A Peace to End All Peace
by David Frokman
This book could have easily been titled “What If” or even better yet “Only If” as it describes at world leader level in detail not only intentions that were miss understood, but also entangled with poor timing of superseding events. If you had ever heard disparaging comments on Churchill as the prime instigator, this book helps you visualize that he was indeed a prime mover, surrounded by a cacophony of leaders on the rise and fall, as we were all twisted by a press leading their peoples into war and a peace that has yet to be achieved. Other prime mover instigators are The Mark Sykes the co author of the infamous Sykes - Picot Agreement between England and France to partition the Ottoman Empire. Infamous do to through his naivete, as it turns out. Also to the cast of British arrogance was Lord Kitchener’s march towards folly in the Middle Eastern debacle. And finally the granddaddy of them all was the British PM Lloyd George, who pulled the strings of many.
This book is clearly from a British perspective as it describes the art of getting the bureaucratic politics right, the chief endeavor of the book. It was clearly akin to the work of Picasso. The chief story plot in the framework of history is the Great Game which was to shield Britain's road to India from the motives of Russia and then France. It was a game where Russia plays a Central Role in the beginning through deception, the middle through folly, and the end through deception. If written by a Russian author it would be only slightly twisted through logical story telling that the British made all their strategic decision from a standpoint of paranoia.
As a late comer to World War One an American can say that Wilson, lost in his own theories of sovereign destiny, was duped by all sides in the conflict and the peace process. I mention this to help the American reader appreciate history's cause and effect and learn you must make a paradigm shift to the perspective of WWI to learn a critical lesson pertinent to our involvement in the Middle East. The book provides a worthy plot in a panoramic view worth the time to read you find nascent Modern Middle East politics entwined with the politics of the Great Powers in a time where the paradigm of a Palestinian State was lost, and still is. In the brokering of Palestinian land Syria was granted to the House of Hussein, and not the Palestinians. This huge gap in fate is only the collective total of what is still an enigma today which is peace. Leaders of that time left today’s world leaders, still blind to that oversight and now buried in time, trying to divide a small piece of unproductive land in Israel when in fact the fruitful land of Arab Syria is rightfully Palestinian. Even the author of this book, a historian uncovers the folly, but does not recognize what is right before his eyes. A paradigm shift in history is still at large.
The first British domino after the Duke Ferdinand was assassinated in Serbia drawing Russia and Germany at odds in a land where Great Britain was beholden as essential to the Great Game. It was only an excuse to go to a pending war to settle brewing international intrigue. Keep in mind this is only 55 years after the Crimean War over the very similar world order. To ward off such a folly; if only the world knew of Churchill’s intentions regarding Turkey, much like his arm waving in the 1930's. If only England knew anything at all about the inner movements of the Ottoman Empire's rising new leaders, and a missed opportunity to bring the Turks in on the side of the Western Allies. If only British admirals at sea actually knew that in their first attack on the Dardanelles, the Turks were out of bullets and evacuating the city, and a simple sail in to the harbor was all that was required to take The Ottoman Empire out of the war. If only.… WWI would have been reduced to a mere conflict. But rather the folly of deception and intrigue between Russia, and England, as the Great Game for the passage to India found new wrinkles of deceptive quagmire that would spin mankind into further world disorder. The deal, missed deal, and counter dealing between the West and the Middle Eastern factions would never have allowed to bloom into the man eating orchid that it had.
Delving into the first layer the reader learns that the partners that went in to WWI as allies came out some as adversaries and some as reluctant partners. Of course the agendas of the alliances were of equally folly as the reasons for their break ups. In every case the rationale could not be substantiated by any argument of self interest. Russia effectively changed sides in the peace process and found alignment with Germany. France and Britain lost their way over Syria. In the process of each country’s effort to out maneuver their partner in a political dance with their new dance partner in their face amidst dance partners among the Muslim survivors who had not learned how to dance to a sovereign tune. All that was missing was a “Square Dance Caller’. This found France with a mandate over a reluctant people and Britain over a vast disparate people that it could not afford to rule.
Where Britain had an opportunity to reach her goal of an empire that ran up the East coast of Africa, across the Middle East and in to India, her deceit in politics domestically and internationally led to the squandering of a peace founded in the footings of democratic rule. This book draws an ironic parallel to that of the American Colonists of the folly in colonial management of far away lands. The difference is is found in the American rue where their subjects who aware of the democratic process and were once amicable with the British Parliament and Crown. In the case of the Middle East mandates that went to Britain, they had no clue of parliamentary procedure and could only judge Britain on the early promises that they could not keep, because they were financial and politically, both domestically and internationally, exhausted.
This book provides detailed account of my summary. The reader gets to agonize over the near misses of peace. The chance for world order seemed always around the corner with ill timed or misplaced communications that would set world leaders off in to a direction totally against their lost goals and objectives. In the end you are as exhausted from frustration as you learn the belligerents of the war and the antagonists of the peace, there were no winners to be found. The following are synopsis’ of a few near misses and of intrigue.
1. The British government was unaware of Turkish diplomatic activity of CUP ( young Turks) and did not realize that the Porte was urgently seeking a Great Power Alliance rather than with Germany.
2. Admiral De Robeck's withdrawal from a Sea – land battle that the Turks had already retreated from combined with the army who failed to attack an enemy who had run out of ammunition. For Winston Churchill, who was only hours away from victory, was to become the torment of his life. It was more than a personal triumph that had slipped through his fingers. It was also his last chance to save the world in which he had grown up: to win a war while the familiar, traditional Europe of traditional established monarchies and empires still survived.
3. al-Faruqi a rogue Arab emissary under no authority form Hussein found himself negotiating the Damascus Protocol drawing up boarders of a partitioned Ottoman Empire with Britain. Language combined with British exuberance, hindered accuracy of the lines...But the geographical references made by McMahon for Britain were hazy. Was reference made for example to the city of Damascus, the environs of Damascus, or the province of Damascus? Did "districts" mean wilayahs (environs) or vilayets (provences)? Was it al-Faryuqi who spoke of districts, or was it McMahon or Clayton? By districts did the British mean towns? The significance of the Aleppo-Homs-Hama-Damascus demand had been bitterly debated ever since. For decades afterward s partisans of an Arab Palestine argued that if those four geographical terms were properly understood, boarders would be different. British Cairo had promised that Palestine would be Arab; while partisans of a Jewish Palestine argued the reverse. In a sense the debate was pointless; McMahon deliberately used phrases so devious as to commit himself to nothing at all. In fact the cities in question were merely four stops on a French railway, connecting Constantinople power to the Hejaz.
4. Whether or not they constituted a majority in the city- and the then current Encyclopedia Britannica indicated that they did not- the Jews were economically preponderant, Baghdad, along with Jerusalem, was one of the two Jewish cities of Asia, and a thousand years before had become the seat of if Diaspora- the head of Jewish religion in the Eastern Diaspora- and this the Capitol of Oriental Judaism. Jews in large numbers lived in the Mesopotamian provinces of Basra and Baghdad since the time of captivity by Babylonians about 600 BC and this settled in the country a thousand years before the coming of Arabs in 634 AD. Recognition of this could have found a Jewish State in Baghdad.
5. Weizman (Jewish leader to Palestine, was introduced the Feisal. He wrote, He is a leader! He is quite intelligent and very honest man, handsome as a picture! He is not interested in Palestine, but on the other hand he wants the while of Northern Syria and Damascus.. Grist contemptuous of the Palestinian Arab whole he doesn't even regard as Arab.
6. The Syrian National party of 1920 did insist on full immediate independence for Syria and was also prepared to recognize a Jewish National home in Palestine. At the same time an Arab delegation from Palestine confronted the British military governor with a resolution opposing Zionism and petitioning part of an independent Syria.
7. When the Palestinian – Jewish question came up the map of the time held that Palestine included what is now Jordan and part of Syria. By 1923 what was once Palestinian, became “token booby prize gifts” to Saudi kings who were not awarded Saudi Arabia and the Jews were left with a barren land to win 35 years and another World War later by comparison called Israel. Today we find ourselves further subdividing the small strip of land called Israel into two separate states on of which already has internal strife leading to further fractionating of Palestinian people.
8. Brought out in parallel events were the Bolshevik excursions of intrigue into Afghanistan and India including what is now Pakistan. This in conjunction with their return to the remains of the Ottoman Empire confounded British strategy to maintain their newly established supremacy of the Great Game. There was a keen fear of Bolshevism among all western powers long before the Totalitarian Communism fear took root. It was in the context of Jewish borne conspiracy that the second Russian Revolution was seen by British officials as the latest manifestations of a bigger conspiracy. Jews were prominent among the Bolshevik leaders; so the Bolshevik seizure of power was viewed by many within British government as not merely as German inspired but as Jewish directed. In the West Bolshevism was a threat to the order of rule by Captains & Kings” more-so that a threat to the liberties of the individual man. One can clearly see that the Jews had to win Israel, despite England’s attempts to "help them along".
In conclusion this strictly British view of the events the of 1915 to 1923 laid the frame work for continued hostilities from the Mediterranean Ocean to the Pacific Ocean open to further settlement by the last of political means…wars. It is clear that at the time the attempted colonial state, while it may have momentarily taken advantage of the local people deserving of self determination, there existed a temporary sense of law and order. The British pull back for what ever reason left one sixth of our world population to figure out how to organize a civilized form of government in a world that at the time was fully vested in nation building through self determination and democratic process. These people only knew government through edicts of corrupt Caliphs through the process of suzerainty. India, a non Muslim country figured it out as they actually maintained the quality aspects of the ruler they later threw out. A lesson learned.
