by Winston Churchill
The Hinge of Fate appears to have been a double hinge with the culmination of Operation Torch. In this volume Churchill demonstrates the importance of Russia’s role as an ally. She took on the brunt of the resistance to Germany. Stalin demanded that the West step up the pressure on Germany, yet neither Britain nor the United States in a position for a Clausewitz attack across the English Channel. At the same time, Americans were eager to see action of some sort. These are the superficial reasons for American action on the ‘shores of Tripoli. This book casts only a modest shadow on the poor performance of the Americans in the early going. It took a couple of set backs and brute of a General Patton. They needed to cut their teeth in actual war.
The Hinge of Fate appears to have been a double hinge with the culmination of Operation Torch. In this volume Churchill demonstrates the importance of Russia’s role as an ally. She took on the brunt of the resistance to Germany. Stalin demanded that the West step up the pressure on Germany, yet neither Britain nor the United States in a position for a Clausewitz attack across the English Channel. At the same time, Americans were eager to see action of some sort. These are the superficial reasons for American action on the ‘shores of Tripoli. This book casts only a modest shadow on the poor performance of the Americans in the early going. It took a couple of set backs and brute of a General Patton. They needed to cut their teeth in actual war.
Operation Torch made sense to both American and British Allies. But the reader is reminded that American was thrust in war not by Germany, but Japan. This book opens with the entry of the United States into a war that Britain had been engaged in for two and a half years. There is some attention devoted towards the Pacific in the beginning, however it is clear Churchill’s mind was on Germany. The course of 1943 in the Pacific was mostly one of retreating and positioning. The main effort was to secure both Australia and then India. The interesting dynamic there was Australia was already an independent Commonwealth nation where as India was still a British colony. Indian troops were ordered around, whereas Churchill had to parlay with the Prime Ministers of both Australia and South Africa. With two hundred pages focused on Japan, the remaining 600 pages were mostly aimed at Germany. This matched the war strategy of Germany first. Regardless of strategy, it is made clear in this book Churchill counted on the United States and together Churchill and Roosevelt counted on the USSR. Too many Americans do not know this.
In the mix of a retreating strategy in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific, in 1942 Churchill was facing a hailstorm of criticism from the public, which carried into not just in Parliament but those in his own ranks. There are books to this day written about Churchill’s ‘miss-management’ of the war. Was Churchill the right man for the job as the question, ending up with a few resignations and finally a vote of confidence. As you read the details of the events, told by the person defending his position, you get the benefit of the actual exchange of communications. What the reader must conclude is Churchill was a gregarious and decisive character whose own career As Lord of the Navy and Minister of Exchequer brought as much experience as those reporting to him. The early losses in Africa and Greece did not come in the wake of Churchill insisting on his way. In fact it was quite the opposite. British General Auchenlek was intent on using more time to build up for an attack while Germany struck first and Tubruck fell, leaving the British who once dominated North Africa along with the French, merely holding on to Egypt. There was a lot of consultation between Churchill and Auchenlek, yet Churchill let his Generals fight their war. It was not until Churchill changed command and installed General Montgomery, that the tide turned in the Allies favor. And to be sure this turning tide occurred before General Patton’s infamous storm ‘so-to-speak’ across North Africa and Italy.
Fredrick Maurice, Director of Military Operations in 1918 to Churchill Having two and s half years of Mr. Lloyd George’s system, sums it up as it was decided: “I am convinced that, with one exception, your system is much the better of the two. …I am convinced that there should be a Minister of Defence, in direct personal touch with the Chiefs of Staff, and the only possible Minister of Defence in time of war is the Prime Minister. You to pass from principles to particularities, have the enormous advantage, rare amongst politicians, of being able to talk the same language as sailors, soldiers, and airmen.” Similarily the United States, had they looked there instills upon the President the office of Commander and Chief.
This Hinge covers four major objectives; the U-boat War in the Atlantic, Supporting Russia by any means of supply, and putting up a new front to the Germans. Note that after the retreated positioning against Japan took place, Churchill focused on Germany. Roosevelt’s memoirs did not give him the same luxury. The three of the four objectives were actually in train and without the success of one, the other could not occur. The fourth, war with Japan, was one of preventing Germany and Japan from joining hands in North Africa. India had to be secured to prevent Japan from consolidating on both China and venturing north. The sea lanes had had to be cleared not simply across the Atlantic, but also through the Artic waters around Finland to the port of Archangel Russia were supplies were brought in for the defense of Moscow. Additionally a supply route and defense system was set up through Iran and then the Caucasus Mountains for the defense of Southern Russia.
The strategy that turned the tide, no matter all that was properly done was Hitler’s errant strategy. Hitler’s navy was at the root of Western shipping, in our Caribbean. Our Republican Congress had handcuffed Roosevelt from doing much. Hitler was strong on the region of the Azores and uniquely positioned to strangle Atlantic shipping. But instead he felt that the war would be won in Norway and moved his naval strength there. This relieved the Atlantic, but made the supply line to Archangel treacherous. Hence the Caucasus strategy was developed and Operation Torch conceived.
In my studies as to why Germany took the world to war twice in a century, I look past Hitler as I feel he was only the catalyst to the conscience of the German people of that time. Evidence of such beings me to this detrimental turn of events between Germany’s Air Force General Goering and its Admiral Raeder. From the book, ‘Time and again he [Raeder] had demanded the formation of a separate Fleet Air Arm, and had been opposed successfully by Goering’s insistence that Air Force could accomplish more at sea than the Navy. Goering won, and on January 30 Raeder resigned. He was replaced by Doenitz, the ambitious Admiral of the U-boats. All effective new construction was henceforth to be monopolized by them.
