By Winston Churchill
This is the fifth in a volume series penned by Churchill
that accounts for his actions in World War Two.
The theme of this volume is titled “How Germany was Isolated and
Assailed on All Sides”. In terms of
events it spans from finally gaining command of the seas, the U-boat War
through the conquest of Sicily and the eventual victory in Italy. Churchill must carefully manage the Italians,
Stalin, and Roosevelt, and other world leaders as he cultivates an ally in Italy
and turns them against Germany. If this
were the only string of events, one could envision this task on par with world
leaders since WWII. However, there are
also many side adventures that occupied Churchill’s calendar in that time. Churchill captures these side tracks,
including management of the British role against Japan, the Greek situation,
the conquest of Rome, and the development of the Normandy invasion. Churchill portrays his skillful balance of
diplomatic relations with world leaders and then turns about to properly manage
not only the generals of the British Empire but also properly communicate with
the likes of General Eisenhower.
There are many historians that seem to have a vendetta
against Churchill. The subject of their
criticism is most prevalent in this volume over the others in this series. They would color him as a reckless dictator
over his generals. There were strategies
that the Generals brought to Churchill whereby he challenge with
alternatives. In Churchill’s words, he clearly
claims his loyalty to Normandy’s invasion.
But he also, for reasons of integrity towards the British people, allied
nations, the soldiers that gave their
last full measure on one beach, hill or battlefield, or his own conscience,
made a broader minded argument with all that he interacted with. His broader mind was criticized by cottage
industry historians, and then rebuked by Churchill himself.
Upon reading the excerpts I provide below, the reader will
get a flavor for the arguments Churchill made to support not only for operation
Overlord, but the larger view of the war on many other fronts. Any author spending time to re-write history,
should recall his books and refund the money to his readers. They should all be compensated for their
wasting a reader’s time reading their
books.
I have worked in leadership roles in a few companies in my
career. I fully appreciate the value of friendship in business. Today I work in a company with headquarters
in Paris, France. There are cultural
differences and language, whether they are the right words (English or French)
or not, is where it shows up first.
With that said the following is an excerpt of a letter penned by
Churchill. It says on a much larger
stage how important friendship is.
Churchill to
Roosevelt: I regard our right to sit
together on movements of our own two forces as fundamental and vital. Hitherto we have prospered wonderfully, but I
now feel that the year of 1944 is loaded with danger. Great differences may develop between us and
we may take the wrong turning. Or again,
we may make compromises and fall between two stools. The only hope is the intimacy and friendship
which has been established between us and between our High Staffs. If that were broken, I should despair on the immediate
future… I need scarcely say that British Chiefs of Staff fully share these
views. I must add that I am more anxious
about the campaign of 1944 than about any other in which I have been involved.
I invite you to read
my bibliography, where many of the excerpts are Churchill’s words in defense of
his critics. Of course there are my comments
as well.
Enjoy
Biography:
Page 4: U-boats were
finally beaten and the mastery of the life-lines across the Atlantic was
finally won. Without this no amphibious operations on the enormous scale
required to liberate Europe would have been possible.
Page 6: The Battle of
the Atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war. Never for one moment could we forget that
everything happening elsewhere, on land, at sea, or in the air depended
ultimately its outcome, and amid all other
cares we viewed its fortunes day by day with hope or apprehension.
Page 21: By trying to
take both New Guinea and Guadalcanal, the Japanese had lost their chance of
winning either. They had to retreat over
the mountain track under close Australian ground and air pursuit.
Page 37: On July 22,
the British Chiefs of Staff urged their America colleagues to plan a direct
attack on Naples on the assumption that extra shipping and aircraft carriers
would be available. The Americans took a different view. While
agreeing to attack, they adhered to their original decision no reinforcements
from America should be sent to General Eisenhower for this or any other purpose
The British Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the Washington
Conference has expressly stated that the elimination of Italy from the war was
one of the prime Allied objects. The
attack on Naples, now given the code name Avalanche, was the best means of
accomplishing this, and the collapse of Italy would increase enormously the
chances of the Cross-Channel invasion not only being successful, but decisive.
My comment: Here is a good example whereby American
bullish Clausewitz strategy had to be tempered by Churchill. This is nothing other than broadmindedness on
a world stage.
Page 43: So durable
however was the impression of his authority and the fear of his personal action
in extremity that there was prolonged hesitation throughout all the forces of
Italian society about how to oust Mussolini.
