Closing the Ring

By Winston Churchill

This is the fifth in a volume series penned by Churchill that accounts for his actions in World War Two.  The theme of this volume is titled “How Germany was Isolated and Assailed on All Sides”.  In terms of events it spans from finally gaining command of the seas, the U-boat War through the conquest of Sicily and the eventual victory in Italy.  Churchill must carefully manage the Italians, Stalin, and Roosevelt, and other world leaders as he cultivates an ally in Italy and turns them against Germany.  If this were the only string of events, one could envision this task on par with world leaders since WWII.  However, there are also many side adventures that occupied Churchill’s calendar in that time.  Churchill captures these side tracks, including management of the British role against Japan, the Greek situation, the conquest of Rome, and the development of the Normandy invasion.  Churchill portrays his skillful balance of diplomatic relations with world leaders and then turns about to properly manage not only the generals of the British Empire but also properly communicate with the likes of General Eisenhower. 

There are many historians that seem to have a vendetta against Churchill.  The subject of their criticism is most prevalent in this volume over the others in this series.  They would color him as a reckless dictator over his generals.  There were strategies that the Generals brought to Churchill whereby he challenge with alternatives.  In Churchill’s words, he clearly claims his loyalty to Normandy’s invasion.  But he also, for reasons of integrity towards the British people, allied nations,  the soldiers that gave their last full measure on one beach, hill or battlefield, or his own conscience, made a broader minded argument with all that he interacted with.  His broader mind was criticized by cottage industry historians, and then rebuked by Churchill himself. 

Upon reading the excerpts I provide below, the reader will get a flavor for the arguments Churchill made to support not only for operation Overlord, but the larger view of the war on many other fronts.  Any author spending time to re-write history, should recall his books and refund the money to his readers.  They should all be compensated for their wasting a reader’s  time reading their books.

I have worked in leadership roles in a few companies in my career. I fully appreciate the value of friendship in business.  Today I work in a company with headquarters in Paris, France.  There are cultural differences and language, whether they are the right words (English or French) or not, is where it shows up first.   With that said the following is an excerpt of a letter penned by Churchill.  It says on a much larger stage how important friendship is.

Churchill to Roosevelt:   I regard our right to sit together on movements of our own two forces as fundamental and vital.  Hitherto we have prospered wonderfully, but I now feel that the year of 1944 is loaded with danger.  Great differences may develop between us and we may take the wrong turning.  Or again, we may make compromises and fall between two stools.  The only hope is the intimacy and friendship which has been established between us and between our High Staffs.  If that were broken, I should despair on the immediate future… I need scarcely say that British Chiefs of Staff fully share these views.  I must add that I am more anxious about the campaign of 1944 than about any other in which I have been involved.

I invite you to read my bibliography, where many of the excerpts are Churchill’s words in defense of his critics.  Of course there are my comments as well.

Enjoy

Biography:

Page 4:  U-boats were finally beaten and the mastery of the life-lines across the Atlantic was finally won. Without this no amphibious operations on the enormous scale required to liberate Europe would have been possible.

Page 6:  The Battle of the Atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war.  Never for one moment could we forget that everything happening elsewhere, on land, at sea, or in the air depended ultimately its outcome, and amid all other  cares we viewed its fortunes day by day with hope or apprehension.

Page 21:  By trying to take both New Guinea and Guadalcanal, the Japanese had lost their chance of winning either.  They had to retreat over the mountain track under close Australian ground and air pursuit. 

Page 37:  On July 22, the British Chiefs of Staff urged their America colleagues to plan a direct attack on Naples on the assumption that extra shipping and aircraft carriers would be  available.  The Americans took a different view. While agreeing to attack, they adhered to their original decision no reinforcements from America should be sent to General Eisenhower for this or any other purpose

The British Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the Washington Conference has expressly stated that the elimination of Italy from the war was one of the prime Allied objects.  The attack on Naples, now given the code name Avalanche, was the best means of accomplishing this, and the collapse of Italy would increase enormously the chances of the Cross-Channel invasion not only being successful, but decisive.

My comment:  Here is a good example whereby American bullish Clausewitz strategy had to be tempered by Churchill.  This is nothing other than broadmindedness on a world stage.

Page 43:  So durable however was the impression of his authority and the fear of his personal action in extremity that there was prolonged hesitation throughout all the forces of Italian society about how to oust Mussolini.