Thus this brilliant action fought by the Royal Navy to protect an allied convoys to Russia at the end of the year led directly to a major crisis in the enemy’s policy, and ended the dream of another German High Seas Fleet
Torch, the conquest of North Africa had to happen for three reasons. First was to reopen the Mediterranean after losses in Greece and on the Med itself. Second Germany required a second front so that it would draw off the strong German forces in Russia. Third, and what American hubris preoccupies itself with was, Americans were at war for nearly a year had had seen little action.
Critical to this multifaceted Hinge of Fate was Churchill’s statesmanship. Coinciding with his coordination with his Generals on strategy, his Ministers on ‘The War Effort’, and wrangling with politicians in Parliament, Churchill’s international diplomacy was essential to Allied victory. I provide an excerpt of a communication between Churchill and Roosevelt representative example.
[President Roosevelt to Former Naval Person] I have also told the Staffs to study a landing in the north of Norway, the occupation of which seems necessary to ensure the flow of our supplies next year to Russia. I have told Molotov we would have something ready for him about this on his return here. We did not go deeply into it in any way. Personally I set great importance upon it if it is a good plan.
I think perhaps the most underplayed dialogue of the war, at least in the West and among Churchill critics, is the dialogue he had with Joseph Stalin in 1943. This wasn’t the over played Malta dialogue at the end of the war. Here Churchill explains the North African strategy: ‘I then described [to Stalin] the military advantages if freeing the Mediterranean ...we could threaten the belly of Hitler's Europe. To illustrate my point I had meanwhile drawn a picture of a crocodile, and explained to Stalin with help of this picture how it was our intention to attack the soft belly of the crocodile as we attacked the snout. And Stalin, whose interest was now at a high pitch, said: “May God prosper this undertaking.”’
This dialogue goes on over a period of days and requires a lot of coordination with others on an international stage, Roosevelt in particular. I brings to light how important a role Russia played in the war, who had to first defend herself and then attack Germany. This strategy of occupying a significant force in North Africa, in conjunction with supplies coming in from Archangel and through Persia, gave Russia what she needed. This was the center pin of the Hinge of Fate as it also gave the America an extra year to iron out the details of a Normandy invasion.
Now separate from Churchill’s book and on to my knowledge of what could have happened goes not to the defense of Churchill’s brilliant role through out the War, but to actually take a swipe at those critics who continue to slander his name with novels of selected excerpts of his own work. Its like shooting a guy with the guys own gun. Here is my point: we defeated Hitler in North Africa about the same time Russia turned the tide in the East. Churchill made his case at that time to launch a front up through the Ljubljana Gap in Yugoslavia, and go right up the under belly to Berlin. Instead, we conceded his arm waving to Eisenhower and Roosevelt who insisted in the Clausewitz approach of full force on one point, Normandy. As a result we lost more men and Stalin actually beat the Allied troops to Berlin. So on a world stage in the balance of things I conclude first that Russia actually took the flag in more ways than one, as she did not concede Eastern Europe until 1990, 35 years later. And finally to Churchill’s critics who insist that he bullied his Generals into his strategy, I say they must be liberals who are merely jealous and red faced to the one dig he took at Liberals: which goes like this: When I was a younger man I was too nice to be a Conservative, as I aged and steeped in wisdom I was too was to be a Liberal.
Below are my bibliography notes with comments, which may be worth a read. I have left other examples and nested praise of whom I claim to be the man of the 20th century.
Pages 34 & 35: Churchill makes it clear that he was not satisfied with the performance of General Auchenlek's performance in northern Africa against the advance of Rommel's forces. He claims a grievous degree of miss-management against superior Rommel troops. Where history calls Rommel the Desert Fox, Churchill finds fault in Auchenlek.
Page 49: [in remarking to the unpreparedness of the British to the Japanese onslaught of Malaya]. The reason I had not asked of this matter, amid the thousands if questions I put, was that the possibility of Singapore having no landward defenses no more entered my mind that that if a battleship being launched without a bottom.
Page 61: [writes Churchill] The Press was full of suggestions that I should remain Prime Minister and make the speeches, but cede the actual control of the war over to someone else. I resolved to yield nothing to any quarter, to make the prime an direct personal
responsibility upon myself and to demand a Vote of Confidence from the House if Commons.
Page 68: [Churchill on Germany] In two and a half years of fighting we have only managed to keep our heads above water… We are beginning to see our way through. It looks as if we were in for a very bad time; but provided we all stand together, and provided we throw in the last spasm of our strength, it looks, more than it ever did before, as if we were going to win
Page 77: [Churchill to Beaverbrook] I am in your duty to undertake this work and try your best to make a success of it, and that you have ample powers for the purpose. I think there is great force in Leather’s argument about the Ministry of War Transport having an effective say in the types of merchant vessels, as they are the only authorities on the subject and have the knowledge. If, after all else has been settled, you break on this point, or indeed on any other in connection with the great office I have shaped for you, I feel bound to say that you will be harshly judged by the nation and in the United States, having regard to the extreme emergency in which we stand and the immense scale of the interest which we are involved. I therefore hope that you will not fall below the high level of events and strike so wounding a blow to your country, at your friend, and above all to your reputation.
Page 49: [in remarking to the unpreparedness of the British to the Japanese onslaught of Malaya]. The reason I had not asked of this matter, amid the thousands if questions I put, was that the possibility of Singapore having no landward defenses no more entered my mind that that if a battleship being launched without a bottom.
Page 61: [writes Churchill] The Press was full of suggestions that I should remain Prime Minister and make the speeches, but cede the actual control of the war over to someone else. I resolved to yield nothing to any quarter, to make the prime an direct personal
responsibility upon myself and to demand a Vote of Confidence from the House if Commons.
