war being the final element of such, Kissinger points out that reluctance to war, brings as demonstrated in Viet Nam, the other sides tendency to circumvent positions not deemed beneficial. Not fighting wars to unconditional surrender has lead to compromised ends in Korea, Viet Nam, the Gulf War resulting in continued loss of life or at minimum loss of liberty and quality of life on all sides. With Iraq and Afghanistan behind us militarily, Kissinger puts Iran in a light of caution. Rather than rush into the breach, Kissinger proposes to press for an improvement in relations with linkage to Iran’s willingness to depart from exporting terrorism to the world. Parallel steps must be taken as unilateral confessions has only proved to strengthen Iran’s tendency to fall back to terrorist ways. Step one would absolutely be the abolishment terrorism exports.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Is a boarder of national interest??… of course. With regard to Nation States, such as Russia, an American policy must be comprised with a sense of respectful inclusiveness. Yet America must fully express that their concerns of balance of power does not end with the Cold War, and a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue nations is a compromise of national interest to all nations. While this book was written pre 9-11, I find it most apropos, to steel a word from the French, that Kissinger was concerned. With regard to the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD); Kissinger writes that “Whatever tenuous plausibility of MAD theory may have had in the two power world,” Richelieu’s balance “evaporates when eight nations have tested nuclear weapons and many regimes are working feverishly in the development of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction… IF one of these weapons destroys an American or European city by accident or design, how would democratic leaders explain to their public their refusal- not inability, but refusal – to protect them against even limited missile attacks? In this vein Kissinger strikes an emotional vote on the balance towards a defense of a nation’s interest, first being security.

While Kissinger recommends the deterrence of weapons of mass destruction, he suggests that with proliferation already in progress we should “not tilt against the windmills”. We should link other countries capabilities to their global agenda. Those agendas who pose a threat to the United States should be met with appropriate response. With regard to Iraq, my recent trip to Europe post Iraq War finds Europe in agreement with American and British led action. With regard to Nation States such as India a close relationship is warranted for common economic as well as other basic human rights issues.

Globalization

Kissinger describes the gap between the economics and the political world as the Achilles heal of the process of globalization. He sites that 20 percent of the world will be part of the international system; the rest will be left behind. This inverse parado exposes The United States as the leader to world resentment. There is the reality that economic growth requires reform and that reform requires political structure with transparent and an independent judicial system. Therefore in my opinion American statesmanship, and the concerns raised in George Soro’s book “The Crisis of Global Capitalism” must be given due attention. (review not written yet)

Closure

I did take notes when Kissinger began drawing contrasts to Jacksonians, Rooseveltonians and finally Wilsonian’s. He does a nice job demonstrating how the personalities of our leaders can be reflected in our public sentiment in the same way our children reflects the values of our parents. The interesting twist comes from the George Keenan’s “Domino” theories within the Cold War era and the roles each of the presidential personalities played in our public opinion. In applying the domino theory, Kissinger shapes an argument from nationalism vested in the era of Splendid Isolation, the National Security vested in TRex, and finally Wilson’s liberty of man. In the discourse it is interesting to note the hawk to dove and vice-versa of each of the left or right political parties. In summary the Viet Nam debate is portrayed as Jacksonian with no category for “limited war”. The Wilsonian’s had concluded there was a moral flaw in our rationale for war. Neither side were willing to support a gradual extrication designed to preserve American credibility in a Cold War environment where security still very much depended on American word. As we somehow managed to escape the trauma of Viet Nam, America today still finds the world hanging on it’s every word; both of the leaders and the people. It is the American people that elect these leaders. So I hold out the question, does the president reflect the voice of the people or are we simply followers. I would like to think there are enough to us paying attention.

The book closes with the concession that America, alone or with Europe is not in a position to right every wrong. A parallel argument is drawn using a corollary between Wilsonian policy and Jacksonian policy of our past.