Page 51: His
(Mussolini’s) fatal mistake was declaring war on France and Great Britain
following Hitler’s victories in June of 1940.
Had he not done this, he might well have maintained Italy in a balancing
position, courted and rewarded by both sides.
Page 52 [metaphor] Hitler as I have pointed out in an
earlier volume, had in fact made a
spider’s web and forgotten the spider.
Page 69: Small-scale
raids by the Commandos paved thw way for greater things, and not only gave us
confidence and experience, but showed the world that although beset on all
sides we were not content with passive defense. … To mount a successful
invasion from the United Kingdom, new engines of war must be contrived and
developed, the three fighting services must be trained to plan and fight as one team, supported by the industry
of the nation, and the whole island converted into an armed camp for launching
the greatest seaborne assault of all time.
When Mountbatten visited me at Chequers before taking up his
new duties, I told him, according to his account, “You to plan for the
offensive. In your Headquarter you will
never thinkdefensively.”
My comment: Notice Churchill uses Mountbatten’s account
to defend those who suggest that he was not supportive of the Normandy
invasion.
Page 86: There were
some close to President Roosevelt who advocated making assault through Burma
into China. They argued that ports and
air bases in China would be indispensible for intensive and sustained air
attacks against eh mainland of Japan.
Although politically attractive in American eyes, this idea ignored the
impossibility of deploying large armies, in the in jungles of Burma, most of
which would have been found by Britain and also in the presence Japanese forces
in China operating on interior lines of communication.
My comment: This passage deserves a little criticism of
Churchill from Americans. Churchill was
focused on Europe. Albeit all Allies
agreed on Germany first, one could accuse Churchill of leaving America to
defend the far away British Empire in the course of defending her own shores. The task at hand in Burma and China was no
more demanding than Normandy. However,
in Churchill’s defense, a plan was set
by all that Germany was to be defeated first.
Page 87: With the
Philippines once more in American hands, Japan would be isolated from many of
its chief sources of supply and the garrisons in the outlying islands of the
Dutch East Indies would be cut off from all hope of rescue.
My comment: Here again Churchill offers an alternative
strategy. I myself in 50/50 insight
would ponder the result of a successful campaign through Burma and China. Would we have been in a position to decide on
the A-bomb?
Page 110: The
difficulty of the Italian Government and the people in extricating themselves
from Hitler’s clutches may make a still
more daring enterprise necessary, for General Eisenhower will need as much Italian
help as he can get.
Page 119: [metaphor] and this hung overhead like a vulture
in the sky.
Page 126: General
Smuts to Churchill: …. But almost all
the honors on land go to the Russians, and deservedly so, considering the scale
and speed of their fighting and the magnificence of their strategy on a vast
front.
Page 158: The most
difficult issue was the decision President Roosevelt and I had taken, of which
I was, as the reader has been, a strong
partisan, to deal with the King and Marshal Bodoglio and treat them as
co-belligerents.
I cannot touch upon this matter of Italy without exposing
myself to the question, which I shall be most properly asked, “Would you apply
this line of argument?” I say , the case
is different.” Twice within our
lifetime, and three times counting the days of our fathers, they have plunged
the world into their wars of expansion and aggression. They combine in the most deadly manner the
qualities of the warrior and the slave.
They do not value freedom themselves, and the spectacle of it in others
is hateful to them. Whenever they become
strong they seek their prey and they will follow with an iron discipline anyone
who will lead them to it. …Nazi tyranny
and Prussian militarism are the two main elements in German life that must be
destroyed.
Page 168: The semi circular
assembly, which appeals to political theorists, enables every individual or
every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according
as the weather changes. I am a supporter of the part system in preference to
the group system. I have seen many earnest and ardent Parliaments
destroyed by the group system. The party
system is much favored by the oblong form chamber. It is easy for an individual to move through
those insensible gradations from Left to Right, but the act of crossing the
Floor is one that requires serious consideration. I am well informed of the matter, for I have
accomplished this difficult process, not only once but twice.
Page 179: I have
repeatedly stated that it is in the major interest of Great Britain to have a
strong France after the war, and I should not hesitate to sustain this view.
…if the healthy and helpful processes I have noted are allowed to take their
course, and if we lact with patience, and above all with a sense of proportion,
in these vexations.