Page 68: [Churchill on Germany] In two and a half years of fighting we have only managed to keep our heads above water… We are beginning to see our way through. It looks as if we were in for a very bad time; but provided we all stand together, and provided we throw in the last spasm of our strength, it looks, more than it ever did before, as if we were going to win
Page 77: [Churchill to Beaverbrook] I am in your duty to undertake this work and try your best to make a success of it, and that you have ample powers for the purpose. I think there is great force in Leather’s argument about the Ministry of War Transport having an effective say in the types of merchant vessels, as they are the only authorities on the subject and have the knowledge. If, after all else has been settled, you break on this point, or indeed on any other in connection with the great office I have shaped for you, I feel bound to say that you will be harshly judged by the nation and in the United States, having regard to the extreme emergency in which we stand and the immense scale of the interest which we are involved. I therefore hope that you will not fall below the high level of events and strike so wounding a blow to your country, at your friend, and above all to your reputation.
My comment: Now this is a job offer a person could not refuse.
Page 89: [On the1943 Cabinet changes and the Vote of Confidence] My own position had not seemed to be affected in all this period of political tension and change at home and disaster abroad.... I did not suffer from any desire to be relieved of my responsibilities. All I wanted was compliance with my wishes after reasonable discussion. Misfortunes only brought me and my Chiefs of Staff closer together, and this unity was felt through all circles of the Government…From outside however there was continuous pressure to change my method of conducting the war, with a view to obtaining better results than were now coming in.
My comment: And so it seems that it was from an outsiders perspective that Masters and Commanders was written. [my review on Cigar Room of Books]There is always the dichotomy of what happened versus how history remembers you.
Page 90: [Fredrick Maurice, Director of Military Operations in 1918 to Churchill] Having two and s half years of Mr. Lloyd George’s system, I am convinced that, with one exception, your system is much the better of the two. …I am convinced that there should be a Minister of Defence, in direct personal touch with the Chiefs of Staff, and the only possible Minister of Defence in time of war is the Prime Minister. You to pass from principles to particularities, have the enormous advantage, rare amongst politicians, of being able to talk the same language as sailors, soldiers, and airmen.
My comment: Hence the resume requirement for the leader of a world power
Page 111: In the Caribbean, amid a wealth of targets, the U-boats chose to prey chiefly on the tankers. Neutrals of all kinds were assailed equally with Allied ships. Week by week the scale of this massacre grew. In February the U-boat losses in the Atlantic rose to seventy-one ships, of 384,000 tons, all but two of which were sunk in the American zone This was the highest rate of loss which we has so far suffered throughout the war.
My comment: We let partisan politics of the Republicans hand cuff Roosevelt and thus he was limited in his war effort up to this time. America paid. And so did the Western Hemisphere.
Page 112: [top] Hitler was however obsessed with the idea that we intended to invade Northern Norway at an early date, With his powerful one-track mind he sacrificed the glittering chances in the Atlantic, and concentrated every available surface ship and many precious U-boat in Norwegian waters. “Norway” he said, “is the ‘zone of destiny in this war.’ It was indeed, as the reader is aware, most important, but at this time the German opportunity lay in the Atlantic. In vain the admirals argued for a naval offensive. Their Fuehrer remained adamant, and his strategic decision was strengthened by the shortage of oil.
My comment: However brilliant historians may portray Allied strategy, all too often it was Hitler's failed strategy that bore more strategic weight towards the outcome of WWII
Page 123 [bottom] - 125 once more Hitler came to our aid by insisting that a group of U-boats should be held ready to ward off an Allied attempt to occupy the Azores or Maderia....The U-boat attack was our worst evil. It would have been wise for the Germans to stake all upon it. . I remember hearing my father say, “In politics when you have got a hold of a good thing, stick to it.” This is also strategic principle of importance. Just as Goering repeatedly shifted his air targets in the Battle of Britain I n1940, so now the U-boat warfare was to some extent weakened for the sake of competing attractions.
Page 129: This tactical idea [air attack] had long been advocated, but the means were lacking. The first of these Support Groups, which later became a most important factor in the U-boat war consisted of two sloops, four of the new frigates…
My comment: It seems that the knitting of tactical ideas along side advancement in technology and tooling proved more advantageous to the Allies than the mere strategic thinking alone.
Page 164: 4. [Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister] With A.I.F. troops we sought to save Malaya and Singapore falling back on the Netherlands East Indies. All these northern defenses are gone or going. Now you contemplate using A.I.F. to save Burma. All this has been done, as in Greece, without adequate air support.
My comment: In Masters and Commanders there is much criticism of Churchill in his strategy of the German front, with no real material evidence strategy wise. However Australia's Prime Minister seems to have much evidence for which to criticize.
Page 193: [former Naval Person to President Roosevelt] middle of page [quoting Churchill]. I am quite ready to accept a considerable delay in "Magnet" to facilitate your additional support to Australasia... [further down the page]. I am advised that we have at present time s total man lift of 280,000 men .... On page 195: For a long time to come it seems your difficulty will be to bring your forces into action, and that the shipping shortage will be the stranglehold.
My comment: In Masters and Commanders there was a considerable focus in making the point that Germany came first. Apparently here in Churchill was not going to do that at the expense of Australasia.
Page 200-201: [Here is a thought from this amateur strategist.] There is no use giving a single further thought to Singapore or the Dutch Indies. They are gone. Australia must be held, and as I telegraphed you, we are willing to undertake that. India must be held, and you must do that; but, frankly, I do not worry so much about that problem as many others do. The Japanese may land on the seacoast west of Burma. They may bombard Calcutta. But I do not visualize that they can get enough troops to make more than a few dents on the boarders – and I think you can hold Ceylon. I hope you can get more submarines out there- more valuable than an inferior surface fleet. I hope you will definitely reinforce the Near East more greatly than at present. You must you must hold Egypt, the Canal, Syria, Iran and the route to the Caucasus.
My comment: The author of Masters and Commanders leads the reader to believe that it was Churchill and England pushing for Germany first and an early invasion of the continent. This Roosevelt letter, at minimum suggests that there was mutual acquiescence to a war strategy; not Churchill bullying his way.