So this leaves a question on Iraq and Afghanistan . Will the United States along with its half hearted world partners repeat the mistake made by the British 86 years ago? Will our efforts to plant the seeds of self determination, beginning at the will of the people take root without the nurturing akin to what France gave to the United States in 1776, or what United States provided to Japan and Germany in the aftermath of WWII? Or will the vacuum left in a premature pullback be a perpetuation of a region in continual conflict? Taking the unfortunate reality of rogue leaders out of the equation to maintain the scope of this book: If history can be of value, the lessons learned are for our world leaders of today to get past the agendas of attack and fear, and on to the recognition of the values found in world peace?
The number one obstacle to learning the truth about ourselves is fear founded in belief in scarcity that perpetuates greed and power. To over come that fear we must first have trust in ourselves and then in our neighbors. In a world of trust comes a world of knowing, a world of intelligence. It was the that lack of intelligence that led to the folly of wars producing more human destruction than any other period in history. This book exposes the need to re-prioritize that lesson learned. A must read.
Monday, June 29, 2009
The Origins of the First World War
The Origins of the First World War
By James Joll
Poetic coincidence, I began reading this book while waiting for a plane in Geneva Switzerland, home of the European UN, in the country nestled between France and Germany. Also as bit of humor TJ lent me this book as a pass through from one of his friends who studied it for a class. I mused at what he took note of versus what I marked as noteworthy. We had to have taken away two different verdicts. This is the third in my series of books where I am purposefully looking for answers to the cause of war. The first two, Rise and fall Of the Third Reich and Paris 1919, only threw clues and inferences. Also know I have a library of read material related to the subject but such material was not necessarily read to answer this single question. I was hoping, from the author’s credentials as college professor and historian, to get something more absolute from this one. While I gained a lot of insight and can now start to draw my own conclusions I hate to say it but I am leaning towards the view of the French, which is always to be fearful of the German propensity for dominion. I am leaning with reservation because the French have yet to reach a level of national conscience that demonstrates peace for the right reason. This review will brush over the top of James Joll’s work and I will make an attempt to connect dots and draw conclusions. Keep in mind I am on to reading on Bismarck and then the Crimean War, so I reserve the liberty to modify conclusions written herin.
This book addresses seven different overarching factors starting with the July crisis in 1914 that may have attributed to the cause of WWI. Of the seven factors the mood of 1914 strikes me as the most intriguing. The mood involves the dynamics between the people and their leaders. The most essential aspect of the relationship is the timing of an action, which may be the result of decisions made long before the action. Power politics versus humanity with a civilized world order looming in the balance. While all the countries involved in WWI experienced these dynamics, Germany, albeit with a considerable peace movement in its midst, appears to have demonstrated the most tangible aptitude towards war.
Along the lines of a manipulated mood, one interesting dynamic the author includes is socialism-v-capitalism. What makes this intriguing is the author demonstrates that it is not the theory of the two philosophies but rather the way each may be applied. History clearly shows that free market, as a medium for freely negotiated division of labor, is an accelerator towards a peaceful society. Socialism has demonstrated the same when you look at Scandinavia. To this day the differences have not come close to instigating an international conflict. Only corruption and power politics internally and internationally can be found as a culprit.
In 1914 the novel idea socialism seemed to challenge the sense of internal power among the leaders where creating international conflict helped bring a sense of nationalism that would be perceived by the constituents as dependant on their leadership. This dynamic did not directly cause the war, but it gave leaders a motive to cultivate the approval to go to war. In the German case, the cultivation of the approval is most prominent. The first reason is the country was only 40 years old with many states questioning their unity. In Germany with the mechanics of their government the military was king. Rather than a civil war killing each other they opted for a war against their neighbors. Today in the European Union, there are many states questioning the purpose and fairness of a new Union, with Germany at center stage once again.
With regard to the mobilization of the war machine in Germany, the feeling of power in conjunction with the limitations in aptitude of one person(s) pulling the levers appears to have been a dynamic of the breakout of the war, but not the cause. To qualify this their was purposeful deception in justifying decisions for war but more so the direct mobilization of military machines were run amuck. Cause and effect was not clearly understood or communicated among the leaders involved. Connecting the dots of the diplomatic cause to the military effect, given that military action as the last instrument of diplomacy, finds the irretrievable orders of mobilization to war irreconcilable with the profit-loss aspects of a military result. Because this is an aspect of the war, I find it difficult to call it the protagonist of the war.
The protagonist to The Great War as history sees it appears to be clearly placed with Germany. In their unification, they found both as a people and in their leadership the desire to expand. At the same time they were internally conflicted which caused leadership to find international conflict a solution to bolstering a unified German mind. The legacies of Bismarck, Nietzche, and Treitschke over 40 years through the education in their schools, the German youth were a brainwashed a people apt to salute anything with a uniform. Those uniforms told them that they deserve more. The Kaiser, with an agenda for more pushed Austria to military action with Serbia. The Kaiser knew a conflict would draw in Russia. The Kaiser knew his plan would require the neutralization of France. The Kaiser miscalculated is English in-laws. Aside from his low level of mental acuity we question his motive.
In defense of the other belligerents, Austria-Hungary’s state of disintegration on its own may have taken a more passive position to a perceived attempt to disrupt the transition of Habsburg power from its current king to its prince in waiting. Russia had its interests in a warm water port guised in its protection of Slavic people, but was not in a position having just been defeated by Japan to go to war. France and England over years of disarmament were just not ready for war. Germany was going a different direction having built up its navy to rival England, and bolstered is army through a conscription level higher than its neighbors. Germany saw both Russia and England as rivals that they needed an upper hand on. The shot heard around the world was all the Kaiser needed to launch a military plan that caused general war. Could this have been prevented?
Balance of Power did not work to gain a world peace and eventually gave way to a United Nations, which obviously is not working, as there have been over 65 wars across national boarders since its inception. We also know building coalitions forces have its limitations as business and political agendas often conflict. It seems greed for money and power corrupt whomever sits at the helm of any type of organization. We know that boycotts and sanctions do not work as world consensus or for that matter consensus at any level is impossible to maintain. What will work? I have said before that it seems that when two or more people ban together for a common cause involving scarcity of some thing, there will be another group ready to fight for their share. Who should be the arbitrator of such conflict and can you scale this arbitration to a world level?
What is missing is Conscience…collective conscience… the power of one singular mind for mankind…the willingness to extend your being beyond your physical self. At the core is You/Us. If you have a conflicted conscience it would follow that your society has a conflicted conscience. Germany certainly displayed how a group of people can make their body temples a false alter through which they perceive the world. They sought for more…the god of more. They had collective conscience going in the right direction, but were merely focused on the State, their State and that is where they became delusional. But lets be fair, Americans in 2007 do it too. Cast a hue of shame on us for collectively lobbying our congressmen for banning the sale of key resources to international entities (China & Dubai) that we fear that they may get more than we get.
So lets turn the coin over and hit the fast forward button. Why does Iran fear the West? Read my past reviews, first they want something today that they once had which is recognition as a world power. They now fear others because those countries want something Persians have. (oil and/or warm water). They feared USSR because of their experience of a Russian agenda for more. (warm water port) They feared the British because of their same experience through bogus business deals. (oil) Iran, believe it or not, prefer to work with and through the United States for their rightful place on the world stage as right now only the United Sates through its diplomacy shine a light on that need. This phenomenon was also observed in my reading of 1919. Yet we fear them (Muslims} because we are convinced they are out to take away our way of life. I consider it merely to be a subplot rooted in Imam rhetoric, albeit rooted in the Quran, a fear that is snatched up by people on both sides of the equation living in fear. In every case there is a fear of one group of people taking away an object even if that object is an idea (ideal) from another group of people.
What if we did away with the groups of people? Sounds too much like communism. What if we did away with the objects? Sounds too much like Jesus. Oddly enough communism banned the teachings of Jesus. What was he teaching? Jesus was teaching that we are all one. When you make a slight on another you are making a slight upon yourself. When you make a gift for another you are making a gift for yourself. When you are giving up a material thing for another, you are gaining a material thing for yourself. When you live at the sake of another you are slighting that other man and thus slighting yourself. We are all one of one singular mind and that is to love (allow another to exist just as he/she is) and be happy with that reality (accept it). The average bear does not see or perhaps does not want to see it that way because he is not at one with himself. There is no singularity of the mind that would enable him to transcend his body temple. Therefore, he spends his energy consuming more things to make his body, family, village, city, nation, more comfortable.
Therefore groups of people build temples, shrines, or monuments that while intended to unite people, they miss all people, ending up with a group of people and therefore have unacceptable separate realities full of conflict, whether intended in its origin or not. Historically we find it to be a part of human nature to behave this way individually and as nations. We have failed to understand that the basic tenant of conflict is the failure to recognize that the human race is all one, the world is a billion piece jigsaw puzzle, where one damaged or missing piece renders the whole puzzle worthless. To break through, can we suspend with the idea of temples, as they are symbols of our separateness? Can we get rid of symbols as they unintentionally classify, which is a proponent of the process of division? These very questions suggest we do away with religion, government, and science, as we know them. They can be seen as opponents to each other and to mankind when applied in the wrong spirit of mind. Daunting!!!!
In the case of WWI it is easy to pass the buck on to Germany. They had motive, preconceived intent, and the ability. There people never saw the devastation on their side of the boarder in that war allowing Hitler to light another fuse. It took the their annihilation in WWII to finally eradicate their compulsion of war like behavior as a nation. But to slight them is to slight the whole human race. Whilst we maintain a continued vigilance on Germany and Japan, we should be mindful of our own thinking as well. Our option as history would propose… annihilation
Not sure I have said anything new, but will leave it here for now. I am on to finishing, Bismarck, Crimean, and then on to techno solutions.