Page 185: My
intention was frustrated by the rough and tragic behavior of the Free French
Administration in Syria. The formal
independence of Syria and the Lebanon had been proclaimed by the Free French at
the end of 1941.
Page 186: The action
taken by the French stultifiedthe agreements we had made with the French, and
also with the Syrians and Lebanese. It
was contrary to the Atlantic Charter and much elese we had declared. It seemed that the situation would be
distorted throughout the whole Middle East and the Arad world, and also
everywhere people would say, “What kind of France is this which while itself subjugated
by the enemy, would seek to subjugate others?
Page 234: In his book
Crusade In Europe, General Eisenhower expressed his opinion that the
development and employment of the “V” weapons were greatly delayed by the
bombing of the experimental plants at Peemunde and other places where they were
manufactured. He goes as far to say on
mage 260:
It seemed likely that if the
Germans has succeeded in perfecting and using those weapons six months earlier
than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proven exceedingly difficult,
perhaps impossible.
Page 247: Churchill
to Roosevelt: No one can doubt that by
knocking out Italy we have enormously helped the Russians advance in the only
way in which it could have been helped at this time. I feel that Eisenhower and Alexander must
have what they need to win the battle in Italy, no matter what the consequence
is produced on subsequent operations.
My comment: This passage would be used by the Churchill
bashers, claiming Churchill’s preference to attack Germany from its underbelly. What they lose track of is that by attacking
Italy Germany could not deploy as many division in France has they could,
leaving a smaller foe to face in the Normandy landing.
Page 254: Give me
easement of six weeks or two months from May 1 in the date of Overlord and I could
for several months use the landing craft in the Mediterranean in order to bring
really effective forces to bear in Italy, and thus not only take Rome, but to
draw German divisions from either or both the Russian and the Normandy fronts.
Page 258: These three
immense battles of Kursk, Orel, and Kharkov, all within a space of two months,
marked the ruin of the German army on the Eastern Front. Everywhere they had been outfought and
overwhelmed. The Russian plan, vast
though it was, never out ran their resources.
My comment: They learned this all too well in their
defense of Moscow against Napoleon a hunderd and thirty years earlier.
Page 285: Our present
plans for 1944 seem open to very grave defects.
We are to put fifteen American and twelve British divisions in to France
in May, and will have about six American an sixteen British or British
controlled divisions on the Italian front.
Unless there is a German collapse, Hitler, lying in the center of the
best communications in the world, can concentrate at least forty to fifty
divisions against either of these forces while holding the other. He could obtain all the necessary forces by
cutting his losses in the Balkans and withdrawing to Save and the Danube without
necessarily weakening his Russian Front.
This is one of the most elementary war propositions.
Page 286: I do not
accept the American argument that our Metropolitan Air Forces can flatten
everything out in the battle zone or on its approaches. This has not been our experience. All this is for your internal consumption,
and not for deployment at this stage. It
may show you however the dangers of our being committed to a “lawyers bargain”
for Overlord in May, for the sake of it we may have to ruin the Italian front
and Balkans possibilities and yet have insufficient forces to maintain
ourselves after the thirtieth of fortieth day.
My comment: throughout these chapters its Churchill’s
argument to maintain a broader view of the war strategy against an American
intensely trained focus on the Clausewitz approach in the beaches of Normandy,
operation Overlord. It cannot be
overlooked that Rome was finally taken only days before Overlord, thus keeping
German divisions pinned down in Italy.
Page 292: Mr. Eden
said that Marshal well knew that the Prime Minister was just as keen on hurting
Hitler as he was. Stalin acknowledged
this, but added with a gust of laughter that I had a tendency to take the easy
road for myself and leave the difficult jobs for the Russians.
Page 312: Churchill
to Roosevelt: We stand by what was
agreed to in Quebec, but we do not feel that such an agreement should be
interpreted rigidly, and without review in the swiftly changing situations of
the war.
Page 315: Churchill
to Roosevelt: I regard our right to sit
together on movements of our own two forces as fundamental and vital. Hitherto we have prospered wonderfully, but I
now feel that the year of 1944 is loaded with danger. Great differences may develop between us and
we may take the wrong turning. Or again,
we may make compromises and fall between two stools. The only hope is the intimacy and friendship
which has been established between us and between our High Staffs. If that were broken, I should despair on the
immediate future… I need scarcely say that British Chiefs of Staff fully share
these views. I must add that I am more
anxious about the campaign of 1944 than about any other in which I have been
involved.