Page 222-223: [telephone conversation Churchill to Roosevelt]. I hope nothing will be done to give guarantees for the non-occupation of Madagascar and Reunion. The Japanese might well turn up at the former one of these fine days, and Vichy will offer no more resistance to them that in French Indo-China.
[Roosevelt's reply]. I look upon Madagascar as the key to the safety of the Indian Ocean, and it may play the same important part in endangering our security there that Indo-China has played in Vichy and Japanese hands.
My comment: Roosevelt was prepared to honor the 1919 request that Ho Chi Mein asked of Woodrow Wilson. Truman reneged and hence we had Vietnam. We forgot this lesson in Vietnam. Obama seems to have not learned from history either as he links up with Sarkosy of France against Libya.
Page 253: [lessons from Midway and Coral Sea battles] The rigidity of the Japanese planning and the tendency to abandon the object when their plans did not go according to schedule is thought to have been largely due to the cumbersome and imprecise nature of their language, which rendered it extremely difficult to improvise by means of signaled communications.
Another lesson stands out. The American Intelligence system succeeded in penetrating the enemy’s mist closely guarded secrets well in advance if the events. Thus Admiral Nimitz, albeit the weaker, was twice able to concentrate all the forces he had in sufficient strength at the right time and place.
Page 276: Time and again he had demanded the formation of a separate Fleet Air Arm, and had been opposed successfully by Goering’s insistence that Air Force could accomplish more at sea than the Navy. Goering won, and on January 30 Raeder resigned. He was replaced by Doenitz, the ambitious Admiral of the U-boats. All effective new construction was henceforth to be monopolized by them
Page 89: [On the1943 Cabinet changes and the Vote of Confidence] My own position had not seemed to be affected in all this period of political tension and change at home and disaster abroad.... I did not suffer from any desire to be relieved of my responsibilities. All I wanted was compliance with my wishes after reasonable discussion. Misfortunes only brought me and my Chiefs of Staff closer together, and this unity was felt through all circles of the Government…From outside however there was continuous pressure to change my method of conducting the war, with a view to obtaining better results than were now coming in.
My comment: And so it seems that it was from an outsiders perspective that Masters and Commanders was written. [my review on Cigar Room of Books]There is always the dichotomy of what happened versus how history remembers you.
Page 90: [Fredrick Maurice, Director of Military Operations in 1918 to Churchill] Having two and s half years of Mr. Lloyd George’s system, I am convinced that, with one exception, your system is much the better of the two. …I am convinced that there should be a Minister of Defence, in direct personal touch with the Chiefs of Staff, and the only possible Minister of Defence in time of war is the Prime Minister. You to pass from principles to particularities, have the enormous advantage, rare amongst politicians, of being able to talk the same language as sailors, soldiers, and airmen.
My comment: Hence the resume requirement for the leader of a world power
Page 111: In the Caribbean, amid a wealth of targets, the U-boats chose to prey chiefly on the tankers. Neutrals of all kinds were assailed equally with Allied ships. Week by week the scale of this massacre grew. In February the U-boat losses in the Atlantic rose to seventy-one ships, of 384,000 tons, all but two of which were sunk in the American zone This was the highest rate of loss which we has so far suffered throughout the war.
My comment: We let partisan politics of the Republicans hand cuff Roosevelt and thus he was limited in his war effort up to this time. America paid. And so did the Western Hemisphere.
Page 112: [top] Hitler was however obsessed with the idea that we intended to invade Northern Norway at an early date, With his powerful one-track mind he sacrificed the glittering chances in the Atlantic, and concentrated every available surface ship and many precious U-boat in Norwegian waters. “Norway” he said, “is the ‘zone of destiny in this war.’ It was indeed, as the reader is aware, most important, but at this time the German opportunity lay in the Atlantic. In vain the admirals argued for a naval offensive. Their Fuehrer remained adamant, and his strategic decision was strengthened by the shortage of oil.
My comment: However brilliant historians may portray Allied strategy, all too often it was Hitler's failed strategy that bore more strategic weight towards the outcome of WWII
Page 123 [bottom] - 125 once more Hitler came to our aid by insisting that a group of U-boats should be held ready to ward off an Allied attempt to occupy the Azores or Maderia....The U-boat attack was our worst evil. It would have been wise for the Germans to stake all upon it. . I remember hearing my father say, “In politics when you have got a hold of a good thing, stick to it.” This is also strategic principle of importance. Just as Goering repeatedly shifted his air targets in the Battle of Britain I n1940, so now the U-boat warfare was to some extent weakened for the sake of competing attractions.
Page 129: This tactical idea [air attack] had long been advocated, but the means were lacking. The first of these Support Groups, which later became a most important factor in the U-boat war consisted of two sloops, four of the new frigates…
My comment: It seems that the knitting of tactical ideas along side advancement in technology and tooling proved more advantageous to the Allies than the mere strategic thinking alone.
Page 164: 4. [Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister] With A.I.F. troops we sought to save Malaya and Singapore falling back on the Netherlands East Indies. All these northern defenses are gone or going. Now you contemplate using A.I.F. to save Burma. All this has been done, as in Greece, without adequate air support.
My comment: In Masters and Commanders there is much criticism of Churchill in his strategy of the German front, with no real material evidence strategy wise. However Australia's Prime Minister seems to have much evidence for which to criticize.
Page 193: [former Naval Person to President Roosevelt] middle of page [quoting Churchill]. I am quite ready to accept a considerable delay in "Magnet" to facilitate your additional support to Australasia... [further down the page]. I am advised that we have at present time s total man lift of 280,000 men .... On page 195: For a long time to come it seems your difficulty will be to bring your forces into action, and that the shipping shortage will be the stranglehold.
My comment: In Masters and Commanders there was a considerable focus in making the point that Germany came first. Apparently here in Churchill was not going to do that at the expense of Australasia.