End notes
The Old Alliance System
1. p. 56: The maintenance of Austria-Hungry as a Great Power became a major foreign policy goal of Germany, both on diplomatic grounds, since Austria was seen as Germany’s only ally, and because any internal crisis in Austro-Hungry might have repercussions in Germany.
2. p. 57: In the years between the Bosnian crisis and the outbreak of the First World War, four things were forcing a reassessment and tightening up of the alliance system in Europe. The upheavals in Turkey which encouraged Russian hopes of compensating for their humiliation in the Far East by gains in the Balkans, …Austrians must act vigorously against Serbia to prevent the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy…the German naval building was a threat to Britain’s imperial interest,…German belief they must take action in order to ensure that the world balance of power was in their favor, … the hopes of the French, using the alliance with Russia to obtain the return of Alsace and Lorraine.
3. p. 63: on the period before 1914: Although the Germans had given the Austrians some diplomatic support at certain points in crisis, the Balkan quarrels had not escalated into European war because the Germans were not prepared to give their ally free hand against Serbia.
4. p. 65: The realization by the Germans that Austria-Hungry was her only reliable ally and that she must be supported at all costs in any policies which Austrians thought essential for survival of the Habsburg State, was an important motive for the German decisions of July 1914; and these decisions have been seen in terms of the Austrian belief that Germany had not supported her sufficiently in the previous years.
5. p. 66: The existence of the alliance system above all conditions expectations laid about the form of a war would take if it broke out, and about who were likely to be friends and enemies. These expectations laid down broad lines of strategic planning, so that general staffs were taking decisions, which often committed them to irreversible military actions if war threatened.
Militarism, Armaments and Strategy
6. p. 70: by 1912 the German authorities were so worried about the Social Democrats won a third of the votes in the Reichstag, they had serious doubts about increasing the size of their army. …the government succeeded in1913 in carrying a three year law through parliament, the anti-militarist movement was strong enough for any government to take into account the mood of the conscripts before starting a war.
7. p. 71 in a town hall conflict a soldiers telegram “ Town Hall occupied by the military. We urgently desire information as to the reasons in order to reassure the excited citizens.” Satirists might laugh at this episode, but it was a sign of the readiness of Germans to accept without question the orders of anyone in a military uniform.
8. p. 72 While the general acceptance of military values by large sections of the German public may have contributed to the mood which made war possible and to the enthusiasm with which the outbreak of war was greeted, the most important aspect of the role of the German army in the coming war was its freedom from civilian political control
9. p. 77 And Winston Churchill, who became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, as result of changes in the cabinet….: I must explicitly repudiate the suggestion that Great Britain can ever allow another naval power to approach her so nearly as to deflect or to restrict her political action by purely naval pressure.” The German government was in fact hoping for just that and wanted political concessions in exchange for naval disarmament.
10. p. 79 The structure of German society gave a special role to the army and produced a special respect for military values. The naval policies of the Kaiser and Tripitz aroused British foreign antagonism and began a naval race which had important social and economic effects as well as producing a radical change in British foreign policy.
11. p. 88 The King withdrew from, politics and Alexander became Prince Regent, while Pasic announced dissolution of parliament and new elections for 1 August. Thus, because of tension between the army and the civilian government, Serbia was in the midst of a major political crisis at the moment of the assignation of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
12. p. 90: Traditions of terrorism and conspiracy going back to the years of Turkish rule contributed an element of instability in both domestic and foreign policy (Serbian)…. Yet in the summer of 1914, when the Serbian army had not yet recovered from efforts in the Balkan wars, was hardly the moment for Serbia to provoke such a war; the evidence does not suggest that either the Serb government or the army command wanted to do so.
13. p. 91: The pace was set by Germany trying, for a variety of reasons, to shift world balance of power in her favor even if it involved a risk of war.
The Primacy of Domestic Politics
14. p. 109: notably that of Germany as we shall see, foreign policy was sometimes used as a way of providing a focus for national feelings so as to distract attention away from divisions and tensions of German society
15. p. 111: The Austro- Hungarian government believed that the establishment of some sort of control over Serbia was essential for the survival of their state.
16. p.111: The Liberal government had been in power in England since 1905 and there were many among supporters who held to tradition of …Gladstone, and believed that the balance of power was a dangerous concept, that expenditure on armaments was both wasteful and wicked and that Britain’s policy should be to maintain the freedom of trade and to keep herself free of foreign entanglements.
17. p. 115: If we look for responsibility for the First World War in the political and constitutional arrangements of the belligerent states, then the structure of the British government can be held responsible for Grey’s reluctance openly to commit Britain to support France and Russia before he was absolutely convinced he could carry his party with him.
18. p. 117: if a war was to come, it would have to be overran issue which would appear to the French public as involving a direct threat to France. For this reason the French government appeared to the Russians to be unreliable allies.
19. p. 117: French Prime Minister Poincare was convinced the he could produce a mood of national unity as was prepared to use his presidential prerogatives as far as they could possibly be stretched in order to do so. Domestic politics were to be subordinated to foreign policy.
20. p. 120: It was by then already clear to Poincare that the strength of anti-militarism had been exaggerated and that mobilization would proceed without interference from socialist or syndicalists.
21. p. 124: The Tsar himself was sometimes influenced by similar ideas for the reconstruction of central Europe. He told a rather bewildered British ambassador in April 1913 that he believed the disintegration of the Austrian Empire was only a matter of time.
22. p. 130: with regard to Germany, There is evidence that, at least from the 1890s, members of imperial government believed a vigorous foreign policy and encouragement of an aggressive nationalist spirit would be one way of overcoming the particularist sentiments in the individual states and producing a mood of national unity comparable to that of 1870.
23. p. 131: Bulow had successfully fought Reichstag elections of 1907 with slogans which combined nationalism, colonialism, and anti-socialism.. However the supporters of the view that it was concern for (German) domestic polititics that determined the conduct of German foreign policy would argue that this was more than just a matter of using foreign political issues for the immediate purpose of winning a particular election, and that foreign policy was deliberately used as a means of manipulating public opinion so as to create a sense of solidarity among German people and overcome the social and political divisions which were seen as a threat to every existence of the German Empire. The attraction of colonial Empire, a large fleet and an active policy would serve both as a basis for rallying the loyal elements around the Kaiser and government and as a means of countering the threat of a growing socialist movement.
24. p. 132: It is unlikely that German naval building would have been pursued so enthusiastically without the Kaiser’s personal commitment to the creation of a German fleet. This was no doubt partly the result of his own psychology – his emotional need to show himself the equal of his British relatives, and his country equal to England, which he both loved and hated.
25. P. 139: Between 1912 and the outbeak of the war, much nationalist propaganda was explicitly linking calls for preparation for war with the hope that a war might put an end to social democracy. ... While other members of the German government and high command believed that there was little point in postponing a war which they considered inevitable. Bethmann, with his eyes on the internal situation, was concerned that a war if it cam should appear to be one in which Germany was attacked by Russia. … From the time of Engals and Marx onwards, socialists had always believed that war against Russia, the most reactionary power in Europe would be justified, however they might criticize militarism at home.
The International Economy
26. p. 161: The international bankers were in a paradoxical position, symbolic perhaps of the whole capitalist system in Europe before 1914. Pm one hand, through their close collaboration with governments, they encouraged by their investment policy the consolidation of alliances and the growth of colonial rivalries. On the other hand the benefited by the flow of international trade and had an interest in uninterrupted international tension.
27. p. 164: The British share of world trade was falling…they had older industries. From a purely economic view of the United States was at least as dangerous a rival a Germany yet there was not talks of growing antagonism between the two. Sir Edward Grey in 1906 “ The economic rivalry (and all that) do not give much offence to our people, and they admire her steady industry and genius for organization. But the do resent mischief making. They suspect the Emperor of aggressive plans of Welpolitik, and they see that Germany is forcing the pace of armaments in order to dominate Europe and is thereby laying a horrible burden of wasteful expenditure upon all the other powers.
28. p. 168: Certainly there were industrialist and military men who hoped the war once begun would end with a peace that would extend their markets or safeguard their strategic position ( Field Marshal Hindenburg was to justify his demands for large annexations from Russia with the words “I need them for maneuvering of my left wing in the next war”)… Bethman approved a program of extensive annexations in the west to be followed in the pushing back of the Russian frontier and ending Russian control over non Russian [people … these gains that Germany went to war and that alone seemed to provide a way out of economic difficulties and contradictions so widely apparent in the spring of 1914.
Imperial Rivalries
29. p. 176 During the 1890s the main imperial rivalries had been between Britain ND France in Africa and Britain and
30. p. 176: Russia in the Far East. Britain and France had been close to war in 1898 over their claims to the upper Nile.
31. p. 181: For Britain in 1914 the threat to the empire which Germany appeared to represent was not a threat to any particular colony – as we shall see, right down to the outbreak of war there was always room for agreement between the two countries on specific colonial questions.
32. p. 181/182: Welpolitik or imperialism in this very general sense – and this was one of the reasons why it could serve as a unifying force for many different groups in German society – seemed to give purpose and a new mission to German state.
33. p. 188: The Turkish government ware increasingly concerned that their obvious weakness, after their defeats in Tripoli and Balkan wars made them vulnerable to a threat of partition, and they became convinced that they had more to fear from Russia than from Germany.
34. p. 181: Nevertheless the case of Turkey – like that of China a decade earlier – and the complex story of Anglo-German co-operation and rivalry there suggest that here was an area in which imperialist rivalries among European Great Powers were contributing to the instability which made the outbreak possible.