Page 332: The
decisions at Quebec were taken before the consequences of the collapse of Italy
were apparent and before the surrender of the Italian Fleet and the successful
invasion of the mainland of Europe.
Nevertheless they maintained until a fortnight ago with inflexible
rigity….. we are now faced with the
prospect that a fixed target date for Overlord will continue to hamper and
enfeeble the Mediterranean campaign.
Nor must we overlook the discouraging and enfeebling effect
upon the whole of the operations in the Mediterranean of the fact that that it
is now common knowledge in the armies that the theatre is to be bled as much a
necessary for the sake of an operation elsewhere in the spring.
Page 334: When I
spoke, I said Overlord remained top of the bill, but this operation should not
be such a tyrant as to rule out every other activity in the Mediterranean; for
example a little flexibility in the employment of landing-craft ought to be
conceded.
Page 345: My third
request was that the Eastern Mediterranean, with all the prizes that it
afforded, should not be neglected, provided no strength which could be applied
across the Channel should be absorbed.
IN all this I adhered to the proportions which I and mentioned to
General Eisenhower two months earlier – namely six-tenths of our realistic
strength across the Channel, three tenths in Italy, and one tenth in the
Eastern Mediterranean. From this I never varied – not one inch in a year.
All the available shipping in the Western Hemisphere was
already committed, to the last ton, to the preparation of Overlord and the
maintenance of Italy.
Page 351: Stalin here observed that he never regarded the operations in then
Mediterranean as being of secondary character.
They were of first importance, but not from the point of view of
invading Germany.
My comment: Stalin had his own invasion plans for eastern
Europe and then Germany. His vision was
a little bit more aggressive that Churchill and Roosevelt read him for. It was after the war that the Cold War came
in to view.
Page 353: The
President here reminded me of the further project of moving up the Northern
Adriatic and then northeast to the Danube.
I agreed, and said once we had taken Rome and destroyed the German
armies south of the Apennines in the narrow part of Italy, the Angelo-American
armies would advance far enough to make contact with the enemy. We could then hold the line with the minimum
forces and keep the option to strike with the remainder either in the South of
France or, in accordance with the President’s idea, northeast from the head of
the Adriatic.
My comment: This passage from Churchill completely
debunks the cottage industry of historians bent on bashing Churchill for single
handedly trying to subvert Overlord. In fact it was the two world leaders
thinking more broadly that the American Generals who applied Clausewitz solely
on the beaches of Normandy. I ask this
simple question: What if Americans,
British, and the Soviets joined hands and went right up through the underbelly
on the eastern side? We’d have had a
super Clausewitz involving the Russians and reducing the risk on American
lives.
Page 356: I replied
that we should be no stronger if we pulled out of the advance on Rome, and once
we had taken the city we should be in a much stronger position through having
destroyed or badly mutilated ten or eleven German divisions. Moreover we required the airfields north of
Rome for the bombing of Germany. It
would be impossible for us to forego the capture of Rome….
My comment: So in the execution of Overlord in
conjunction of the allied bombing of Germany, and no more buildup of our
Italian front, we left Eastern Europe at the mercy of Stalin’s hidden agenda.
Page 362: We agreed
to look at the problem. Stalin asked
whether it would be with or without Polish participation. I said “Yes, “and that when this was all
informally agreed between ourselves, we could go to the Poles later. Mr. Eden here remarked that he had been much
struck by Stalin’s statement that afternoon that the Poles could go as far west
as Oder. He saw hope in that and was
much encouraged. Stalin asked whether we
thought he was going to swallow up Poland.
Eden said he did not know how much the Russians were going to eat. How much would they have left
undigested? Stalin said the Russian did
not want anything belonging to other people, although they might take a bite out of Germany.
Page 366: I then set
the British case. I said that I was
somewhat concerned at the number and complexity of the problems which
confronted us. The Conference represented some twelve to
fourteen millions of the human race, who depended upon our reaching right
conclusions. It was therefore imperative
that we should not separate until the great military, political, and moral
problems confronting us had been firmly resolved: but I proposed to confine
myself to a few specific points which might be studied by a military sub-committee.
Speaking for myself, I said I thought that sufficient
landing-craft to transport at least two divisions should be retained in the
Mediterranean.