Page 200-201: [Here is a thought from this amateur strategist.] There is no use giving a single further thought to Singapore or the Dutch Indies. They are gone. Australia must be held, and as I telegraphed you, we are willing to undertake that. India must be held, and you must do that; but, frankly, I do not worry so much about that problem as many others do. The Japanese may land on the seacoast west of Burma. They may bombard Calcutta. But I do not visualize that they can get enough troops to make more than a few dents on the boarders – and I think you can hold Ceylon. I hope you can get more submarines out there- more valuable than an inferior surface fleet. I hope you will definitely reinforce the Near East more greatly than at present. You must you must hold Egypt, the Canal, Syria, Iran and the route to the Caucasus.
My comment: The author of Masters and Commanders leads the reader to believe that it was Churchill and England pushing for Germany first and an early invasion of the continent. This Roosevelt letter, at minimum suggests that there was mutual acquiescence to a war strategy; not Churchill bullying his way.
Page 222-223: [telephone conversation Churchill to Roosevelt]. I hope nothing will be done to give guarantees for the non-occupation of Madagascar and Reunion. The Japanese might well turn up at the former one of these fine days, and Vichy will offer no more resistance to them that in French Indo-China.
[Roosevelt's reply]. I look upon Madagascar as the key to the safety of the Indian Ocean, and it may play the same important part in endangering our security there that Indo-China has played in Vichy and Japanese hands.
My comment: Roosevelt was prepared to honor the 1919 request that Ho Chi Mein asked of Woodrow Wilson. Truman reneged and hence we had Vietnam. We forgot this lesson in Vietnam. Obama seems to have not learned from history either as he links up with Sarkosy of France against Libya.
Page 253: [lessons from Midway and Coral Sea battles] The rigidity of the Japanese planning and the tendency to abandon the object when their plans did not go according to schedule is thought to have been largely due to the cumbersome and imprecise nature of their language, which rendered it extremely difficult to improvise by means of signaled communications.
Another lesson stands out. The American Intelligence system succeeded in penetrating the enemy’s mist closely guarded secrets well in advance if the events. Thus Admiral Nimitz, albeit the weaker, was twice able to concentrate all the forces he had in sufficient strength at the right time and place.
Page 276: Time and again he had demanded the formation of a separate Fleet Air Arm, and had been opposed successfully by Goering’s insistence that Air Force could accomplish more at sea than the Navy. Goering won, and on January 30 Raeder resigned. He was replaced by Doenitz, the ambitious Admiral of the U-boats. All effective new construction was henceforth to be monopolized by them
Thus this brilliant action fought by the Royal Navy to protect an allied convoys to Russia at the end of the year led directly to a major crisis in the enemy’s policy, and ended the dream of another German High Seas Fleet....
My comment: once again we find it that it was not the direct result of decisive victory in the battle at sea or on land that decided the fate of WWII but the internal strategy that came from the German command. Was it the culture of Hitler or is it simply the German nature?
Page 281: This transmitting machine for these microwaves, as they are called, was entirely a British invention and revolutionized the radio war both on land and at sea.
My comment: I wonder if our American Lomus, the famous ‘capitalist inventor’ would agree to such a lofty claim, considering the contributions the Americans brought to the
effort.
Page 322: In planning the gigantic enterprise ... Our first Imperial obligation was to defend India. From the Japanese invasion, by which it seemed it was already menaced. Moreover, this task bore a decisive relation to the whole war. To leave four hundred millions of His Majesty’s subjects, to whom we were bound to honor, to be ravaged and over run as China had been, by Japanese would have been a deed of shame. But also to allow the Germans and the Japanese to join hands in India or the Middle East involved a measureless disaster to the Allied cause [Round-up]
My comment: Had Churchill not put up pre-emotive measures in the Indian Ocean, what in retrospect appears remote was at least a valid concern of Churchill's. It is a concern that his critics showed no mercy for.
Page 327: [Former Naval Person to the President] If Winant is with you now, he would no doubt explain the Foreign Office view about Russia. The Increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the principles of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her. This was the basis on which Russia acceded the Charter, and I expect that a severe process of liquidating hostile elements in the Baltic States, etc, was employed by the Russians when they took these regions at the beginning of the war.
My comment: While Churchill may have had a practical point, it was weak when considering the weak and dependent position Russia was in. Where he defended a betraying France, he was willing to sell out the Baltic countries.
Page 335: I said that if the Soviet military power was seriously reduced by the German onslaught, Hitler would in all probability move as many troops and air forces as possible back to the West, with the object of invading Great Britain. He might also strike down through Bakau to the Caucasus and Persia. This latter thrust would expose us to the gravest dangers, and we should by no means feel satisfied that we had sufficient forces to ward it off. Therefore our fortunes were bound up with the resistance of the Soviet Army.
Page 340: [President Roosevelt to Former Naval Person] I have also told the Staffs to study a landing in the north of Norway, the occupation of which seems necessary to ensure the flow of our supplies next year to Russia. I have told Molotov we would have something ready for him about this on his return here. We did not go deeply into it in any way. Personally I set great importance upon it if it is a good plan.
My comment: In reading Masters and Commanders, that author is largely critical of Churchill with regard to his military strategy. He gives very little weight to the Statesmanship that held Churchill to international intrigue and obligation. The obligation, overlooked by his critics, influenced Churchill
Page 358: I would ask the Chiefs of staff to consider the following two principles: a) No substantial landing in France unless we are going to stay; and b) No substantial landing in France unless the Germans are demoralized by another failure against Russia.
My comment: Both proved to be very sound principles. The latter flies in the face of those ignorant Americans, full of hubris, who claim America won WWII.
My comment: once again we find it that it was not the direct result of decisive victory in the battle at sea or on land that decided the fate of WWII but the internal strategy that came from the German command. Was it the culture of Hitler or is it simply the German nature?