35. p. 191: Giolitti states: Tripolitania is a province of the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman Empire is a European great power. The integrity of what remains of the Ottoman Empire is one of the principles on which equilibrium an peace is based… Can it be in the interests of Italy to shatter one of the cornerstones of the old edifice? And what if after we have attacked Turkey, the Balkans begin to stir? And what if a Balkin war provokes a clash between the two power blocs and a European war? Can it be that we can shoulder the responsibility of putting a match to the powder?
36. p. 192: Certainly Italy’s imperialist war was one of the sparks lighting what one historian has called the long fuse linking the outbreak of the First Wiorld War to remote origins in the Balkins.
37. p. 192: The outbreak of war in 1914 wa not caused by immediate imperialist rivalries; and Germany’s aspirations for colonial territory might well have been achieved by agreement with Britain if the Germans had been prepared to abate their claims to naval hegemony. Nevertheless weak independent states such as Morocco and Ottoman were a temptation for the imperialist.
38. p 195: Imperialist thinking had always accepted the risk of war and regarded armed struggle as an essential part of imperial extension, even though tin fact imperialist was had hitherto for the most part been limited in scope. By 1914 this intensified the crisis in which German ambitions, French grievances, Russian expansionism, British anxieties and Austrian fears lead to decisions that war was inevitable.
The Mood of 1914
39. p. 199: But the mood in which peoples of Europe accepted and in some cases welcomed the idea of war was not just the result of the way in which their governments had justified their immediate political decisions. It was founded on the accumulation of national traditions and attitudes which had formed beliefs about the nature of the state and authority, reinforced by the curriculum in schools over the past decades and the kind of language in which politicians and journalists had discussed international relations.
40. p. 203: at the Tsar’s initial peace conferences in 1899 and 1907, the Kaiser declared: I’ll go along with the on conference comedy but I’ll keep my dagger at my side during the waltz.
41. p. 204 Most members of the peace movement were anxious to stress that their attempts to reform their system of international relations and to reduce armaments did not mean they lacked patriotism… “ We cannot continue criticism of policy which has led to this war as we did in the case of South Africa, for our safety is at stake. We can none of now think of anything but this one object”.
42. p. 204: Among socialist, “The working man has no country” the Communist Manifesto had proclaimed in 1848, “National differences and antagonisms are daily more and more vanishing owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, the freedom of commerce, the world market, the corresponding thereto.
43. p. 204: The internal regime of a stat was opposing Russia was of little importance: Turkey, for example as in the Crimean War was on the side of history because, as Engals put it a few years later: “A subjectively reactionary force can in foreign policy fulfill an objectively revolutionary mission.
44. p. 208: in France the revolutionary syndicalists and some socialists were calling for general strike in the event of mobilization… the French departments were busy revising the lists of people who were to be arrested in the event of mobilization.
45. p. 210: in Germany, they never forgot the twelve years under Bismarck’s snit-socialist law which had made many of the usual activities of political party impossible and were terrified that similar restrictions might be imposed again. …Bebel in fact accepted the socialist’s impotence in the face of German state and the Prussian military caste…
46. p. 211: In short the governments were very successful in convincing their citizens that they were the victims of aggression and in appealing to immediate feelings of patriotism and self-preservation which proved stronger than any internationalist convictions.
47. p. 217. When the war broke out, the British at least were encouraged by their newspapers, propagandists and religious leaders to attribute the war specifically to the influence of two German writers, the philosopher Fredrick Nietzche and the historian Heinrich von Treitschke.
48. p. 218: The moment the State proclaims “Your State and the existence of your State are now at stake” selfishness disappears and party hatred is silenced…In this consists the grandeur of war, that trivial things are entirely lost sight of in the great ideal of the State.
49. p. 223: Baden-Powell enabling the British Empire to survive: “We must all be bricks in the wall of that great enterprise – the British Empire – and we must be careful that we do not let our differences of opinion on politics and other questions grow so strong as to divide us.”
By James Joll
Poetic coincidence, I began reading this book while waiting for a plane in Geneva Switzerland, home of the European UN, in the country nestled between France and Germany. Also as bit of humor TJ lent me this book as a pass through from one of his friends who studied it for a class. I mused at what he took note of versus what I marked as noteworthy. We had to have taken away two different verdicts. This is the third in my series of books where I am purposefully looking for answers to the cause of war. The first two, Rise and fall Of the Third Reich and Paris 1919, only threw clues and inferences. Also know I have a library of read material related to the subject but such material was not necessarily read to answer this single question. I was hoping, from the author’s credentials as college professor and historian, to get something more absolute from this one. While I gained a lot of insight and can now start to draw my own conclusions I hate to say it but I am leaning towards the view of the French, which is always to be fearful of the German propensity for dominion. I am leaning with reservation because the French have yet to reach a level of national conscience that demonstrates peace for the right reason. This review will brush over the top of James Joll’s work and I will make an attempt to connect dots and draw conclusions. Keep in mind I am on to reading on Bismarck and then the Crimean War, so I reserve the liberty to modify conclusions written herin.
This book addresses seven different overarching factors starting with the July crisis in 1914 that may have attributed to the cause of WWI. Of the seven factors the mood of 1914 strikes me as the most intriguing. The mood involves the dynamics between the people and their leaders. The most essential aspect of the relationship is the timing of an action, which may be the result of decisions made long before the action. Power politics versus humanity with a civilized world order looming in the balance. While all the countries involved in WWI experienced these dynamics, Germany, albeit with a considerable peace movement in its midst, appears to have demonstrated the most tangible aptitude towards war.
Along the lines of a manipulated mood, one interesting dynamic the author includes is socialism-v-capitalism. What makes this intriguing is the author demonstrates that it is not the theory of the two philosophies but rather the way each may be applied. History clearly shows that free market, as a medium for freely negotiated division of labor, is an accelerator towards a peaceful society. Socialism has demonstrated the same when you look at Scandinavia. To this day the differences have not come close to instigating an international conflict. Only corruption and power politics internally and internationally can be found as a culprit.
In 1914 the novel idea socialism seemed to challenge the sense of internal power among the leaders where creating international conflict helped bring a sense of nationalism that would be perceived by the constituents as dependant on their leadership. This dynamic did not directly cause the war, but it gave leaders a motive to cultivate the approval to go to war. In the German case, the cultivation of the approval is most prominent. The first reason is the country was only 40 years old with many states questioning their unity. In Germany with the mechanics of their government the military was king. Rather than a civil war killing each other they opted for a war against their neighbors. Today in the European Union, there are many states questioning the purpose and fairness of a new Union, with Germany at center stage once again.
With regard to the mobilization of the war machine in Germany, the feeling of power in conjunction with the limitations in aptitude of one person(s) pulling the levers appears to have been a dynamic of the breakout of the war, but not the cause. To qualify this their was purposeful deception in justifying decisions for war but more so the direct mobilization of military machines were run amuck. Cause and effect was not clearly understood or communicated among the leaders involved. Connecting the dots of the diplomatic cause to the military effect, given that military action as the last instrument of diplomacy, finds the irretrievable orders of mobilization to war irreconcilable with the profit-loss aspects of a military result. Because this is an aspect of the war, I find it difficult to call it the protagonist of the war.
The protagonist to The Great War as history sees it appears to be clearly placed with Germany. In their unification, they found both as a people and in their leadership the desire to expand. At the same time they were internally conflicted which caused leadership to find international conflict a solution to bolstering a unified German mind. The legacies of Bismarck, Nietzche, and Treitschke over 40 years through the education in their schools, the German youth were a brainwashed a people apt to salute anything with a uniform. Those uniforms told them that they deserve more. The Kaiser, with an agenda for more pushed Austria to military action with Serbia. The Kaiser knew a conflict would draw in Russia. The Kaiser knew his plan would require the neutralization of France. The Kaiser miscalculated is English in-laws. Aside from his low level of mental acuity we question his motive.
In defense of the other belligerents, Austria-Hungary’s state of disintegration on its own may have taken a more passive position to a perceived attempt to disrupt the transition of Habsburg power from its current king to its prince in waiting. Russia had its interests in a warm water port guised in its protection of Slavic people, but was not in a position having just been defeated by Japan to go to war. France and England over years of disarmament were just not ready for war. Germany was going a different direction having built up its navy to rival England, and bolstered is army through a conscription level higher than its neighbors. Germany saw both Russia and England as rivals that they needed an upper hand on. The shot heard around the world was all the Kaiser needed to launch a military plan that caused general war. Could this have been prevented?
Balance of Power did not work to gain a world peace and eventually gave way to a United Nations, which obviously is not working, as there have been over 65 wars across national boarders since its inception. We also know building coalitions forces have its limitations as business and political agendas often conflict. It seems greed for money and power corrupt whomever sits at the helm of any type of organization. We know that boycotts and sanctions do not work as world consensus or for that matter consensus at any level is impossible to maintain. What will work? I have said before that it seems that when two or more people ban together for a common cause involving scarcity of some thing, there will be another group ready to fight for their share. Who should be the arbitrator of such conflict and can you scale this arbitration to a world level?
What is missing is Conscience…collective conscience… the power of one singular mind for mankind…the willingness to extend your being beyond your physical self. At the core is You/Us. If you have a conflicted conscience it would follow that your society has a conflicted conscience. Germany certainly displayed how a group of people can make their body temples a false alter through which they perceive the world. They sought for more…the god of more. They had collective conscience going in the right direction, but were merely focused on the State, their State and that is where they became delusional. But lets be fair, Americans in 2007 do it too. Cast a hue of shame on us for collectively lobbying our congressmen for banning the sale of key resources to international entities (China & Dubai) that we fear that they may get more than we get.
