By Winston Churchill
This is the fifth in a volume series penned by Churchill
that accounts for his actions in World War Two.
The theme of this volume is titled How Germany was Isolated and Assailed
on All Sides. In terms of events it
spans from finally gaining command of the seas, the U-boat War through the
conquest of Sicily and the eventual victory in Italy. Churchill must carefully manage the Italians,
Stalin, and Roosevelt as he cultivates an ally in Italy and turns them against
Germany. If this were the only string of
events, one could envision this task on par with world leaders since WWII. However, there are also many side adventures
that occupied Churchill’s calendar in that time. Churchill captures these side tracks,
including management of the British role against Japan, the Greek situation,
the conquest of Rome, and the development of the Normandy invasion. Churchill portrays his skillful balance of diplomatic
relations with world leaders and then turns about to properly manage not only
the generals of the British Empire but also properly communicate with the likes
of General Eisenhower.
There are many historians that seem to have a vendetta
against Churchill. Te subject of their
criticism is most prevalent in this volume over the others in this series. They would color him as a reckless dictator
over his generals. There were strategies
that the Generals brought to Churchill whereby he challenged with
alternatives. In Churchill’s words, he
clearly claims his loyalty to Normandy’s invasion. But he also, for reasons of integrity towards
the British people, allied nations, the
soldiers that gave their last full measure on one beach, hill or battlefield,
or his own conscience. His broader mind
was criticized by cottage industry historians, and then rebuked by Churchill
himself.
Upon reading the excerpts I provide below, the reader will
get a flavor for the arguments Churchill made to support not only for operation
Overlord, but the larger view of the war on many other fronts. Any author spending time to re write history,
should recall his books and refund the money to his readers. They should all be compensated for their
waste of time reading their books.
Biography:
Page 4: U-boats were
finally beaten and the mastery of the life-lines across the Atlantic was
finally won. Without this no amphibious operations on the enormous scale
required to liberate Europe would have been possible.
Page 6: The Battle of
the Atlantic was the dominating factor all through the war. Never for one moment could we forget that
everything happening elsewhere, on land, at sea, or in the air depended
ultimately its outcome, and amid all other
cares we viewed its fortunes day by day with hope or apprehension.
Page 21: By trying to
take both New Guinea and Guadalcanal, the Japanese had lost their chance of
winning either. They had to retreat over
the mountain track under close Australian ground and air pursuit.
Page 37: On July 22,
the British Chiefs of Staff urged their America colleagues to plan a direct
attack on Naples on the assumption that extra shipping and aircraft carriers
would be available. The Americans took a different view. While
agreeing to attack, they adhered to their original decision no reinforcements
from America should be sent to General Eisenhower for this or any other purpose
The British Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the Washington
Conference has expressly stated that the elimination of Italy from the war was
one of the prime Allied objects. The
attack on Naples, now given the code name Avalanche, was the best means of
accomplishing this, and the collapse of Italy would increase enormously the
chances of the Cross-Channel invasion not only being successful, but decisive.
My comment: Here is a good example whereby American
bullish Clausewitz strategy had to be tempered by Churchill. This is nothing other than broadmindedness on
a world stage.
Page 43: So durable
however was the impression of his authority and the fear of his personal action
in extremity that there was prolonged hesitation throughout all the forces of
Italian society about how to oust Mussolini.
Page 51: His
(Mussolini’s) fatal mistake was declaring war on France and Great Britain
following Hitler’s victories in June of 1940.
Had he not done this, he might well have maintained Italy in a balancing
position, courted and rewarded by both sides.
Page 52 [metaphor] Hitler as I have pointed out in an
earlier volume, had in fact made a
spider’s web and forgotten the spider.
Page 69: Small-scale
raids by the Commandos paved thw way for greater things, and not only gave us
confidence and experience, but showed the world that although beset on all
sides we were not content with passive defense. … To mount a successful
invasion from the United Kingdom, new engines of war must be contrived and
developed, the three fighting services must be trained to plan and fight as one team, supported by the industry
of the nation, and the whole island converted into an armed camp for launching
the greatest seaborne assault of all time.
When Mountbatten visited me at Chequers before taking up his
new duties, I told him, according to his account, “You to plan for the
offensive. In your Headquarter you will
never thinkdefensively.”
My comment: Notice Churchill uses Mountbatten’s account
to defend those who suggest that he was not supportive of the Normandy
invasion.
Page 86: There were
some close to President Roosevelt who advocated making assault through Burma
into China. They argued that ports and
air bases in China would be indispensible for intensive and sustained air
attacks against eh mainland of Japan.
Although politically attractive in American eyes, this idea ignored the
impossibility of deploying large armies, in the in jungles of Burma, most of
which would have been found by Britain and also in the presence Japanese forces
in China operating on interior lines of communication.
My comment: This passage deserves a little criticism of
Churchill from Americans. Churchill was
focused on Europe. Albeit all Allies
agreed on Germany first, one could accuse Churchill of leaving America to
defend the far away British Empire in the course of defending her own shores. The task at hand in Burma and China was no
more demanding than Normandy. However,
in Churchill’s defense, a plan was set
by all that Germany was to be defeated first.
Page 87: With the
Philippines once more in American hands, Japan would be isolated from many of
its chief sources of supply and the garrisons in the outlying islands of the
Dutch East Indies would be cut off from all hope of rescue.
My comment: Here again Churchill offers an alternative
strategy. I myself in 50/50 insight
would ponder the result of a successful campaign through Burma and China. Would we have been in a position to decide on
the A-bomb?
Page 110: The
difficulty of the Italian Government and the people in extricating themselves
from Hitler’s clutches may make a still
more daring enterprise necessary, for General Eisenhower will need as much
Italian help as he can get.