Page 281: This transmitting machine for these microwaves, as they are called, was entirely a British invention and revolutionized the radio war both on land and at sea.
My comment: I wonder if our American Lomus, the famous ‘capitalist inventor’ would agree to such a lofty claim, considering the contributions the Americans brought to the
effort.
Page 322: In planning the gigantic enterprise ... Our first Imperial obligation was to defend India. From the Japanese invasion, by which it seemed it was already menaced. Moreover, this task bore a decisive relation to the whole war. To leave four hundred millions of His Majesty’s subjects, to whom we were bound to honor, to be ravaged and over run as China had been, by Japanese would have been a deed of shame. But also to allow the Germans and the Japanese to join hands in India or the Middle East involved a measureless disaster to the Allied cause [Round-up]
My comment: Had Churchill not put up pre-emotive measures in the Indian Ocean, what in retrospect appears remote was at least a valid concern of Churchill's. It is a concern that his critics showed no mercy for.
Page 327: [Former Naval Person to the President] If Winant is with you now, he would no doubt explain the Foreign Office view about Russia. The Increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the principles of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her. This was the basis on which Russia acceded the Charter, and I expect that a severe process of liquidating hostile elements in the Baltic States, etc, was employed by the Russians when they took these regions at the beginning of the war.
My comment: While Churchill may have had a practical point, it was weak when considering the weak and dependent position Russia was in. Where he defended a betraying France, he was willing to sell out the Baltic countries.
Page 335: I said that if the Soviet military power was seriously reduced by the German onslaught, Hitler would in all probability move as many troops and air forces as possible back to the West, with the object of invading Great Britain. He might also strike down through Bakau to the Caucasus and Persia. This latter thrust would expose us to the gravest dangers, and we should by no means feel satisfied that we had sufficient forces to ward it off. Therefore our fortunes were bound up with the resistance of the Soviet Army.
Page 340: [President Roosevelt to Former Naval Person] I have also told the Staffs to study a landing in the north of Norway, the occupation of which seems necessary to ensure the flow of our supplies next year to Russia. I have told Molotov we would have something ready for him about this on his return here. We did not go deeply into it in any way. Personally I set great importance upon it if it is a good plan.
My comment: In reading Masters and Commanders, that author is largely critical of Churchill with regard to his military strategy. He gives very little weight to the Statesmanship that held Churchill to international intrigue and obligation. The obligation, overlooked by his critics, influenced Churchill
Page 358: I would ask the Chiefs of staff to consider the following two principles: a) No substantial landing in France unless we are going to stay; and b) No substantial landing in France unless the Germans are demoralized by another failure against Russia.
My comment: Both proved to be very sound principles. The latter flies in the face of those ignorant Americans, full of hubris, who claim America won WWII.
Page 368: [during the battle for Tobruk]. As to Auchinleck himself, I have all possible confidence in him as regards his leadership and the way he is conducting the battle with the forces that are available to him. My only whish is the he could be in two places at one time, both here at the center of the web and forward directing the Eight Army battle in person. …It is Auchinleck's battle, and decisions as to leadership subordinate to himself are for him to make.
My comment: This too flies in the face of the sentiment of Churchill's critics, who accuse him of meddling in to military.
Page 384: [right at the day of the fall of Tobruk; a note of General Ismay]. Plans and preparations for the 'Bolero' operation in 1943, on a large scale as possible, are to be pushed forward with all speed and energy.
My comment: Tobruk helped make the decision on where America makes it's presence in forces known to the world.
Page 398: The motion [essentially to censure Churchill from directing the war] was seconded by Sir Roger Keys...He concentrated his criticism mainly on his expert advisers... It is three times - in Gallipoli, in Norway, and in the Mediterranean...
My comment: having read the details of all three I fully appreciate that the misfortunes of each were not due to Churchill direction but to the military's execution. Even Keys admits this a yet in the face of clear fact they insist on criticizing. The most egregious was Gallipoli where the Admiral retired form battle at the very moment the enemy was out of ammunition. He gave Turkey months to re-arm. Does the lesser-informed reader, perhaps counting only on this book fully appreciate this? It is my opinion that the authors of too many history books are less studied than myself, who holds no historian credentials what so ever.
Page 481: I then described [to Stalin] the military advantages if freeing the Mediterranean ...we could threaten the belly of Hitler's Europe
To illustrate my point I had meanwhile drawn a picture of a crocodile, and explained to Stalin with help of this picture how it was our intention to attack the soft belly of the crocodile as we attacked the snout. And Stalin, whose interest was now at a high pitch, said: “May God prosper this undertaking.”
My comment: in the context of Churchill's description of his visit with Stalin, I has at mused with first Churchill's despising disposition of Stalin. I was then impressed with his setting the score straight in terms of Stalin's recent sentiment towards a nearly defeated Britain. This was to set the stage for 'selling' the Torch Operation. Good plan or not, Stalin was sold in the second person at least. He was in no position but to buy it.
Page 486: He [Stalin] felt that if the British Army had been fighting the Germans as much as the Russian Army...
My comment: And herein lay the dichotomy of Russian -v- American view on the question of who won WWII. While it is true American entry tipped the scales. But the reader has a full detailing of strategy intrigue in it's planning stages of the invasion of Normandy. Much depended on the success of the Russians who paid a much higher price for the victory over Germany that all the Allied Forced combined.
Page 493: "we had a visit from Mr. George Bernard Shaw and Lady Astor." Lady Astor suggested that Mr. Lloyd George should be invited to the Moscow visit, to which Stalin replied, “Why should we ask him? He was the head of the intervention.” On this Lady Astor said , “ That’s not true. It was Churchill who miss-led him.” “Anyhow” said Stalin, “Lloyd George was head of the Government and belonged to the Left. He was responsible, and we like a downright enemy better than a pretending friend.” “well Churchill is finished,” said Lady Astor. “I am not so sure,” Stalin had answered. “If a great crisis comes, the English people might turn to an old war horse.” At this point I interrupted, saying, “There is much in what she said. I wish I was very active in the intervention, and I do not wish you to think otherwise.” He admitted amicably, so I said, "Have you forgiven me?". "Premier Stalin, he say, " said Interpreter Pavlov, " all that is in the past, and the past belongs to God."