So lets turn the coin over and hit the fast forward button. Why does Iran fear the West? Read my past reviews, first they want something today that they once had which is recognition as a world power. They now fear others because those countries want something Persians have. (oil and/or warm water). They feared USSR because of their experience of a Russian agenda for more. (warm water port) They feared the British because of their same experience through bogus business deals. (oil) Iran, believe it or not, prefer to work with and through the United States for their rightful place on the world stage as right now only the United Sates through its diplomacy shine a light on that need. This phenomenon was also observed in my reading of 1919. Yet we fear them (Muslims} because we are convinced they are out to take away our way of life. I consider it merely to be a subplot rooted in Imam rhetoric, albeit rooted in the Quran, a fear that is snatched up by people on both sides of the equation living in fear. In every case there is a fear of one group of people taking away an object even if that object is an idea (ideal) from another group of people.
What if we did away with the groups of people? Sounds too much like communism. What if we did away with the objects? Sounds too much like Jesus. Oddly enough communism banned the teachings of Jesus. What was he teaching? Jesus was teaching that we are all one. When you make a slight on another you are making a slight upon yourself. When you make a gift for another you are making a gift for yourself. When you are giving up a material thing for another, you are gaining a material thing for yourself. When you live at the sake of another you are slighting that other man and thus slighting yourself. We are all one of one singular mind and that is to love (allow another to exist just as he/she is) and be happy with that reality (accept it). The average bear does not see or perhaps does not want to see it that way because he is not at one with himself. There is no singularity of the mind that would enable him to transcend his body temple. Therefore, he spends his energy consuming more things to make his body, family, village, city, nation, more comfortable.
Therefore groups of people build temples, shrines, or monuments that while intended to unite people, they miss all people, ending up with a group of people and therefore have unacceptable separate realities full of conflict, whether intended in its origin or not. Historically we find it to be a part of human nature to behave this way individually and as nations. We have failed to understand that the basic tenant of conflict is the failure to recognize that the human race is all one, the world is a billion piece jigsaw puzzle, where one damaged or missing piece renders the whole puzzle worthless. To break through, can we suspend with the idea of temples, as they are symbols of our separateness? Can we get rid of symbols as they unintentionally classify, which is a proponent of the process of division? These very questions suggest we do away with religion, government, and science, as we know them. They can be seen as opponents to each other and to mankind when applied in the wrong spirit of mind. Daunting!!!!
In the case of WWI it is easy to pass the buck on to Germany. They had motive, preconceived intent, and the ability. There people never saw the devastation on their side of the boarder in that war allowing Hitler to light another fuse. It took the their annihilation in WWII to finally eradicate their compulsion of war like behavior as a nation. But to slight them is to slight the whole human race. Whilst we maintain a continued vigilance on Germany and Japan, we should be mindful of our own thinking as well. Our option as history would propose… annihilation
Not sure I have said anything new, but will leave it here for now. I am on to finishing, Bismarck, Crimean, and then on to techno solutions.
End notes
The Old Alliance System
1. p. 56: The maintenance of Austria-Hungry as a Great Power became a major foreign policy goal of Germany, both on diplomatic grounds, since Austria was seen as Germany’s only ally, and because any internal crisis in Austro-Hungry might have repercussions in Germany.
2. p. 57: In the years between the Bosnian crisis and the outbreak of the First World War, four things were forcing a reassessment and tightening up of the alliance system in Europe. The upheavals in Turkey which encouraged Russian hopes of compensating for their humiliation in the Far East by gains in the Balkans, …Austrians must act vigorously against Serbia to prevent the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy…the German naval building was a threat to Britain’s imperial interest,…German belief they must take action in order to ensure that the world balance of power was in their favor, … the hopes of the French, using the alliance with Russia to obtain the return of Alsace and Lorraine.
3. p. 63: on the period before 1914: Although the Germans had given the Austrians some diplomatic support at certain points in crisis, the Balkan quarrels had not escalated into European war because the Germans were not prepared to give their ally free hand against Serbia.
4. p. 65: The realization by the Germans that Austria-Hungry was her only reliable ally and that she must be supported at all costs in any policies which Austrians thought essential for survival of the Habsburg State, was an important motive for the German decisions of July 1914; and these decisions have been seen in terms of the Austrian belief that Germany had not supported her sufficiently in the previous years.
5. p. 66: The existence of the alliance system above all conditions expectations laid about the form of a war would take if it broke out, and about who were likely to be friends and enemies. These expectations laid down broad lines of strategic planning, so that general staffs were taking decisions, which often committed them to irreversible military actions if war threatened.
Militarism, Armaments and Strategy
6. p. 70: by 1912 the German authorities were so worried about the Social Democrats won a third of the votes in the Reichstag, they had serious doubts about increasing the size of their army. …the government succeeded in1913 in carrying a three year law through parliament, the anti-militarist movement was strong enough for any government to take into account the mood of the conscripts before starting a war.
7. p. 71 in a town hall conflict a soldiers telegram “ Town Hall occupied by the military. We urgently desire information as to the reasons in order to reassure the excited citizens.” Satirists might laugh at this episode, but it was a sign of the readiness of Germans to accept without question the orders of anyone in a military uniform.
8. p. 72 While the general acceptance of military values by large sections of the German public may have contributed to the mood which made war possible and to the enthusiasm with which the outbreak of war was greeted, the most important aspect of the role of the German army in the coming war was its freedom from civilian political control
9. p. 77 And Winston Churchill, who became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, as result of changes in the cabinet….: I must explicitly repudiate the suggestion that Great Britain can ever allow another naval power to approach her so nearly as to deflect or to restrict her political action by purely naval pressure.” The German government was in fact hoping for just that and wanted political concessions in exchange for naval disarmament.
10. p. 79 The structure of German society gave a special role to the army and produced a special respect for military values. The naval policies of the Kaiser and Tripitz aroused British foreign antagonism and began a naval race which had important social and economic effects as well as producing a radical change in British foreign policy.
11. p. 88 The King withdrew from, politics and Alexander became Prince Regent, while Pasic announced dissolution of parliament and new elections for 1 August. Thus, because of tension between the army and the civilian government, Serbia was in the midst of a major political crisis at the moment of the assignation of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
12. p. 90: Traditions of terrorism and conspiracy going back to the years of Turkish rule contributed an element of instability in both domestic and foreign policy (Serbian)…. Yet in the summer of 1914, when the Serbian army had not yet recovered from efforts in the Balkan wars, was hardly the moment for Serbia to provoke such a war; the evidence does not suggest that either the Serb government or the army command wanted to do so.
13. p. 91: The pace was set by Germany trying, for a variety of reasons, to shift world balance of power in her favor even if it involved a risk of war.
The Primacy of Domestic Politics
14. p. 109: notably that of Germany as we shall see, foreign policy was sometimes used as a way of providing a focus for national feelings so as to distract attention away from divisions and tensions of German society
15. p. 111: The Austro- Hungarian government believed that the establishment of some sort of control over Serbia was essential for the survival of their state.
16. p.111: The Liberal government had been in power in England since 1905 and there were many among supporters who held to tradition of …Gladstone, and believed that the balance of power was a dangerous concept, that expenditure on armaments was both wasteful and wicked and that Britain’s policy should be to maintain the freedom of trade and to keep herself free of foreign entanglements.
17. p. 115: If we look for responsibility for the First World War in the political and constitutional arrangements of the belligerent states, then the structure of the British government can be held responsible for Grey’s reluctance openly to commit Britain to support France and Russia before he was absolutely convinced he could carry his party with him.
18. p. 117: if a war was to come, it would have to be overran issue which would appear to the French public as involving a direct threat to France. For this reason the French government appeared to the Russians to be unreliable allies.
19. p. 117: French Prime Minister Poincare was convinced the he could produce a mood of national unity as was prepared to use his presidential prerogatives as far as they could possibly be stretched in order to do so. Domestic politics were to be subordinated to foreign policy.
20. p. 120: It was by then already clear to Poincare that the strength of anti-militarism had been exaggerated and that mobilization would proceed without interference from socialist or syndicalists.
21. p. 124: The Tsar himself was sometimes influenced by similar ideas for the reconstruction of central Europe. He told a rather bewildered British ambassador in April 1913 that he believed the disintegration of the Austrian Empire was only a matter of time.
22. p. 130: with regard to Germany, There is evidence that, at least from the 1890s, members of imperial government believed a vigorous foreign policy and encouragement of an aggressive nationalist spirit would be one way of overcoming the particularist sentiments in the individual states and producing a mood of national unity comparable to that of 1870.
23. p. 131: Bulow had successfully fought Reichstag elections of 1907 with slogans which combined nationalism, colonialism, and anti-socialism.. However the supporters of the view that it was concern for (German) domestic polititics that determined the conduct of German foreign policy would argue that this was more than just a matter of using foreign political issues for the immediate purpose of winning a particular election, and that foreign policy was deliberately used as a means of manipulating public opinion so as to create a sense of solidarity among German people and overcome the social and political divisions which were seen as a threat to every existence of the German Empire. The attraction of colonial Empire, a large fleet and an active policy would serve both as a basis for rallying the loyal elements around the Kaiser and government and as a means of countering the threat of a growing socialist movement.
24. p. 132: It is unlikely that German naval building would have been pursued so enthusiastically without the Kaiser’s personal commitment to the creation of a German fleet. This was no doubt partly the result of his own psychology – his emotional need to show himself the equal of his British relatives, and his country equal to England, which he both loved and hated.