Page 51:  His (Mussolini’s) fatal mistake was declaring war on France and Great Britain following Hitler’s victories in June of 1940.  Had he not done this, he might well have maintained Italy in a balancing position, courted and rewarded by both sides.

Page 52 [metaphor] Hitler as I have pointed out in an earlier volume, had in fact  made a spider’s web and forgotten the spider.

Page 69:  Small-scale raids by the Commandos paved thw way for greater things, and not only gave us confidence and experience, but showed the world that although beset on all sides we were not content with passive defense. … To mount a successful invasion from the United Kingdom, new engines of war must be contrived and developed, the three fighting services must be trained to plan and  fight as one team, supported by the industry of the nation, and the whole island converted into an armed camp for launching the greatest seaborne assault of all time.

When Mountbatten visited me at Chequers before taking up his new duties, I told him, according to his account, “You to plan for the offensive.   In your Headquarter you will never thinkdefensively.”

My comment:  Notice Churchill uses Mountbatten’s account to defend those who suggest that he was not supportive of the Normandy invasion.

Page 86:  There were some close to President Roosevelt who advocated making assault through Burma into China.  They argued that ports and air bases in China would be indispensible for intensive and sustained air attacks against eh mainland of Japan.  Although politically attractive in American eyes, this idea ignored the impossibility of deploying large armies, in the in jungles of Burma, most of which would have been found by Britain and also in the presence Japanese forces in China operating on interior lines of communication.

My comment:  This passage deserves a little criticism of Churchill from Americans.  Churchill was focused on Europe.  Albeit all Allies agreed on Germany first, one could accuse Churchill of leaving America to defend the far away British Empire in the course of defending her own shores.  The task at hand in Burma and China was no more demanding than Normandy.  However, in Churchill’s defense,  a plan was set by all that Germany was to be defeated first. 

Page 87:  With the Philippines once more in American hands, Japan would be isolated from many of its chief sources of supply and the garrisons in the outlying islands of the Dutch East Indies would be cut off from all hope of rescue.

My comment:  Here again Churchill offers an alternative strategy.  I myself in 50/50 insight would ponder the result of a successful campaign through Burma and China.  Would we have been in a position to decide on the A-bomb?

Page 110:  The difficulty of the Italian Government and the people in extricating themselves from Hitler’s clutches may  make a still more daring enterprise necessary, for General Eisenhower will need as much Italian help as he can get.

Page 119: [metaphor] and this hung overhead like a vulture in the sky.

Page 126:  General Smuts to Churchill:  …. But almost all the honors on land go to the Russians, and deservedly so, considering the scale and speed of their fighting and the magnificence of their strategy on a vast front.

Page 158:  The most difficult issue was the decision President Roosevelt and I had taken, of which I was, as the reader has been,  a strong partisan, to deal with the King and Marshal Bodoglio and treat them as co-belligerents.

I cannot touch upon this matter of Italy without exposing myself to the question, which I shall be most properly asked, “Would you apply this line of argument?”  I say , the case is different.”  Twice within our lifetime, and three times counting the days of our fathers, they have plunged the world into their wars of expansion and aggression.  They combine in the most deadly manner the qualities of the warrior and the slave.  They do not value freedom themselves, and the spectacle of it in others is hateful to them.  Whenever they become strong they seek their prey and they will follow with an iron discipline anyone who will lead them to it.  …Nazi tyranny and Prussian militarism are the two main elements in German life that must be destroyed.

Page 168:  The semi circular assembly, which appeals to political theorists, enables every individual or every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according as the weather changes. I am a supporter of the part system in preference to the group system.  I have  seen many earnest and ardent Parliaments destroyed by the group system.  The party system is much favored by the oblong form chamber.  It is easy for an individual to move through those insensible gradations from Left to Right, but the act of crossing the Floor is one that requires serious consideration.  I am well informed of the matter, for I have accomplished this difficult process, not only once but twice.

Page 179:  I have repeatedly stated that it is in the major interest of Great Britain to have a strong France after the war, and I should not hesitate to sustain this view. …if the healthy and helpful processes I have noted are allowed to take their course, and if we lact with patience, and above all with a sense of proportion, in these vexations.

Page 185:  My intention was frustrated by the rough and tragic behavior of the Free French Administration in Syria.  The formal independence of Syria and the Lebanon had been proclaimed by the Free French at the end of 1941. 

Page 186:  The action taken by the French stultifiedthe agreements we had made with the French, and also with the Syrians and Lebanese.  It was contrary to the Atlantic Charter and much elese we had declared.  It seemed that the situation would be distorted throughout the whole Middle East and the Arad world, and also everywhere people would say, “What kind of France is this which while itself subjugated by the enemy, would seek to subjugate others?

Page 234:  In his book Crusade In Europe, General Eisenhower expressed his opinion that the development and employment of the “V” weapons were greatly delayed by the bombing of the experimental plants at Peemunde and other places where they were manufactured.  He goes as far to say on mage 260:       

It seemed likely that if the Germans has succeeded in perfecting and using those weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proven exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible.

Page 247:  Churchill to Roosevelt:  No one can doubt that by knocking out Italy we have enormously helped the Russians advance in the only way in which it could have been helped at this time.  I feel that Eisenhower and Alexander must have what they need to win the battle in Italy, no matter what the consequence is produced on subsequent operations.

My comment:  This passage would be used by the Churchill bashers, claiming Churchill’s preference to attack Germany from its underbelly.  What they lose track of is that by attacking Italy Germany could not deploy as many division in France has they could, leaving a smaller foe to face in the Normandy landing.

Page 254:  Give me easement of six weeks or two months from May 1 in the date of Overlord and I could for several months use the landing craft in the Mediterranean in order to bring really effective forces to bear in Italy, and thus not only take Rome, but to draw German divisions from either or both the Russian and the Normandy fronts.

Page 258:  These three immense battles of Kursk, Orel, and Kharkov, all within a space of two months, marked the ruin of the German army on the Eastern Front.  Everywhere they had been outfought and overwhelmed.  The Russian plan, vast though it was, never out ran their resources.

My comment:  They learned this all too well in their defense of Moscow against Napoleon a hunderd and thirty years earlier.

Page 285:  Our present plans for 1944 seem open to very grave defects.  We are to put fifteen American and twelve British divisions in to France in May, and will have about six American an sixteen British or British controlled divisions on the Italian front.  Unless there is a German collapse, Hitler, lying in the center of the best communications in the world, can concentrate at least forty to fifty divisions against either of these forces while holding the other.  He could obtain all the necessary forces by cutting his losses in the Balkans and withdrawing to Save and the Danube without necessarily weakening his Russian Front.  This is one of the most elementary war propositions.

Page 286:  I do not accept the American argument that our Metropolitan Air Forces can flatten everything out in the battle zone or on its approaches.  This has not been our experience.  All this is for your internal consumption, and not for deployment at this stage.  It may show you however the dangers of our being committed to a “lawyers bargain” for Overlord in May, for the sake of it we may have to ruin the Italian front and Balkans possibilities and yet have insufficient forces to maintain ourselves after the thirtieth of fortieth day.

My comment:  throughout these chapters its Churchill’s argument to maintain a broader view of the war strategy against an American intensely trained focus on the Clausewitz approach in the beaches of Normandy, operation Overlord.  It cannot be overlooked that Rome was finally taken only days before Overlord, thus keeping German divisions pinned down in Italy.

Page 292:  Mr. Eden said that Marshal well knew that the Prime Minister was just as keen on hurting Hitler as he was.  Stalin acknowledged this, but added with a gust of laughter that I had a tendency to take the easy road for myself and leave the difficult jobs for the Russians.

Page 312:  Churchill to Roosevelt:  We stand by what was agreed to in Quebec, but we do not feel that such an agreement should be interpreted rigidly, and without review in the swiftly changing situations of the war.

Page 315:  Churchill to Roosevelt:   I regard our right to sit together on movements of our own two forces as fundamental and vital.  Hitherto we have prospered wonderfully, but I now feel that the year of 1944 is loaded with danger.  Great differences may develop between us and we may take the wrong turning.  Or again, we may make compromises and fall between two stools.  The only hope is the intimacy and friendship which has been established between us and between our High Staffs.  If that were broken, I should despair on the immediate future… I need scarcely say that British Chiefs of Staff fully share these views.  I must add that I am more anxious about the campaign of 1944 than about any other in which I have been involved.

Page 332:  The decisions at Quebec were taken before the consequences of the collapse of Italy were apparent and before the surrender of the Italian Fleet and the successful invasion of the mainland of Europe.  Nevertheless they maintained until a fortnight ago with inflexible rigity…..  we are now faced with the prospect that a fixed target date for Overlord will continue to hamper and enfeeble the Mediterranean campaign.

Nor must we overlook the discouraging and enfeebling effect upon the whole of the operations in the Mediterranean of the fact that that it is now common knowledge in the armies that the theatre is to be bled as much a necessary for the sake of an operation elsewhere in the spring.

Page 334:  When I spoke, I said Overlord remained top of the bill, but this operation should not be such a tyrant as to rule out every other activity in the Mediterranean; for example a little flexibility in the employment of landing-craft ought to be conceded.

Page 345:  My third request was that the Eastern Mediterranean, with all the prizes that it afforded, should not be neglected, provided no strength which could be applied across the Channel should be absorbed.  IN all this I adhered to the proportions which I and mentioned to General Eisenhower two months earlier – namely six-tenths of our realistic strength across the Channel, three tenths in Italy, and one tenth in the Eastern Mediterranean.  From this I never  varied – not one inch in a year.

All the available shipping in the Western Hemisphere was already committed, to the last ton, to the preparation of Overlord and the maintenance of Italy.

Page 351: Stalin here observed that he  never regarded the operations in then Mediterranean as being of secondary character.  They were of first importance, but not from the point of view of invading Germany.

My comment:  Stalin had his own invasion plans for eastern Europe and then Germany.  His vision was a little bit more aggressive that Churchill and Roosevelt read him for.  It was after the war that the Cold War came in to view.

Page 353:  The President here reminded me of the further project of moving up the Northern Adriatic and then northeast to the Danube.  I agreed, and said once we had taken Rome and destroyed the German armies south of the Apennines in the narrow part of Italy, the Angelo-American armies would advance far enough to make contact with the enemy.  We could then hold the line with the minimum forces and keep the option to strike with the remainder either in the South of France or, in accordance with the President’s idea, northeast from the head of the Adriatic.

My comment:  This passage from Churchill completely debunks the cottage industry of historians bent on bashing Churchill for single handedly trying to subvert Overlord. In fact it was the two world leaders thinking more broadly that the American Generals who applied Clausewitz solely on the beaches of Normandy.  I ask this simple question:  What if Americans, British, and the Soviets joined hands and went right up through the underbelly on the eastern side?  We’d have had a super Clausewitz involving the Russians and reducing the risk on American lives.  

Page 356:  I replied that we should be no stronger if we pulled out of the advance on Rome, and once we had taken the city we should be in a much stronger position through having destroyed or badly mutilated ten or eleven German divisions.  Moreover we required the airfields north of Rome for the bombing of Germany.  It would be impossible for us to forego the capture of Rome….

My comment:  So in the execution of Overlord in conjunction of the allied bombing of Germany, and no more buildup of our Italian front, we left Eastern Europe at the mercy of Stalin’s hidden agenda.

Page 362:  We agreed to look at the problem.  Stalin asked whether it would be with or without Polish participation.  I said “Yes, “and that when this was all informally agreed between ourselves, we could go to the Poles later.  Mr. Eden here remarked that he had been much struck by Stalin’s statement that afternoon that the Poles could go as far west as Oder.  He saw hope in that and was much encouraged.  Stalin asked whether we thought he was going to swallow up Poland.  Eden said he did not know how much the Russians were going to eat.  How much would they have left undigested?  Stalin said the Russian did not want anything belonging to other people, although they might take  a bite out of Germany.

Page 366:  I then set the British case.  I said that I was somewhat concerned at the number and complexity of the problems which confronted us.  The  Conference represented some twelve to fourteen millions of the human race, who depended upon our reaching right conclusions.  It was therefore imperative that we should not separate until the great military, political, and moral problems confronting us had been firmly resolved: but I proposed to confine myself to a few specific points which might be studied by a military sub-committee.

Speaking for myself, I said I thought that sufficient landing-craft to transport at least two divisions should be retained in the Mediterranean.