My comment: The reader of history after considering the source of this last sentence finds himself getting up off the floor be daft in any attempt to interpret the true intent or meaning in Stalin's words. Of my experience of Russian literature, this is classic Russian caricature. The intrigue between Churchill and Stalin has enough depth for a fascinating history novel. The author would have to paint a landscape of both lives to formulate common themes that exist in all men and the exact out the departure and it's cause. It must be understood that Stalin in the 1950's was much worse that Stalin of WWII
Page 509: President Roosevelt to Former Naval Person; [the complete
communique]
My comment: Upon reading this one comes to appreciate the diplomacy,
at it's highest level. Right on the heels of the Churchill - Stalin
meeting, the reader is further impressed by the diplomacy between
Chiang Kai-shek.
Page 521: [upon his inspection of the Desert Front under the new command of Montgomery] To sum up, while I and others would prefer the September to the August battle, because of our growing strength I am satisfied that we have lively, confident, resolute men in command, working together as an admirable team under leaders of the highest military quality. Everything has been done...as I have no part to play in this battle, which must be left to those in whom we place our trust.
My Comment: To those who criticize Churchill for his management of the military, let this passage be in part his defense.
Page 554 - 555: [Cripps's resignation]. But the most serious comment on our war methods came from Sir Stafford Cripps. The Lord Privy Seal. As Leader of the House of Commons his position was one of prime importance. On him fell the burden of explaining our successive defeats and disappointments to the House of Commons, and he certainly discharged his task with skill and loyalty...he had developed serious doubts about the state of national morale and the effectiveness of our machinery for the centeral direction of the war. In the mood of public opinion at home he detected a widespread sense of frustration and discontent. Workers he believed, were suffering a demoralizinf sense of futility when they heard that the weapons which they had strained every nerve to produce had been found wanting in Libya. Scientists and technicians with ideas for operational devices were receiving no encouragement. Businessmen were exasperated at official delays and indecisions and at the wasteful proliferation of committees. In the Services officers and men were baffled and disturbed by evidence of inadequate military leadership
Page 557 - 558: [Churchill's response the Cripps letter] I am surprised and somewhat pained to receive your letter....I also have convictions on these matters, which are the result of long experience and heavy responsibility. Another would no doubt do differently.
I do not intend to argue here, as it would be endless, but I am sure you would not underrate the wisdom, knowledge, and precision of mind of the First Sea Lord if you worked with him closely as I have under the hard stresses of this war. Indeed I cannot help saying that I feel you are less than generous to the Admiralty achievement by which we have lived.
My comment: there were those that disagreed with Churchill's war methods. The chapter suspense and Strain is Churchill's most focused defense. I reading a past chapter on Cripps's handling of Burma and India in preparation of the Japanese attack, I was not impressed with Cripps. One could say Churchill prevailed on the backs of Americans.
I would say it was a combination of Churchill's statesmanship and his intimate knowledge of British military operations that enabled Churchill to be specific in his requests to Roosevelt, and to further coordinate the war effort with all the British dominion prime ministers. Churchill's diplomacy between Stalin, Roosevelt, and the
British Prime Ministers was the cogent glue that molded a coordinated defeat of Germany and then Japan.
Page 576: [Roosevelt to Churchill]. The Russian front is today our greatest reliance, and we simply must find a direct manner in which to help them other than our diminishing supplies. We shal on our part undertake to replace in the Middle East all our own planes which are transferred, and assist you in every way possible with your own air problems in the Middle East.
My comment: there were those that disagreed with Churchill's war methods. The chapter suspense and Strain is Churchill's most focused defense. I reading a past chapter on Cripps's handling of Burma and India in preparation of the Japanese attack, I was not impressed with Cripps. One could say Churchill prevailed on the backs of Americans.
I would say it was a combination of Churchill's statesmanship and his intimate knowledge of British military operations that enabled Churchill to be specific in his requests to Roosevelt, and to further coordinate the war effort with all the British dominion prime ministers. Churchill's diplomacy between Stalin, Roosevelt, and the
British Prime Ministers was the cogent glue that molded a coordinated defeat of Germany and then Japan.
Page 576: [Roosevelt to Churchill]. The Russian front is today our greatest reliance, and we simply must find a direct manner in which to help them other than our diminishing supplies. We shal on our part undertake to replace in the Middle East all our own planes which are transferred, and assist you in every way possible with your own air problems in the Middle East.
I believe we would stand a good chance of getting as high a proportion of ships through as we did with P.Q,18. Under any circumstances I think better that we take this risk than endanger our whole relations with Russia at this time. I know that you and Pound will give this proposal of mine every consideration I should tell you that our Ambassador, Admiral Smiley, has asked to come deliver in person a very important message might be.
About “Velvet” the President proposed that I should send the following to Stalin.
You will recall our conversation about putting a British American air force in the Caucasus. I have examined the matter with the president, and we have determined to move to accomplish this without delay…
My comment: To those who say the Allies won WWII is point to our President's statement herein. Little is taught to our American history students as to the Russian defense of first Moscow and second Stalingrad, the Bakau Oil Fields and the Caucasus Mountains. This clearly marks the title of this book. Where so little was supplied to the enormity of the critical Hinge of Fate. The hinge being a Russian victory in the winter of 42-43
Page 596: [Churchill to Montgomery] The following is for you and Montgomery alone...[of operation Torch] Clark has visited “Torch” area and held long conference with friendly French generals. We have reason to believe that not only will little opposition be encountered, but that powerful assistance will be forth coming. Events may therefore move more quickly, perhaps considerably more quickly, than had been planned. Decisive reactions may well be expected in France; nothing sinister has yet cropped up in Spain. So far as we know the enemy have no idea of what is in store for them, and certainly no idea of the scale or imminence. Every good wish to you Montgomery. Your battle continuing at full blast will play a memorable part.... so far we know the enemy have no idea of what is in store for them, and certainly no idea of it's scale or imminence.