Page 377: It was not
a choice between the Mediterranean and the date of Overlord, but between the
Bay of Bengal and the date of Overlord.
However the Americans had pinned us down to a date for Overlord and
operations in the Mediterranean had suffered for two months. Our army in Italy was somewhat disheartened
by the removal of seven divisions.
Page 380: If the
operation did not take place, he did not want the Red Army to be
disappointed. Disappointment could only
create bad feeling. If there was no big
change in the European war in 1944, it
would be difficult for the Russians to carry on. They were ware weary. He [Stalin] feared that a feeling of
isolation might develop in the Red Army.
That is why he tried to find out whether Overlord would be undertaken on
time as promised. If not, he would have
to take steps to prevent bad feeling in the Red Army. It was most important.
My comment: Here is where I feel Churchill misread
Stalin. Stalin had already turned
Germany around to the defensive. His
army had plenty to be motivated.
Page 383: I
[Churchill] said [to Stalin], “Truth is so precious that she should always be
attended by a bodyguard of lies.” Stalin
and his comrades greatly appreciated this remark when it was translated, and
upon this note our formal conference ended gaily.
Page 402: I said that
if Germany were divided into a number of parts as suggested by the President,
and these parts were not attached to other combinations they would
reunite. It was not a question of
dividing Germany so much as giving life to the cut off bits and making them
content not to be dependent on the Greater reich. Even if this were achieved for fifty years,
that would be a lot.
My comment: In 2014 I believe the world would hope that
forever would be the correct amount of time.
Page 405: I was of
course more attracted by the President’s alternative suggestion of a
right-handed move from Italy by Istria and Trieste, with ultimate designs for
reaching Vienna through the Ljubljana gap.
All this lay five or six months ahead.
There would be plenty of time to make a final choice.
My comment: Churchill makes record here and I am sure
there is an official record indicating that President Roosevelt also envisioned
an attack on Germany through its ‘soft underbelly’ of Italy. This absolutely debunks the cottage industry
of historians bent on bashing Churchill for distracting the Overlord planning. I believe that the southern strategy over
Overlord would have saved lives and prevented the Cold War.
Page 405: Stalin’s
promise to enter the war against Japan as soon as Hitler was overthrown and his
armies defeated was of highest importance.
My comment: Truman’s atom bomb decision thwarted the
opportunity for Stalin’s promise to mature.
Imagine the world situation if USSR allied with USA and Great Britain on
the Chinese continent against Japan. The
game of ‘What If’ would be a nice distraction for the cottage industry of
historians bent on bashing Churchill.
Page 409: This
[President Roosevelt’s commitment to China] would have swept away my plans for
taking Rhodes, on which I believed the entry of Turkey into the war largely
depended. But Mr. Roosevelt’s heart was
set upon it.
My comment: Let us play more What If? What if Roosevelt lived longer. Would he have pressed Stalin for his promise
over the atom bomb? What if the
Americans were less bent on having it their way with Clausewitz mentality? And at the same time the reader becomes
painfully aware of the contradicting strategy between Generals and
Leaders. General’s strategy was to
island hopped and starved Japan.
Roosevelt’s heart was bent on a China based offensive. Unsettled differences on alternatives forced
focus on Overlord, or was it focus on Overlord prevented a broader view in
strategic thinking.
Page 409: Marshal
Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet would declare war on Japan
the moment Germany was defeated. This
would give us better bases than we could ever find in China and made all the
more important that we make Overlord a success.
Page 410: On the last
point I suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from
Mountbatten [in Asia] in order to strengthen Overlord and Anvil. The President said that we could not agree
with this. We had a moral obligation to
do something for China.
My comment: So historians give Roosevelt a pass. He allows for moral obligation to distract
the strategic plans for Overlord.
Page 426: As I saw
the problem, the campaign in Italy, in which millions or more of our British,
British controlled and Allied armies were engaged, was faithful and
indispensable comrade and counterpart to the main cross-Channel operation. Here the American clear-cut, logical, large scale,
mass-production style of thought was formidable. In life people have first to “Concentrate on
essentials.” This is no doubt the first
step out from confusion and fatuity; but it’s only the first step. The second stage of the war is a general
harmony of war effort by making everything fit together.
Page 448: [Churchill
to Roosevelt] I have always expected that when the commanders took the matter
into their hands, they would make alterations in the plans, which nevertheless
have proved invaluable as a basis for future decisions.
Page [Churchill to King Mihailovic, Yugoslovia] Therefore
the people have set themselves difficult tasks and we are bound to accomplish
them.
My comment: I include this excerpt only to demonstrate
Churchill’s ability to communicate up and down the hierarchy of government in
many countries.
Page 486: [Churchill
to General Wilson] I do not want to
worry General Alexander in the height of the battle, but I am not at all
surprised at the inquiry from the United States Chief’s of Staff. There are three points on which you should
touch. First is why was the 504 Regiment
of paratroops not used at Anzio as proposed, and why is the existing British
Parachute Brigade used as ordinary infantry in the line? Secondly; why was n attempt made to occupy
the high ground and at least the towns of Vellentri, Campoleone, and Cisterna
twelve or twenty-four hours after the unopposed landing. Thirdly, the question asked by the United
Sates Chiefs of Staff: Why has there
been no heavily mounted aggressive offensive on the main front to coincide with
the withdrawal of troops by Germans to face the landing?
My comment: Churchill drills in to the General beyond the
USA inquiry, thus shaping the answer
Page 488: We were
apparently still stronger than the Germans in fighting power. The ease with which they [the Germans] moved
their pieces about the board and the rapidity which they adjusted the perilous
gaps they had to make on their southern front was most impressive. It all seemed to give us very adverse data
for Overlord.
Page 499: [metaphor}
When you have to hold a hot coffee pot, it is better not to break the handle
off until you are sure that you will get another equally convenient and
serviceable, or at any rate until there is a dish cloth ready.
My comment: A
Churchill metaphor demonstrating his humanity.
Page 511: Here and at
the Anzio bridgehead we had pinned down in
Central Italy nearly twenty good German divisions. Many of them might have gone to France
Page 512: They
questioned the wisdom of undertaking Anvil at all, in view of the way things
were going in Italy, and pointed out that when Anvil first found favor at
Teheran we expected that the Germans would withdraw to a line north of Rome. But now it is clear beyond all doubt that the
Germans intended to resist our advance on Italy to the utmost.
My comment: With all that was observed of German’s
reluctance to surrender in Russia, why would anyone have an expectation that
Hitler would do anything different?
Page 532: The Greeks
rival the Jews in being the most politically minded race in the world. No matter how forlorn their circumstances or
how grave the peril to their country, they are always divided into many
parties, with many leaders who fight among themselves with desperate
vigor. It has be said that wherever
there are three Jews it will be found there are two Prime Ministers and one
leader of the Opposition Party.
Page 543: [Churchill
advice to the Greek King’s standing court] Wherever else do you expect to live
in times like these? Please however be careful
to follow very exactly the instructions you are receiving from me, namely first in priority order and discipline
to be maintained in the armed forces; secondly, the safety of the King’s person
to be ensured; thirdly every effort to be made to induce Tsouderos to hold
office till the King returns and has had time to look around; fourthly try to
get Venizelos to remain with Tsouderos; fifthly, celebrate Easter Sunday in a manner
pious and becoming.
Page 582:
[metaphor] Thought arising from FACTUAL EXPERIENCE may be a bridle or a
spur.
Page 586: The
“Mulberry harbors, I now heard, were meeting with difficulties. I therefore summoned a conference on January
24. It was intended to plant a
breakwater (“Gooseberry”) in each of the divisional assult area. This now meant a total of five
“Gooseberried,” two of which would in due course be absorbed into the
“Mulberries.”
Page 587: The
Admiralty needed eight thousand yards of blockships. Nearly all were provided by using seventy old
merchant ships and four obsolete war ships.
Page 593: These plans
depended on our ability to maintain a rapid build-up over the beaches. To co-ordinate all the intricate shipping
movements a special organization was established at the Supreme Commander’s
head quarters at Portsmith. With subordinate inter-Service bodies at embarkation
port.
Page 597 The
concentration of the assaulting forces – 176,000 men, 20,000 vehicles, and many
thousand tons of stores, all to be shipped in the first two days – was an
enormous task
Page 611: [of the
value of taking Rome, fully appreciated by Churchill] First it drew ten divisions from the
following places: one from France, one
from Hungary, four from Yugoslovia and Istria, ione from Denmark and three from
North Italy, it brought on a defensive battle for usin which, thought we lost
25,000 men, the Germans were repulsed and much of the of their divisions
broken, with a loss of about thirty thousand men.