Page 377:  It was not a choice between the Mediterranean and the date of Overlord, but between the Bay of Bengal and the date of Overlord.  However the Americans had pinned us down to a date for Overlord and operations in the Mediterranean had suffered for two months.  Our army in Italy was somewhat disheartened by the removal of seven divisions.

Page 380:  If the operation did not take place, he did not want the Red Army to be disappointed.  Disappointment could only create bad feeling.  If there was no big change in the European war in 1944,  it would be difficult for the Russians to carry on.  They were ware weary.  He [Stalin] feared that a feeling of isolation might develop in the Red Army.  That is why he tried to find out whether Overlord would be undertaken on time as promised.  If not, he would have to take steps to prevent bad feeling in the Red Army.  It was most important.

My comment:  Here is where I feel Churchill misread Stalin.  Stalin had already turned Germany around to the defensive.  His army had plenty to be motivated. 

Page 383:  I [Churchill] said [to Stalin], “Truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.”  Stalin and his comrades greatly appreciated this remark when it was translated, and upon this note our formal conference ended gaily.

Page 402:  I said that if Germany were divided into a number of parts as suggested by the President, and these parts were not attached to other combinations they would reunite.  It was not a question of dividing Germany so much as giving life to the cut off bits and making them content not to be dependent on the Greater reich.  Even if this were achieved for fifty years, that would be a lot.

My comment:  In 2014 I believe the world would hope that forever would be the correct amount of time.

Page 405:  I was of course more attracted by the President’s alternative suggestion of a right-handed move from Italy by Istria and Trieste, with ultimate designs for reaching Vienna through the Ljubljana gap.  All this lay five or six months ahead.  There would be plenty of time to make a final choice.

My comment:  Churchill makes record here and I am sure there is an official record indicating that President Roosevelt also envisioned an attack on Germany through its ‘soft underbelly’ of Italy.  This absolutely debunks the cottage industry of historians bent on bashing Churchill for distracting the Overlord planning.  I believe that the southern strategy over Overlord would have saved lives and prevented the Cold War.

Page 405:  Stalin’s promise to enter the war against Japan as soon as Hitler was overthrown and his armies defeated was of highest importance.

My comment:  Truman’s atom bomb decision thwarted the opportunity for Stalin’s promise to mature.  Imagine the world situation if USSR allied with USA and Great Britain on the Chinese continent against Japan.  The game of ‘What If’ would be a nice distraction for the cottage industry of historians bent on bashing Churchill.

Page 409:  This [President Roosevelt’s commitment to China] would have swept away my plans for taking Rhodes, on which I believed the entry of Turkey into the war largely depended.  But Mr. Roosevelt’s heart was set upon it.

My comment:  Let us play more What If?   What if Roosevelt lived longer.  Would he have pressed Stalin for his promise over the atom bomb?  What if the Americans were less bent on having it their way with Clausewitz mentality?  And at the same time the reader becomes painfully aware of the contradicting strategy between Generals and Leaders.  General’s strategy was to island hopped and starved Japan.  Roosevelt’s heart was bent on a China based offensive.  Unsettled differences on alternatives forced focus on Overlord, or was it focus on Overlord prevented a broader view in strategic thinking.

Page 409:  Marshal Stalin had voluntarily proclaimed that the Soviet would declare war on Japan the moment Germany was defeated.  This would give us better bases than we could ever find in China and made all the more important that we make Overlord a success.

Page 410:  On the last point I suggested that it might be necessary to withdraw resources from Mountbatten [in Asia] in order to strengthen Overlord and Anvil.  The President said that we could not agree with this.  We had a moral obligation to do something for China.

My comment:  So historians give Roosevelt a pass.  He allows for moral obligation to distract the strategic plans for Overlord. 

Page 426:  As I saw the problem, the campaign in Italy, in which millions or more of our British, British controlled and Allied armies were engaged, was faithful and indispensable comrade and counterpart to the main cross-Channel operation.  Here the American clear-cut, logical, large scale, mass-production style of thought was formidable.  In life people have first to “Concentrate on essentials.”  This is no doubt the first step out from confusion and fatuity; but it’s only the first step.  The second stage of the war is a general harmony of war effort by making everything fit together.

Page 448:  [Churchill to Roosevelt] I have always expected that when the commanders took the matter into their hands, they would make alterations in the plans, which nevertheless have proved invaluable as a basis for future decisions.