My comment: The Russians were wearing down the Germans in Stalingrad and the British had them occupied in Egypt; thus making their landings in Casablanca an Tripoli a far less triumph that our American song and history books lead young Americans to believe. Hubris may be the right word when describing our role in WWII in Europe.
Page 637: [upon the appointment by Eisenhower of Admiral Darlan over de Gaulle in French North Africa]. Not only Parliament but the nation found it hard to swallow "De Gaulle banned; Darlan up lifted . At the same time the facts could not be stated nor the arguments deployed in public. While in my mind , rightly or wrongly I never had the slightest doubt that it wsa my duty to support General Eisenhower and to save the lives of the soldiers committed to the enterprise, I was acutely sensitive to the opposite argument, and understood, if only to override, the discarded alternative conviction.
My comment: Again Churchill does an adequate job of describing the events, from a first hand view, that thwarts the notion of too many people that he over reached is authority in military affairs.
Page 640: I now turn to examine a peculiar form of French mentality...The Almighty in his infinite wisdom did not see fit to create Frenchmen in the image of Englishmen. ... For instance any officer who obeys the command of his lawful superior or of one whom he believes to be his lawful superior is absolutely immune from subsequent punishment. Much therefore turns in the minds of French officers upon whether there is a direct, unbroken chain of lawful command, and this is held by many Frenchmen to be more important than moral, national, or international considerations...
My comment: Churchill spent much of his exile years painting in France. His view on Frenchmen is invaluable then and still today. Understanding that people of come from different experiences and therefore react differently cannot be over stated on any stage of
world affairs. I am most impressed with Churchill's chapter closing eulogy of understanding and forgiveness given towards Darlan. This becomes the most insightful chapter that I have read to date (now four) in all of the volumes Churchill wrote on WWII.
Page 718: Allied units were much intermingled, and the problem was complicated by General Giaurd's refusal to allow French troops to be placed under British command.
My comment: If I had a dollar for every time I read about lack of French cooperation, I could retire. The name Vichy alone is the epitome of France. I refer back to the note made on page 640 and put an exclamation mark after it.
Page 745: [Stalin to Churchill in response to a congratulations letter after Liberation of Rostov-on-the-Don]. 3. It is evident from your message also the establishment of the second front, in particular in France, is envisaged only in August-September. ... With
simultaneous ..,,pressure on Hitler and Mussolini 4. We have reliable information... It is just because the military operations in Tunis slackened that Hitler was able to throw in some additional troops against the Russians.
My comment: it is often said in hubris tone by ugly Americans won WWII. I watched the 1970 movie Patton last night to complement this book. While it is true that Hitler re-enforced Rommel's army in Tunis after their defeat in Allomein, the US troops entered the war and were defeated in their first legitimate test against the Germans. Patton put a boot into his army and then the army put a boot into Germany. It might better be said that Some Americans achieve great things and the rest follow.
Page 749: [Churchill's reply] ...12. With regard to the attack across the Channel, it is the earnest wish of the President and myself that our troops should be in general battle in Europe... However in case the enemy should weaken sufficiently we are preparing to strike earlier than August.
My comment: Churchill's previous eleven points articulate that the Allied forces were far from ready for a Normandy invasion. We were waiting for a Russian victory. History, world history, is clear that as massive as the Allied effort was, Russia had already defeated Germany and was on the march towards Berlin. Our efforts certainly hastened the overall defeat of Germany, but Russia was not only first to Berlin, but did more to get there first. This must be considered against the effort the Allies waged against Japan where USSR did not. In the end the total WWII effort must recognize Russia as an equal ally and not a Bolshevik enemy. It's 2012, twenty-two years post collapse of the USSR and about time our educators bring this to light to our young impressionable American students.
Page 786: [The antithesis thinking in Churchill’s mind going into his third Washington conference] Going into swampy jungles to fight Japanese is like going in to the water to fight a shark. It is better to entice him into a trap or catch him on a hook and then demolish him with axes after hauling him on to dry land. [The basis for operation
Assam]
Page 791: [opening speech at the 1943 Washington conference] Another great effect of the elimination of Italy would be felt in the Balkans, where patriots of various nationalities with difficulty held in check by large Axis forces, which included twenty-five or more Italian divisions. If these withdrew, the effect would be either Germany have to give up the Balkans or else she would have to withdraw large forces from the Russian front to fill the gap. In no other way could relief be given to the Russian front on so large a scale this year.
My comment: While Stalin was pushing for a second front and Eisenhower's Normandy is the popular offensive taught to too many American students, Italy proved to be most effective. Italy enabled USSR to march across the Balkans in to Germany. This strengthens my [and Churchill's] argument that attacking further north from Italy would have A) cost less lives and B) gotten us to Berlin way before the Russians. The conclusion would have precluded the East Germany fiasco that the world lived with for fifty years. Churchill’s Lubjana Gap vision was right and once again yet he allowed his advisors, his circle of decision makers, push an alternative plan. Could this have been to his lesson learned at Gallipoli, where had his Admiral sailed in to a defeated Turkish army Constantinople in the first day, WWI may have seen a completely different conclusion as well.
Page 817: The circumstances of our meeting were favorable to the British. We had three times as many troops, four times as many war ships, and almost as many airplanes available for actual operations as the Americans. We had since Alamein, not to speak of the earlier years, lost in the Mediterranean eight times as meany men and three times as much tonnage as our Allies. But what ensured for these potent facts....we had continued to accept General Eisenhower’s Supreme Command.