25. P. 139: Between 1912 and the outbeak of the war, much nationalist propaganda was explicitly linking calls for preparation for war with the hope that a war might put an end to social democracy. ... While other members of the German government and high command believed that there was little point in postponing a war which they considered inevitable. Bethmann, with his eyes on the internal situation, was concerned that a war if it cam should appear to be one in which Germany was attacked by Russia. … From the time of Engals and Marx onwards, socialists had always believed that war against Russia, the most reactionary power in Europe would be justified, however they might criticize militarism at home.
The International Economy
26. p. 161: The international bankers were in a paradoxical position, symbolic perhaps of the whole capitalist system in Europe before 1914. Pm one hand, through their close collaboration with governments, they encouraged by their investment policy the consolidation of alliances and the growth of colonial rivalries. On the other hand the benefited by the flow of international trade and had an interest in uninterrupted international tension.
27. p. 164: The British share of world trade was falling…they had older industries. From a purely economic view of the United States was at least as dangerous a rival a Germany yet there was not talks of growing antagonism between the two. Sir Edward Grey in 1906 “ The economic rivalry (and all that) do not give much offence to our people, and they admire her steady industry and genius for organization. But the do resent mischief making. They suspect the Emperor of aggressive plans of Welpolitik, and they see that Germany is forcing the pace of armaments in order to dominate Europe and is thereby laying a horrible burden of wasteful expenditure upon all the other powers.
28. p. 168: Certainly there were industrialist and military men who hoped the war once begun would end with a peace that would extend their markets or safeguard their strategic position ( Field Marshal Hindenburg was to justify his demands for large annexations from Russia with the words “I need them for maneuvering of my left wing in the next war”)… Bethman approved a program of extensive annexations in the west to be followed in the pushing back of the Russian frontier and ending Russian control over non Russian [people … these gains that Germany went to war and that alone seemed to provide a way out of economic difficulties and contradictions so widely apparent in the spring of 1914.
Imperial Rivalries
29. p. 176 During the 1890s the main imperial rivalries had been between Britain ND France in Africa and Britain and
30. p. 176: Russia in the Far East. Britain and France had been close to war in 1898 over their claims to the upper Nile.
31. p. 181: For Britain in 1914 the threat to the empire which Germany appeared to represent was not a threat to any particular colony – as we shall see, right down to the outbreak of war there was always room for agreement between the two countries on specific colonial questions.
32. p. 181/182: Welpolitik or imperialism in this very general sense – and this was one of the reasons why it could serve as a unifying force for many different groups in German society – seemed to give purpose and a new mission to German state.
33. p. 188: The Turkish government ware increasingly concerned that their obvious weakness, after their defeats in Tripoli and Balkan wars made them vulnerable to a threat of partition, and they became convinced that they had more to fear from Russia than from Germany.
34. p. 181: Nevertheless the case of Turkey – like that of China a decade earlier – and the complex story of Anglo-German co-operation and rivalry there suggest that here was an area in which imperialist rivalries among European Great Powers were contributing to the instability which made the outbreak possible.
35. p. 191: Giolitti states: Tripolitania is a province of the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman Empire is a European great power. The integrity of what remains of the Ottoman Empire is one of the principles on which equilibrium an peace is based… Can it be in the interests of Italy to shatter one of the cornerstones of the old edifice? And what if after we have attacked Turkey, the Balkans begin to stir? And what if a Balkin war provokes a clash between the two power blocs and a European war? Can it be that we can shoulder the responsibility of putting a match to the powder?
36. p. 192: Certainly Italy’s imperialist war was one of the sparks lighting what one historian has called the long fuse linking the outbreak of the First Wiorld War to remote origins in the Balkins.
37. p. 192: The outbreak of war in 1914 wa not caused by immediate imperialist rivalries; and Germany’s aspirations for colonial territory might well have been achieved by agreement with Britain if the Germans had been prepared to abate their claims to naval hegemony. Nevertheless weak independent states such as Morocco and Ottoman were a temptation for the imperialist.
38. p 195: Imperialist thinking had always accepted the risk of war and regarded armed struggle as an essential part of imperial extension, even though tin fact imperialist was had hitherto for the most part been limited in scope. By 1914 this intensified the crisis in which German ambitions, French grievances, Russian expansionism, British anxieties and Austrian fears lead to decisions that war was inevitable.
The Mood of 1914
39. p. 199: But the mood in which peoples of Europe accepted and in some cases welcomed the idea of war was not just the result of the way in which their governments had justified their immediate political decisions. It was founded on the accumulation of national traditions and attitudes which had formed beliefs about the nature of the state and authority, reinforced by the curriculum in schools over the past decades and the kind of language in which politicians and journalists had discussed international relations.
40. p. 203: at the Tsar’s initial peace conferences in 1899 and 1907, the Kaiser declared: I’ll go along with the on conference comedy but I’ll keep my dagger at my side during the waltz.
41. p. 204 Most members of the peace movement were anxious to stress that their attempts to reform their system of international relations and to reduce armaments did not mean they lacked patriotism… “ We cannot continue criticism of policy which has led to this war as we did in the case of South Africa, for our safety is at stake. We can none of now think of anything but this one object”.
42. p. 204: Among socialist, “The working man has no country” the Communist Manifesto had proclaimed in 1848, “National differences and antagonisms are daily more and more vanishing owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, the freedom of commerce, the world market, the corresponding thereto.
43. p. 204: The internal regime of a stat was opposing Russia was of little importance: Turkey, for example as in the Crimean War was on the side of history because, as Engals put it a few years later: “A subjectively reactionary force can in foreign policy fulfill an objectively revolutionary mission.
44. p. 208: in France the revolutionary syndicalists and some socialists were calling for general strike in the event of mobilization… the French departments were busy revising the lists of people who were to be arrested in the event of mobilization.
45. p. 210: in Germany, they never forgot the twelve years under Bismarck’s snit-socialist law which had made many of the usual activities of political party impossible and were terrified that similar restrictions might be imposed again. …Bebel in fact accepted the socialist’s impotence in the face of German state and the Prussian military caste…
46. p. 211: In short the governments were very successful in convincing their citizens that they were the victims of aggression and in appealing to immediate feelings of patriotism and self-preservation which proved stronger than any internationalist convictions.
47. p. 217. When the war broke out, the British at least were encouraged by their newspapers, propagandists and religious leaders to attribute the war specifically to the influence of two German writers, the philosopher Fredrick Nietzche and the historian Heinrich von Treitschke.
48. p. 218: The moment the State proclaims “Your State and the existence of your State are now at stake” selfishness disappears and party hatred is silenced…In this consists the grandeur of war, that trivial things are entirely lost sight of in the great ideal of the State.
49. p. 223: Baden-Powell enabling the British Empire to survive: “We must all be bricks in the wall of that great enterprise – the British Empire – and we must be careful that we do not let our differences of opinion on politics and other questions grow so strong as to divide us.”
Crimea
Crimea
by Trevor Royle
The prime players are Russia, Turkey, Britain, France. The issue is world power, or at least a strategic piece of the world's power puzzle. At issue in disguise were the holy prizes, masked in Russia's need to save '' the Christians '' in a Muslim ruled Turkey. It was a land within the Ottoman Empire in decline. ( a sick old man was the phrase of the time). With the battlefield looking like it should be Turkey, the Russian Crimean peninsula and actually the city of Sevastopol becomes the scene of the siege. There was an air of arrogance and possibly hubris amongst the European powers specifically amongst the people at large. Hubris spilled over into the leadership of each country as they were actually giving considerable thought to their strategic interest. England had concerns over an encroachment of influence immediately on their Indian colony. Russia was in search of a warm water port in the Mediterranean. France…well its not quite clear what she wanted outside of an influence in the Middle East as other than the Christian prizes there were no outside strategic interests. The one possible rationale for the French may have been the mood of the French where a convincing victory would remove the 1815 international shackles.
The Affair at Sinope is history’s lesson in poetic justice. Russia took advantage of their naval supremacy over Turkey. In proactive reaction to ward off the deployment of additional Turkish troops in Maldivian front, Russian ships sank the Turkish ships while still in harbor. They annihilated the fleet with a first in the use of solid shells. The burning fleet caught the harbor on fire. Turkey’s loss of 2000 soldiers and as many sailors. It gave the impression of a massacre to the rest of the world. Up to this point the world leaders were not anxious to war with Russia. That all changed as England and France took notice.
So one can look at the power strategic of military victory versus the power of the free press and ask which is most effective in terms of winning the long lasting minds of men. In particular the London Times worked the English people into lather over the ordeal that otherwise giving the speed and quality of information in 1855, could have gone unnoticed. The book does not delve into the reasons why. The reason I select hubris over arrogance is the aristocracy of the English would actually take knoll top picnics giving them clear vista over battlefields where thousands would die in a day.
You could also look at the leadership, but only from a perspective of the shortsightedness of their strategic vision. While arrogance may have played a minor part the book makes it painfully clear how ignorant the leaders were to how unprepared England and Russia were for the war. Only France, who by coincidence of recently having been involved in wars in North Africa had an army with a working practice on the battlefield. England had not seen war in almost 50 years so they let their armies, not yet institutions, go fallow. Russia did not have access to the same technological advancements as those of Western Europe. All belligerents involved had not yet learned the lesson of coordinating the military with the leaders. When you put poor vision in conjunction with a lathered up people, you have license to exercise a military power that may not have legitimate moral standing. Given the news still coming out of the Balkins and the Ottoman Empire, all this chemistry of a European and World society of man has yet to find stability.