Page 119: [metaphor] and this hung overhead like a vulture
in the sky.
Page 126: General
Smuts to Churchill: …. But almost all
the honors on land go to the Russians, and deservedly so, considering the scale
and speed of their fighting and the magnificence of their strategy on a vast
front.
Page 158: The most
difficult issue was the decision President Roosevelt and I had taken, of which
I was, as the reader has been, a strong
partisan, to deal with the King and Marshal Bodoglio and treat them as
co-belligerents.
I cannot touch upon this matter of Italy without exposing
myself to the question, which I shall be most properly asked, “Would you apply
this line of argument?” I say , the case
is different.” Twice within our
lifetime, and three times counting the days of our fathers, they have plunged
the world into their wars of expansion and aggression. They combine in the most deadly manner the
qualities of the warrior and the slave.
They do not value freedom themselves, and the spectacle of it in others
is hateful to them. Whenever they become
strong they seek their prey and they will follow with an iron discipline anyone
who will lead them to it. …Nazi tyranny
and Prussian militarism are the two main elements in German life that must be
destroyed.
Page 168: The semi circular
assembly, which appeals to political theorists, enables every individual or
every group to move round the centre, adopting various shades of pink according
as the weather changes. I am a supporter of the part system in preference to
the group system. I have seen many earnest and ardent Parliaments
destroyed by the group system. The party
system is much favored by the oblong form chamber. It is easy for an individual to move through
those insensible gradations from Left to Right, but the act of crossing the
Floor is one that requires serious consideration. I am well informed of the matter, for I have
accomplished this difficult process, not only once but twice.
Page 179: I have
repeatedly stated that it is in the major interest of Great Britain to have a
strong France after the war, and I should not hesitate to sustain this view.
…if the healthy and helpful processes I have noted are allowed to take their
course, and if we lact with patience, and above all with a sense of proportion,
in these vexations.
Page 185: My
intention was frustrated by the rough and tragic behavior of the Free French
Administration in Syria. The formal
independence of Syria and the Lebanon had been proclaimed by the Free French at
the end of 1941.
Page 186: The action
taken by the French stultifiedthe agreements we had made with the French, and
also with the Syrians and Lebanese. It
was contrary to the Atlantic Charter and much elese we had declared. It seemed that the situation would be
distorted throughout the whole Middle East and the Arad world, and also
everywhere people would say, “What kind of France is this which while itself
subjugated by the enemy, would seek to subjugate others?
Page 234: In his book
Crusade In Europe, General Eisenhower expressed his opinion that the
development and employment of the “V” weapons were greatly delayed by the
bombing of the experimental plants at Peemunde and other places where they were
manufactured. He goes as far to say on
mage 260:
It seemed likely that if the
Germans has succeeded in perfecting and using those weapons six months earlier
than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proven exceedingly difficult,
perhaps impossible.
Page 247: Churchill
to Roosevelt: No one can doubt that by
knocking out Italy we have enormously helped the Russians advance in the only
way in which it could have been helped at this time. I feel that Eisenhower and Alexander must
have what they need to win the battle in Italy, no matter what the consequence
is produced on subsequent operations.
My comment: This passage would be used by the Churchill
bashers, claiming Churchill’s preference to attack Germany from its underbelly. What they lose track of is that by attacking
Italy Germany could not deploy as many division in France has they could,
leaving a smaller foe to face in the Normandy landing.
Page 254: Give me
easement of six weeks or two months from May 1 in the date of Overlord and I
could for several months use the landing craft in the Mediterranean in order to
bring really effective forces to bear in Italy, and thus not only take Rome,
but to draw German divisions from either or both the Russian and the Normandy
fronts.
Page 258: These three
immense battles of Kursk, Orel, and Kharkov, all within a space of two months,
marked the ruin of the German army on the Eastern Front. Everywhere they had been outfought and
overwhelmed. The Russian plan, vast
though it was, never out ran their resources.
My comment: They learned this all too well in their
defense of Moscow against Napoleon a hunderd and thirty years earlier.
Page 285: Our present
plans for 1944 seem open to very grave defects.
We are to put fifteen American and twelve British divisions in to France
in May, and will have about six American an sixteen British or British controlled
divisions on the Italian front. Unless
there is a German collapse, Hitler, lying in the center of the best
communications in the world, can concentrate at least forty to fifty divisions
against either of these forces while holding the other. He could obtain all the necessary forces by
cutting his losses in the Balkans and withdrawing to Save and the Danube
without necessarily weakening his Russian Front. This is one of the most elementary war
propositions.
Page 286: I do not
accept the American argument that our Metropolitan Air Forces can flatten
everything out in the battle zone or on its approaches. This has not been our experience. All this is for your internal consumption,
and not for deployment at this stage. It
may show you however the dangers of our being committed to a “lawyers bargain”
for Overlord in May, for the sake of it we may have to ruin the Italian front
and Balkans possibilities and yet have insufficient forces to maintain
ourselves after the thirtieth of fortieth day.
My comment: Throughout these chapters its Churchill’s
argument to maintain a broader view of the war strategy against an American
intensely trained focus on the Clausewitz approach in the beaches of Normandy,
operation Overlord. It cannot be
overlooked that Rome was finally taken only days before Overlord, thus keeping
German divisions pinned down in Italy.
Page 292: Mr. Eden
said that Marshal well knew that the Prime Minister was just as keen on hurting
Hitler as he was. Stalin acknowledged
this, but added with a gust of laughter that I had a tendency to take the easy
road for myself and leave the difficult jobs for the Russians.
Page 312: Churchill
to Roosevelt: We stand by what was
agreed to in Quebec, but we do not feel that such an agreement should be interpreted
rigidly, and without review in the swiftly changing situations of the war.
Page 315:
