Known and UnKnown

Known and Unknown
By Donald Rumsfeld

It seemed often enough to draw a general summary of Rumsfeld to be a man who stated his mind in so sufficient detail that he lay groundwork for disagreement. Throughout his political career, among those that friction existed you would find names such as GHW Bush, Kissinger, and Rockefeller. Even within the GW Bush Cabinet, Rumsfeld takes numerous critiques of Colin Powell. Though never a direct challenge, Rumsfeld provides enough narrative framed with ample detail to draw lines of critique or at least question marks around Powell. He does the same with Condoleezza Rice. So why with so much controversy would you read this book? To discover the history of a well thought executive. You could preface this book with the phrase “May it please the ‘people’ ” Though his beginnings were in elective office most of has career as a public servant was in administration at executive level.

Rumsfeld was a Young Turk Congressman turned career beltway executive. What is remarkable about this book is Rumsfeld's detail in description knits together with a ‘frictious yarn’ the relationships of many prime movers from 1960 his political career inception, to 2006 its close. The most notable was his relationship with Dick Cheney a man he first hired in government who later ‘hired’ him back to government. As an additional bonus Rumsfeld's detail lays a landscape in beltway activity that intersects many issues and biographies making this book a required cross-reference for all historians and biographers. There is a continuous thread in his government work with only a couple of side tracks.

He was most passionate in international commitments, making note that being weak was provocative. From Vietnam; through Carters failed Salt II prompting Russian expansionism and Iran's Hostages, to Reagan's who while strong elsewhere was not strong Lebanon, to the EIGHT weak responses to terrorism by Clinton, Rumsfeld felt an about face in American response to being pushed around was in order. While Kennedy and Johnson were devious though largely ineffective, Carter had proven to be totally unqualified, Clinton was marginally strong in the Balkans but weak in executing and response elsewhere, it was Bush ‘41’ and ‘43’ that put the world on notice. This qualified Rumsfeld as a Cabinet member in GW Bush’s presidency and it was Dick Cheney who made the case to the president elect and then sought him out.

Rumsfeld rubbed folks in power with difficult questions, which created adversaries and respect at the same time Asking the difficult question or going against the grain can be found in examples like Rumsfeld asking LBJ, as the Senate's youngest Congressman, if his actions against North Vietnam had any affect. Johnson admitted a reluctant no. In another example, while being assigned the Space Committee in Congress he asked why are we going to the moon when developing technology and capability in orbiting earth would be a better way of staying even with the Soviet space race. In 1963 Rumsfeld moved against his constituents for LBJ's Civil Rights Bill. This happened to be a move JFK wouldn't take. He noted that while Kennedy achieved legendary status he achieved little as a President. Kennedy’s mission to the moon spent much but accomplished little. Kennedy’s record noted by Rumsfeld; on the foreign front Khrushchev came away from the Vienna talks feeling Kennedy was young and inexperienced. Khrushchev demonstrated this feeling by building a wall in Berlin and engaged Kennedy with a missile crisis. On the domestic side Kennedy would not stand up to Southern Democrats on Civil Rights, giving the issue only lip service. As a note of caution, we find an exact parallel in President Obama.

This tendency to let his convictions from well formed thought, some of known facts some in anticipation of what wasn’t yet known, found friction that comes out even in GW Bush’s administration. Rumsfeld goes on record of not being fond of Condoleezza Rice. He suggests that consensus was formed as opposed to decisions being made. You would think that consensus was more democratic and therefore more effective. As a result decisions were not clear nor were the resulting actions. While it may have created an impression of disharmony to the outsider it only existed between Rumsfeld and Rice and possibly Rice and Powell with a little of Rumsfeld and Powell. Rumsfeld writes 'Our NSC discussions were nothing like what was described by the book chroniclers and so-called experts, none of whom had ever attended an NSC meeting. While he critiques Rice's style as NSC Chief he in a backhanded way admits that Bush's cabinet was more harmonious than the other presidential administrations he served on. This is a mark of a good leader in GW Bush.

Circling back to the 1960’s in drawing on the knitted patters of lessons learned that led to decisions made in government, Rumsfeld's 'Young Turks' chapter of the 1960's is quite intriguing to see that while alienating most from the left and a select group from the out dated right, it found a formulation of relationships of GOP leaders that would shape our country in the last half of the 20th century. On the list were Reagan, George Romney, and GHW Bush. Their first prize accomplishment however was Rumsfeld’s who reshaped parliamentary procedure allowing more transparency in legislature. This accomplishment was lost under his tenure as Secretary of Defense as he was too often accused of underhanded closed door decisions. Let us be reminded that an executive of Department of Defense works under very different circumstance that a US Congressman. Also let us not forget that too often the accusations came from a Press with an adversarial agenda and no real proof.

In decision making at a personal level, in those defining days the known and unknown theme comes out as he describes his position for appropriation of $700M for the Vietnam War in May of 65. He writes: "basing my decision, as I wrote at the time, "on for fundamental fact that we cannot know what is in the mind of the President and certainly we cannot function if we operate on the assumption that his motives were bad." I concluded, "Frankly I did not have the vaguest idea whether I voted properly.” Fact is he voted on fundamentals not detail. The fundamental that Rumsfeld worked from was that LBJ was well intended and honest. Fact is LBJ may have been well intended, but asking a simple detail question like what is the $700M for, may have flushed out the truth in the massive troop increase that Johnson deployed in 65. His unknown was one question away, though never asked.

Further on lessons learned leading to future decisions we find a long term memory, and with that appreciably a lesson never to forget. What is interesting is to speculate on is how Rumsfeld was real close to the political damage caused by body count reports in our newspapers during the Vietnam War. He knew it affected our strategy as well as that of Le Duc Tao's negotiating position with Kissinger during the Paris Peace Talks. Was it this experience that affected the troop count in the 2003 Iraq war? Or was it Tommy Frank's new technology strategy? Or both? Both strategists were deeply entangled in Vietnam with lessons learned. In the end, although it took a few more years for success in Iraq, it's my opinion that we gave the enemy less to send home in body bags. We took away that political opportunity that defeated us in Vietnam. We saved lives of American troops. I am satisfied with Rumsfeld’s unpopular decision. This was a decision from a known perspective.


Bringing details to a higher level the book brings out Rumsfeld’s pre-emptive posture in defending America. As early as 1984 as a prime mover himself, in this role of Middle East envoy for Reagan, Rumsfeld found his beginnings to the 2001 anti-terror policy of GW Bush. In an era where America where still at the affect of Vietnam, the bombing of the Marine barrack in Lebanon left an impression. He writes "It should be clear: the way to successfully deal with terrorists is to not only try to defend against them, but also take the battle to them. Beirut demonstrated to me the profound truth that weakness is provocative. Our withdrawal from Lebanon contributed again to an impression among our friends and enemies of a vulnerable and irresolute America." In a speech in 1984 Rumsfeld registers his position on terrorism saying: “Increasingly, terrorism is not random nor the work of isolated madmen. Rather, it is state-sponsored, by nations using it as a central element of their foreign policy...A single attack by a small weak nation, by influencing public opinion and morale, can alter the behavior of great nations or force tribute for wealthy nations. Unchecked, state-sponsored terrorism is adversely changing the balance of power in our world.”

The GW Bush Administration and Rumsfeld’s role as Secretary of Defense during the Iraq war would be the prime reason one would read this book. Rumsfeld, like many other auto biographers, hopes that the preceding half of the book helps shapes the reader's mind with the same paradigm Rumsfeld held while serving at a post fraught with many controversial issues. The theme known and unknown by this time has not just an appreciation by the reader, but it also has a personality. What follows here is a summary of a may it “please the people” defense summary dissertation

Rumesfeld writes "While it may look like trivia, the Bush administration gained 90 coalition partners in the War on Terror." This flies in the face of the liberal pundits and their democrat protagonists that I have come to despise. What I find remarkable is that like Bush, Rumsfeld takes the heat and calls it a communication short fall on their part. They din not blame it on Clinton. What was not effectively communicated was the purpose of the alliance. The fact is Rumsfeld followed the advice of a close ally in Benjamin Netanyahu who cautioned against building a permanent alliance that would restrict flexibility in the future. Rumsfeld advised that the mission should define the alliance not the other way around. Calling it a war on terror implied a message that we were defending our country; not exacting revenge. Calling it a war enabled a coalition to form with multifaceted missions. The facets were not made know to the world. Both Bush and Rumsfeld take the heat, for which when looking at roles and responsibilities of a Cabinet, one would normally look to the Secretary of State who in this case is Colin Powell and in succession Condoleezza Rice.


There is much criticism of our handling of Afghanistan in terms of not finishing the job before starting a war with Iraq. This criticism comes from not clearly defining the job in a region where no one country trusted the other, beginning with the factions within Afghanistan. Here is an interesting fact: the Clinton administration through CIA officials advised Massoud, Afghanistan's Northern Alliance leader, not to kill bin-Laden if the opportunity arose. "You guys are crazy," Massoud responded. "You haven't changed a bit." So why would the leaders of Afghanistan trust Bush? Bush made one thing clear; the government that sponsored terrorism was to be properly disposed of. And that was accomplished. More importantly was how we did it. Nearly all Muslim countries concurred that the Taliban had to go. They also advised that a US backed war spearheaded by Afghans would do wonders inside Afghanistan and in the larger Muslim world, in terms of American-Islam relations.

With regard to 'finishing' and the Tora Bora question; Rumsfeld's General Tommy Franks reasoned against an Afghan winter in a mountain pass that holds much military history in favor of the local Pashtun people who had no affinity with any country, 'The insertion of a large number of our own forces would have taken time, providing a window for the terrorists to escape. The marshaling of American troops could also have led to fierce engagements with local Pashtuns, causing casualties on both sides. Further, an intrusion into the Pashtun heartland with thousands of American conventional ground forces, who were unfamiliar with the language, the cultures, and the territory, might have reversed the hard work that had convinced a large number of the Pashtuns to cooperate with us.

With as much criticism for timeline wars and immediate gratification of victory, as though the war was a sporting event led by presidential candidate Obama, the patience in both Iraq and Afghanistan allowed for achievement of the goals at the lowest possible cost of American lives. In retrospect gaining field victory, allowing the rebels, the Pashtuns, to claim victory. This is exactly what appears to be Obama's agenda in Libya. Sadly he either doesn't know this yet as of 90 days post Libyan invasion, or he won't claim that he is once again following GW Bush war policy against a country that has actually assisted America in
it's war on terror. In Bush we had a President. In Obama we have the same as we did in Clinton a candidate, making all moves by the polls in pursuit of a second term.

Trivia fact: in 1998 the Hill in Washington DC passed a bill (Congress 360 to 38, Senate unanimous) for regime change in Iraq and Clinton signed it. Clinton failed to act however. He sited UN sanctions that were actually funneling millions in un-designated aid the Saddam Hussein. Rumsfeld requested a NSC principals meeting on Iraq in July of 2001 to set predetermined options on the table. All declined. It was Rumsfeld who had a war agenda alone, contrary to popular belief under strong encouragement of Democrat pundits. One has to look at what was known and unknown as the harsh facts that 9/11 put the United States on a war footing that was not of its choosing. Bush did not come in to office with a war agenda. He campaigned on a education theme. 9/11 forced Bush to re-examine everything.

In the WMD quagmire Rumsfeld and others at senior level would engage intelligence officials in briefings. This process brought a deeper investigation on intelligence causing some within the intelligence community to complain the process was politicized. In response to this Rumsfeld removed himself from direct participation of which brought complaint that absence of senior participation caused undesirable results and diminished the clarity of the objective. Who in the general public knows and appreciates this inner dialogue of decision making? Yet we the people, not at the benefit of Rumsfeld’s closing statements of 'his-story' if not to read this book would miss it. Amazingly on page 433 the now unclassified list of WMD evidence is published. At summary level it provides a list that all governments agreed to.

The list is not long. The last two bullets are the most provocative:
1. Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might decide that only an
organization such as al-Qaeda - with world wide reach and extensive
terrorist infrastructure, and already engaged in a life-or-death
struggle against the United States - could perpetrate the type if
terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct.

2. In such circumstances, he might decide that the extreme step if
assisting the Islamist terrorist in conducting CBM [chemical or
biological weapon] attack against the United States would be his last
chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with him.

It is essential to note that there was no coercion by Bush on intelligence supporting WMD. There was no challenge by Powell on WMD or troop quantity. Rumsfeld defined a process and engagement of key principals that helps one visualize a rise to a decision by the most qualified of person in Colin Powell. He did not push back on troop count, though he was given ample opportunity to do so in the pre-launch phase of the war. He made no objections. The situations to do so make it clear Powell was on board with troop count. Powell the most seasoned Cabinet member on intelligence was allowed his own ascent to a determination. He made his own decision that there was conclusive evidence for WMD. The narrative that he was duped sprung from the live interview in Riyadh. It took off and Powell never retreated from it. This was Powell's fall from my graces. He could have stepped up and simply said what Rumsfeld and Bush said...'I was wrong


Rumsfeld takes the heat for a misstatement he made saying he knew where the WMD were as opposed to saying "suspected". Again we find one statement made out of context exploited with a negative spin for political reason alone. There were no winners and this country will continue to lose its footing when we the people respond to coined phrases without reading the books. The popular phrase chanted "Bush lied, people died" was the simple phrase that too many people latched on to foolishly. It was as viral as “hell no we won't go". I despise vehemently those who participated in that chant and associated actions, including some in my family. It suggests a tendency of mob rule by the ignorant. Rather to learn and consider the wider context they prefer to be ignorant in the vain of partisan politics at the cost of national security. I say this on June 19,
2011 when our current president has taken us to war with Libya, a brutal regime but in line with US security and helpful to us in the war on terrorist. Obama, like Johnson waged war not simply without declaring it, but actively denying it. He hides behind NATO and says we have no boots on the ground while boots are in the air. And yet there is no cry of foul from the partisan morons.

In the end I found reading Rumsfeld’s book, a autobiography of a controversial person, as rewarding as reading all of Kissinger’s work. Both authors are strong in detail and rationale. For that reason alone the read is a great mental work out that recharges a discipline lost among too many people. In reading their testimonies, while one may still struggle with concurrence, he does become enlightened on the notion that the decisions were always complex and there was no evil agenda. Books like these should be required reading before a person goes to the ballot box.

Interesting Notes

It was a Democratic Congress that actually passed a bill that gave Nixon the power to impose wage and price control as a way to show the public they were doing something about inflation. They never dreamed Nixon would enact it. Carter also made the same imposition on Corporate America with the same dismal results. It was in Rumsfeld's opinion the worst thing Nixon did. Oddly enough he was persuaded by John Connelly an ex-Democrat known for being shot along side Kennedy, turned Republican, as Secretary of Treasury, who received all the powers enacted by the new and broad economic controls. They were akin to obamacare. The saving grace was the controls were temporary. Rumsfeld was eventually assigned the job to manage it mostly because he was against it and therefore would ensure that it was temporary.


It is popular opinion that the president's position is influential in abortion decisions. It is also popular opinion the Republicans are pro life and Democrats are pro choice. It was Republican Nixon who chose the Supreme Court Justice that wrote the majority position in Roe-v-Wade that favored abortion-choice.

It is quite clear in the book that Rumsfeld and GHW Bush did not have an affinity for one another. There are no occurrences of disagreement but a few occurrences of competitive rivalry when the political landscape of Washington D.C. Shrugged. Rumsfeld writes that GHW Bush was in the running to be selected by Ford as his Vice President. He suggests that Bush was lobbying for the job. Having just read All the Best, Bush's memoirs, I don't recall any position that Bush was appointed where he lobbied fir the job. Here is the irony; in both memoirs every appointment was met with modesty. Rumsfeld seems to hold the record for turning down but later accepting appointments. He is convincing with his detail in his case each time.

Rumsfeld writes that as Chief of Staff for Ford he made a long list of candidates for Director of CIA. GHW Bush was on his list but below the 'short list' candidates. He says Bush was eager to get back from then remote China and into the main stream. Having just read Bush's Auto biography I note a differing story where Bush was thoroughly enjoying China. The request to be CIA Director came as a surprise to Bush. Rumsfeld taken by the controversy called Ford for a clarification. Ford sided with Rumsfeld. In 1988 after a brief attempt at A presidential run Rumsfeld found Dole preferable to GHW Bush. As a result the close relationship Rumsfeld held with Cheney
over the years saw a period of frost while Cheney was Secretary of Defense under GHW Bush.

I find it simply classic that Clinton's rhetoric brow beating on GHW Bush over the phrase 'read my lips' but raised taxes anyway got him elected. Yet Clinton too raised the same taxes he beat Bush up on. It is classic Democrat strategy to beat up the opponent rather than take a stand. This same tactic was used by Obama who has in two short years confirmed more GW Bush legacy policy than any of his own campaign promises.

A quip of wit to Putin in 2001: 'money is a coward'- that is when potential investors see instability and uncertainty, they tend to invest their money elsewhere... When businessmen see that Russia's closest associates are Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Libya and the like and see corruption and periodic opposition to American policies, they
conclude Russia is an uncertain place and that their investments could be at risk.

Interesting trivia: LBJ had approval from Cambodia and Laos to bomb. Nixon never crossed what was he was approved to do.