The news turned from that of spawning war to that of severe criticism of the British government’s execution of the war. The armies went into the war theater unprepared where even in victory, there were heavy losses attributed to non-combat scenarios. At the first sounding of difficulty the English people became un-nerved at wars prospect. Poor, inaccurate, and untimely communication led to many interpretations of an event where not just knowledge, but timing of that knowledge was essential for a clear picture. And only an unmerciful God knew. With regard to the imminent attack on Sevastopol, while the British were on reconnaissance the Russians already new British intensions, they were reading the Times. I am most intrigued at most with the people’s views before, during, and after this battle. Arrogance -to- Blame. Arrogance in We - to - Blame in You. (any one but me )
The Crimean war gave significant ground to test the rapid advancements in technology coming from the western born industrial revolution. The naval attack on Odessa marked the last time a British war ship, the Arethusa would fight a sea battle fully under sail. The Russian introduced to mankind a new military weapon of under water mines in the harbor of Kronstdat in the Gulf of Finland. Other technologies include telegraph, balloons, tunneling; steam powered train, sulfurous fumes, missiles, periscope, and the Minie Rifle.
Behind the lines medical advancements along with an elevated awareness to the loss of life and limb gave room for the introduction of battlefield rescue and behind the line hospitals in war. Ladies with Lamps brings Florence Nightingale to a sorely exposed medical service. The press, for the first time in British history, brought home the horror of war. The controversy was politicized at a social class level. While the French were supreme in medical service, all the Christian contingencies in the war appealed to the new awareness of war enough to advance medical technology, while the Turks did absolutely nothing.
With regard to diplomacy there were channels between the leaders and press, between the leaders themselves, between the leaders and the Admirals and Generals, and finally between the participants. On the Battlefield the European combatants distained the Turks in many way, most notable for me was to read: “In fighting along side Turks, the French distained the Turkish ritual of beheading their fallen foe, so much that they did not want to fight along side them.” Missed Opportunities, during and immediately after the battle of Alma the first battle on the Crimean peninsula, first poor field reconnaissance resulting in disagreements by field command. Second was conflicting direction from Allied leaders lead to a battle victory but not a victory of what was to become the Crimean War.
The logistics leading up to the siege and actual of Battle of Sevastopol, found the French always waiting on the English and impatience drew a rivalry in who’s in charge. At Balaklava the Cavalryman’s Battle represents more of poor planning in a war that was hastily rushed in to. The Russians were mostly organized, however with a character of complacency. The allies found battle strategy undermined by poor communication across battalions within armies and generals of each army. On the French/British side Egos' were the prime protagonist. On page 272 you read: “That was the interpretation of the order but, from his position above the cavalry, Raglan wished them to move forward to take any of attacking the enemy. Instead he was treated to the sight of the Light Brigade dismounted and taking their ease in the morning sun. His inpatients were exacerbated by the tardy arrival of the infantry.” Myself I have to struggle to imagine, knowing I am going into combat, and taking a preverbal '' coffee break ''
Diplomacy, as we know it in the 20th century post 1917, amongst the leaders found to be lacking in every case in Crimea. It was only too evident that Napoleon III thumbed his nose at peace talks that were ripe for all when he had not convincingly beat the Russians. The English and the French had changed their tunes. Just prior to the battle of Sevastopol, it became apparent that even with an allied victory, a war could not be won. Even the United States came close to joining in the war. Nathaniel Hawthorne, had been instrumental in stopping an illegal shipment through a merchant called Field.....(This was quite a concession. Hawthorne had already admitted his preferences:’ I hate England; though I love some Englishmen, and like them generally, in fact'') this was in the course of diplomacy against England. It is clear, had we engaged, it would have been on the side of Russia. In the end Austria’s Ferdinand played the part of broker in a war of exhausted belligerents that did not see their way to a clear treaty. It is discussed that in 1877, twelve years later, the events and causes of the Crimean War were being repeated already. This time. Disraeli chose diplomacy over war. With Bismarck as broker, a peace treaty was drawn that laid down all manner of problems, which would re-emerge 36 years later in WWI. While not discussed in this book, I know from reading Bismarck that the protagonist of WWI was not Bismarck work, but rather the deviation from his work by the Kaiser. In 1914 Disraeli and Bismarck were gone but the same issues of Turkish {Islamic ) oppression of Christians and Russian expansion were catalyst where a reckless Germany lit the fuse. In all three wars the issues, the sides taken by the belligerents, and the peace treaties did not square up. The impending factor was the arrogant mood of hubris of the people, including the leaders, in conjunction with a fear of losing control of world power; a power that translated to psyche and life style of its people.
With regard to the moral cause for war, any war, it always seems to get lost in the shuffle. In the case of the Crimean War, one which I now call World War One, The Great Elche, Lord Stratford to the Sultan lays into a formal letter a call to an end of Islamic oppression and corruption. In doing so there would be no cause for international involvement, war. Ironically, the forth treaty point-of peace was Joint European guarantees of Rights for Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, they said, How could Stratford in behalf of the Allies declared war on Russia because this Power was encroaching upon the independence of the Sultan by demanding to interfere in spiritual affairs of the Orthodoxies and how can he now demand a concession which they declared themselves, more than once, both verbally and in writing, to be inconsistent with the Sultans sovereign rights and independence? General Stratford: noted not only did the then leader Mahomet Ali lead an obnoxious personal life.... notorious for corruption and branded with criminality...he had been found guilty of murdering his Christian mistress and, at Stratford’s insistence, sacked from public life-but official Turkish appointment of him in the first place showed a contempt for British attempts to introduce reforms in court. What was the point of bolstering the Ottoman Empire by taking its side against Russia asked Stratford, if its rulers were in default to British demands that changes be made in its style of government? Ali’s successor Abd-el-Mejit agreed to a wide range of measures to protect Christian rights and all non-Muslims in his Empire, including the abolition of the death penalty for apostasy. This commitment was included in the peace settlement. I must make a note having traveled to Saudi Arabia, that when the aircraft crosses over into Saudi territory the captain comes on the public address and reads to the passengers key Islamic laws. Included in this is the abolition of Christianity, which he reads is punishable by death. When I heard that I rose from my business class seat to use the restroom. When I looked back all the women who were previously wearing some very skin bearing outfits were all in black ropes. It was alarming at least.
You could then ask, what was won. Russia's aim was a warm water port through a Russian solution to the Eastern Question. Nicholas succeeded, somewhat in 1855. The 1914 tzar/Chairman continued the success somewhat. I find it ironic that a man more evil than Hitler conned three of the Great Leaders of the free world to grant Nicholas' wish in signing a treaty in Yalta, on the tip of the Crimean Peninsula; went un-noticed!!! This gave Moscow 45 more years of warm water access. Only now as I write this review, sitting next to a woman from Crimea on an aircraft traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit, do I fully appreciate that the Crimea is now Ukraine and not Russia. What was lost or never really won; apparently free will amongst all man. Included with this reality is a fear that we are apt to do it all again.
So I ask in this time of immediate gratification and living in the here and now, what defines now? Is it this moment or could the study of history expand our worldview of now in a way that allows us at a larger social level, to learn from our lessons in history, an expanded now, and not touch the hot stove. Not to let the newspapers draw us to a level of consciousness that allows leaders to go unchecked, or worse yet be protagonist in their waging of a war. That airplane ride as much as this book makes clear to me that world peace may require a military that does not fire a shot. Is this a bit naive? Possibly…likely. When you consider it took the complete destruction of Germany and Japan to change their ways in defense of a free world, in a snap shot of a broader now; is that what it takes to bring the Eastern Question, a world that is not free to an answer?
Perhaps another solution is the appreciation that freedom is infolded in the world of free enterprise and democracy, the American experiment, is the government of choice to ensure a check on our leaders, and a free expression of its people. Perhaps the expansion in information technologies will help get a broader message to the people of the world. The Internet is a new twist in that articles not subject to editors biased messaging but rather bloggers where all information is openly and aggressively challenged. Keep in mind however North Korea struggles with electricity let alone infrastructure for the information rich web. Iran and China are demonstrably very capable of using that same web to monitor and control what is being viewed and said. Throwing that reality into the equation helps a person of the Western World appreciate an informational peace is not around the corner and is dependant on a certain “freedom of the press” Until then the poison of fear will poison us all.
I could have taken an intriguing view on the personal stories described in this book. They are equally valuable in understanding the travesty in war. I welcome all readers to have a good look at this book and fill in on items I may have missed.
by Trevor Royle
The prime players are Russia, Turkey, Britain, France. The issue is world power, or at least a strategic piece of the world's power puzzle. At issue in disguise were the holy prizes, masked in Russia's need to save '' the Christians '' in a Muslim ruled Turkey. It was a land within the Ottoman Empire in decline. ( a sick old man was the phrase of the time). With the battlefield looking like it should be Turkey, the Russian Crimean peninsula and actually the city of Sevastopol becomes the scene of the siege. There was an air of arrogance and possibly hubris amongst the European powers specifically amongst the people at large. Hubris spilled over into the leadership of each country as they were actually giving considerable thought to their strategic interest. England had concerns over an encroachment of influence immediately on their Indian colony. Russia was in search of a warm water port in the Mediterranean. France…well its not quite clear what she wanted outside of an influence in the Middle East as other than the Christian prizes there were no outside strategic interests. The one possible rationale for the French may have been the mood of the French where a convincing victory would remove the 1815 international shackles.
The Affair at Sinope is history’s lesson in poetic justice. Russia took advantage of their naval supremacy over Turkey. In proactive reaction to ward off the deployment of additional Turkish troops in Maldivian front, Russian ships sank the Turkish ships while still in harbor. They annihilated the fleet with a first in the use of solid shells. The burning fleet caught the harbor on fire. Turkey’s loss of 2000 soldiers and as many sailors. It gave the impression of a massacre to the rest of the world. Up to this point the world leaders were not anxious to war with Russia. That all changed as England and France took notice.