Page [Churchill to King Mihailovic, Yugoslovia] Therefore the people have set themselves difficult tasks and we are bound to accomplish them.

My comment:  I include this excerpt only to demonstrate Churchill’s ability to communicate up and down the hierarchy of government in many countries.

Page 486:  [Churchill to General Wilson]  I do not want to worry General Alexander in the height of the battle, but I am not at all surprised at the inquiry from the United States Chief’s of Staff.  There are three points on which you should touch.  First is why was the 504 Regiment of paratroops not used at Anzio as proposed, and why is the existing British Parachute Brigade used as ordinary infantry in the line?  Secondly; why was n attempt made to occupy the high ground and at least the towns of Vellentri, Campoleone, and Cisterna twelve or twenty-four hours after the unopposed landing.  Thirdly, the question asked by the United Sates Chiefs of Staff:  Why has there been no heavily mounted aggressive offensive on the main front to coincide with the withdrawal of troops by Germans to face the landing?

My comment:  Churchill drills in to the General beyond the USA inquiry, thus shaping the answer

Page 488:  We were apparently still stronger than the Germans in fighting power.  The ease with which they [the Germans] moved their pieces about the board and the rapidity which they adjusted the perilous gaps they had to make on their southern front was most impressive.  It all seemed to give us very adverse data for Overlord.

Page 499:  [metaphor} When you have to hold a hot coffee pot, it is better not to break the handle off until you are sure that you will get another equally convenient and serviceable, or at any rate until there is a dish cloth ready.

My comment: A Churchill metaphor demonstrating his humanity.

Page 511:  Here and at the Anzio bridgehead we had pinned down in  Central Italy nearly twenty good German divisions.  Many of them might have gone to France

Page 512:  They questioned the wisdom of undertaking Anvil at all, in view of the way things were going in Italy, and pointed out that when Anvil first found favor at Teheran we expected that the Germans would withdraw to a line north of Rome.  But now it is clear beyond all doubt that the Germans intended to resist our advance on Italy to the utmost.

My comment:  With all that was observed of German’s reluctance to surrender in Russia, why would anyone have an expectation that Hitler would do anything different?

Page 532:  The Greeks rival the Jews in being the most politically minded race in the world.  No matter how forlorn their circumstances or how grave the peril to their country, they are always divided into many parties, with many leaders who fight among themselves with desperate vigor.  It has be said that wherever there are three Jews it will be found there are two Prime Ministers and one leader of the Opposition Party.

Page 543:  [Churchill advice to the Greek King’s standing court] Wherever else do you expect to live in times like these?  Please however be careful to follow very exactly the instructions you are receiving from me,  namely first in priority order and discipline to be maintained in the armed forces; secondly, the safety of the King’s person to be ensured; thirdly every effort to be made to induce Tsouderos to hold office till the King returns and has had time to look around; fourthly try to get Venizelos to remain with Tsouderos; fifthly, celebrate Easter Sunday in a manner pious and becoming.

Page 582:  [metaphor]  Thought arising  from FACTUAL EXPERIENCE may be a bridle or a spur.

Page 586:  The “Mulberry harbors, I now heard, were meeting with difficulties.  I therefore summoned a conference on January 24.  It was intended to plant a breakwater (“Gooseberry”) in each of the divisional assult area.  This now meant a total of five “Gooseberried,” two of which would in due course be absorbed into the “Mulberries.”

Page 587:  The Admiralty needed eight thousand yards of blockships.  Nearly all were provided by using seventy old merchant ships and four obsolete war ships.

Page 593:  These plans depended on our ability to maintain a rapid build-up over the beaches.  To co-ordinate all the intricate shipping movements a special organization was established at the Supreme Commander’s head quarters at Portsmith. With subordinate inter-Service bodies at embarkation port.

Page 597  The concentration of the assaulting forces – 176,000 men, 20,000 vehicles, and many thousand tons of stores, all to be shipped in the first two days – was an enormous task

Page 611:  [of the value of taking Rome, fully appreciated by Churchill]  First it drew ten divisions from the following places:  one from France, one from Hungary, four from Yugoslovia and Istria, ione from Denmark and three from North Italy, it brought on a defensive battle for usin which, thought we lost 25,000 men, the Germans were repulsed and much of the of their divisions broken, with a loss of about thirty thousand men.