So one can look at the power strategic of military victory versus the power of the free press and ask which is most effective in terms of winning the long lasting minds of men. In particular the London Times worked the English people into lather over the ordeal that otherwise giving the speed and quality of information in 1855, could have gone unnoticed. The book does not delve into the reasons why. The reason I select hubris over arrogance is the aristocracy of the English would actually take knoll top picnics giving them clear vista over battlefields where thousands would die in a day.
You could also look at the leadership, but only from a perspective of the shortsightedness of their strategic vision. While arrogance may have played a minor part the book makes it painfully clear how ignorant the leaders were to how unprepared England and Russia were for the war. Only France, who by coincidence of recently having been involved in wars in North Africa had an army with a working practice on the battlefield. England had not seen war in almost 50 years so they let their armies, not yet institutions, go fallow. Russia did not have access to the same technological advancements as those of Western Europe. All belligerents involved had not yet learned the lesson of coordinating the military with the leaders. When you put poor vision in conjunction with a lathered up people, you have license to exercise a military power that may not have legitimate moral standing. Given the news still coming out of the Balkins and the Ottoman Empire, all this chemistry of a European and World society of man has yet to find stability.
The news turned from that of spawning war to that of severe criticism of the British government’s execution of the war. The armies went into the war theater unprepared where even in victory, there were heavy losses attributed to non-combat scenarios. At the first sounding of difficulty the English people became un-nerved at wars prospect. Poor, inaccurate, and untimely communication led to many interpretations of an event where not just knowledge, but timing of that knowledge was essential for a clear picture. And only an unmerciful God knew. With regard to the imminent attack on Sevastopol, while the British were on reconnaissance the Russians already new British intensions, they were reading the Times. I am most intrigued at most with the people’s views before, during, and after this battle. Arrogance -to- Blame. Arrogance in We - to - Blame in You. (any one but me )
The Crimean war gave significant ground to test the rapid advancements in technology coming from the western born industrial revolution. The naval attack on Odessa marked the last time a British war ship, the Arethusa would fight a sea battle fully under sail. The Russian introduced to mankind a new military weapon of under water mines in the harbor of Kronstdat in the Gulf of Finland. Other technologies include telegraph, balloons, tunneling; steam powered train, sulfurous fumes, missiles, periscope, and the Minie Rifle.
Behind the lines medical advancements along with an elevated awareness to the loss of life and limb gave room for the introduction of battlefield rescue and behind the line hospitals in war. Ladies with Lamps brings Florence Nightingale to a sorely exposed medical service. The press, for the first time in British history, brought home the horror of war. The controversy was politicized at a social class level. While the French were supreme in medical service, all the Christian contingencies in the war appealed to the new awareness of war enough to advance medical technology, while the Turks did absolutely nothing.
With regard to diplomacy there were channels between the leaders and press, between the leaders themselves, between the leaders and the Admirals and Generals, and finally between the participants. On the Battlefield the European combatants distained the Turks in many way, most notable for me was to read: “In fighting along side Turks, the French distained the Turkish ritual of beheading their fallen foe, so much that they did not want to fight along side them.” Missed Opportunities, during and immediately after the battle of Alma the first battle on the Crimean peninsula, first poor field reconnaissance resulting in disagreements by field command. Second was conflicting direction from Allied leaders lead to a battle victory but not a victory of what was to become the Crimean War.
The logistics leading up to the siege and actual of Battle of Sevastopol, found the French always waiting on the English and impatience drew a rivalry in who’s in charge. At Balaklava the Cavalryman’s Battle represents more of poor planning in a war that was hastily rushed in to. The Russians were mostly organized, however with a character of complacency. The allies found battle strategy undermined by poor communication across battalions within armies and generals of each army. On the French/British side Egos' were the prime protagonist. On page 272 you read: “That was the interpretation of the order but, from his position above the cavalry, Raglan wished them to move forward to take any of attacking the enemy. Instead he was treated to the sight of the Light Brigade dismounted and taking their ease in the morning sun. His inpatients were exacerbated by the tardy arrival of the infantry.” Myself I have to struggle to imagine, knowing I am going into combat, and taking a preverbal '' coffee break ''
Diplomacy, as we know it in the 20th century post 1917, amongst the leaders found to be lacking in every case in Crimea. It was only too evident that Napoleon III thumbed his nose at peace talks that were ripe for all when he had not convincingly beat the Russians. The English and the French had changed their tunes. Just prior to the battle of Sevastopol, it became apparent that even with an allied victory, a war could not be won. Even the United States came close to joining in the war. Nathaniel Hawthorne, had been instrumental in stopping an illegal shipment through a merchant called Field.....(This was quite a concession. Hawthorne had already admitted his preferences:’ I hate England; though I love some Englishmen, and like them generally, in fact'') this was in the course of diplomacy against England. It is clear, had we engaged, it would have been on the side of Russia. In the end Austria’s Ferdinand played the part of broker in a war of exhausted belligerents that did not see their way to a clear treaty. It is discussed that in 1877, twelve years later, the events and causes of the Crimean War were being repeated already. This time. Disraeli chose diplomacy over war. With Bismarck as broker, a peace treaty was drawn that laid down all manner of problems, which would re-emerge 36 years later in WWI. While not discussed in this book, I know from reading Bismarck that the protagonist of WWI was not Bismarck work, but rather the deviation from his work by the Kaiser. In 1914 Disraeli and Bismarck were gone but the same issues of Turkish {Islamic ) oppression of Christians and Russian expansion were catalyst where a reckless Germany lit the fuse. In all three wars the issues, the sides taken by the belligerents, and the peace treaties did not square up. The impending factor was the arrogant mood of hubris of the people, including the leaders, in conjunction with a fear of losing control of world power; a power that translated to psyche and life style of its people.
With regard to the moral cause for war, any war, it always seems to get lost in the shuffle. In the case of the Crimean War, one which I now call World War One, The Great Elche, Lord Stratford to the Sultan lays into a formal letter a call to an end of Islamic oppression and corruption. In doing so there would be no cause for international involvement, war. Ironically, the forth treaty point-of peace was Joint European guarantees of Rights for Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In Turkey, they said, How could Stratford in behalf of the Allies declared war on Russia because this Power was encroaching upon the independence of the Sultan by demanding to interfere in spiritual affairs of the Orthodoxies and how can he now demand a concession which they declared themselves, more than once, both verbally and in writing, to be inconsistent with the Sultans sovereign rights and independence? General Stratford: noted not only did the then leader Mahomet Ali lead an obnoxious personal life.... notorious for corruption and branded with criminality...he had been found guilty of murdering his Christian mistress and, at Stratford’s insistence, sacked from public life-but official Turkish appointment of him in the first place showed a contempt for British attempts to introduce reforms in court. What was the point of bolstering the Ottoman Empire by taking its side against Russia asked Stratford, if its rulers were in default to British demands that changes be made in its style of government? Ali’s successor Abd-el-Mejit agreed to a wide range of measures to protect Christian rights and all non-Muslims in his Empire, including the abolition of the death penalty for apostasy. This commitment was included in the peace settlement. I must make a note having traveled to Saudi Arabia, that when the aircraft crosses over into Saudi territory the captain comes on the public address and reads to the passengers key Islamic laws. Included in this is the abolition of Christianity, which he reads is punishable by death. When I heard that I rose from my business class seat to use the restroom. When I looked back all the women who were previously wearing some very skin bearing outfits were all in black ropes. It was alarming at least.
You could then ask, what was won. Russia's aim was a warm water port through a Russian solution to the Eastern Question. Nicholas succeeded, somewhat in 1855. The 1914 tzar/Chairman continued the success somewhat. I find it ironic that a man more evil than Hitler conned three of the Great Leaders of the free world to grant Nicholas' wish in signing a treaty in Yalta, on the tip of the Crimean Peninsula; went un-noticed!!! This gave Moscow 45 more years of warm water access. Only now as I write this review, sitting next to a woman from Crimea on an aircraft traveling from Amsterdam to Detroit, do I fully appreciate that the Crimea is now Ukraine and not Russia. What was lost or never really won; apparently free will amongst all man. Included with this reality is a fear that we are apt to do it all again.
So I ask in this time of immediate gratification and living in the here and now, what defines now? Is it this moment or could the study of history expand our worldview of now in a way that allows us at a larger social level, to learn from our lessons in history, an expanded now, and not touch the hot stove. Not to let the newspapers draw us to a level of consciousness that allows leaders to go unchecked, or worse yet be protagonist in their waging of a war. That airplane ride as much as this book makes clear to me that world peace may require a military that does not fire a shot. Is this a bit naive? Possibly…likely. When you consider it took the complete destruction of Germany and Japan to change their ways in defense of a free world, in a snap shot of a broader now; is that what it takes to bring the Eastern Question, a world that is not free to an answer?
Perhaps another solution is the appreciation that freedom is infolded in the world of free enterprise and democracy, the American experiment, is the government of choice to ensure a check on our leaders, and a free expression of its people. Perhaps the expansion in information technologies will help get a broader message to the people of the world. The Internet is a new twist in that articles not subject to editors biased messaging but rather bloggers where all information is openly and aggressively challenged. Keep in mind however North Korea struggles with electricity let alone infrastructure for the information rich web. Iran and China are demonstrably very capable of using that same web to monitor and control what is being viewed and said. Throwing that reality into the equation helps a person of the Western World appreciate an informational peace is not around the corner and is dependant on a certain “freedom of the press” Until then the poison of fear will poison us all.
I could have taken an intriguing view on the personal stories described in this book. They are equally valuable in understanding the travesty in war. I welcome all readers to have a good look at this book and fill in on items I may have missed.
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